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I 
Abstract 
Although the German framework of incentive-based energy regulation appears to be well-defined 
because it draws from international experience and eliminates several present drawbacks existing with 
revenue-cap regulation doubts of industry and politicians concerning the application of benchmarking 
techniques and more importantly, the future industry structure, remain. The regulation scheme is based 
on experience with energy sector reforms in the US due to it being a precursor in this regard, e.g. by 
introducing incentive-based regulation as early as 1994 and publishing the relevant data in a very 
detailed way.  
This thesis therefore brings together the two issues of certain efficiency measurement problems and 
the industry restructuring in Germany and the US in order to contribute to the current discussion of 
robust benchmarking and to provide political implications related to the industry’s structure. 
Therefore, the application of DEA and SFA constitutes the heart of the whole study. These techniques 
are applied on German electricity DSOs as well as on data for US electricity DSOs and US gas TSOs. 
The application to US data can then be used to derive information about business strategies and their 
success in a sector that is being restructured. The US experience will lead to relevant German policy 
implications with respect to the future structure of the energy industry in Germany.  
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1 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Over the last 20 years, energy sector reforms have been transforming the structure and operating 
environment of the energy industries in many countries all around the world. The major objective of 
these reforms has been the introduction of competition wherever possible and to encourage regulation 
where necessary. This kind of reform typically involves the vertical separation (ownership or 
functional) of potentially competitive segments from network segments. The former segments, such as 
electricity generation or retail businesses, are gradually deregulated whereas the network segments are 
assumed to have natural monopoly characteristics and thus, they are still subject to price, network 
access, service quality, and entry regulations (Joskow, 2006). 
A segment is characterized as a natural monopoly if its cost functions are subadditive over the total 
relevant output range, meaning that it is economically reasonable to have the output produced by only 
one company. In the case of network operators, the high investment costs for the grid generally lead to 
decreasing average costs in a single-output case;1 therefore it is efficient that this service should be 
supplied by one company – the natural monopoly. 
In the past, cost-based regulation approaches (rate-of-return regulation or cost-plus regulation) were 
widely used for price regulation purposes. One approach is the rate-of-return regulation, often used in 
US regulation, which assures the regulated company a certain pre-defined rate of return on its 
regulatory asset base. In principle, the regulated company can choose its price structure freely unless 
the total pre-defined rate of return is exceeded. Another approach, often applied in European 
regulation, is the cost-plus regulation, in which a pre-defined profit margin is added to the costs of the 
company. Obviously, in a cost-based regulation framework the regulated company has no incentive to 
operate at minimum costs because it can increase its profits by simply expanding the asset or cost 
base. The rate-of-return regulation is prone to the Averch-Johnson effect (Averch and Johnson, 1962), 
which states that the company chooses an input mix that is characterized by too much capital 
(overinvestment, “gold-plating”) and allocative inefficiency. In cost-plus regulation a company can 
have the incentive to signal wrong costs to the regulator or even to choose wasting resources in order 
to increase the cost base. This latter strategy is referred to as technical inefficiency. The problems with 
cost-based regulation approaches are based on imperfect information and especially information 
asymmetries between regulator and regulated companies. As long as a company’s revenues (or 
regulated prices) and costs are linked, the company has no incentive to minimize costs and achieve 
technical and allocative efficiency. Thus, the regulator cannot specify performance targets (efficient 
                                                     
1
 Although there are multiple dimensions to energy as a good, the transportation or distribution service for electricity and gas 
is commonly treated as a homogeneous good, especially in benchmarking analyses. The dimensions generally related to 
energy quality are often referred to as reliability of transport, safety, product quality (e.g. frequency (electricity), pressure 
(gas)), and quality of service. See E-Bridge, The Brattle Group, and ECgroup (2006) for a detailed discussion with respect to 
German regulation. 
2 
cost base) correctly and it cannot observe a manager’s effort to reduce costs (Borrmann and Finsinger, 
1999). 
This drawback has been taken up by many scholars, who have suggested introducing incentive-based 
regulation, which decouples revenues and costs in order to provide an incentive to reduce costs. 
Incentive-based regulation can be characterized by the use of rewards and penalties to induce the 
regulated company to achieve the desired goals (generally in form of an efficient cost base) whereby 
the company is allowed some discretion in how to achieve them. The use of financial rewards and 
penalties replaces a command and control form of regulation and provides incentives to the company 
to achieve the goals. No specific actions how to achieve the goals are pre-defined by the regulator. 
Hence, the company can use its internal information and can establish internal incentives appropriate 
for enhancing the company’s performance (Lewis and Garmonv, 1997).  
Two basic models of incentive-based regulation have been proposed by scholars.2 Littlechild (1983) 
introduced the price-cap or revenue-cap approach, often referred to as the RPI-X formula, with RPI 
describing the change of a price index, such as the retail price index (RPI), and the X-factor describing 
the improvement in a company’s performance. By using this simple formula in the respective cap 
regulation, the output prices or revenues are allowed to increase in accordance with the increase of the 
price index less the improvement. Shleifer (1985) developed the concept of yardstick competition, 
whereby a company’s allowed cost base is pre-defined on the basis of the cost base of similar 
companies and not on the company’s own costs. 
In practice, some price and revenue-cap regulation models based on the RPI-X formula have been 
adopted by many regulators.3 The goals that have to be achieved by the regulated companies and the 
corresponding inefficiency levels of a company are not directly observable by the regulator and it 
therefore needs some techniques of predicting these levels. 
Four main approaches have been proposed for the setting of the X-factors. First, the “building block” 
approach, which is often used in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, is based on 
forecasting developments of different cost blocks, e.g. capital base, demand, etc. The sum of the cost 
blocks sets the “revenue requirement”, which is set as a revenue cap. In this case, the X-factor is rather 
a smoothing factor than the performance improvement factor for the revenues over the regulatory 
period. In a second approach, analytical cost models are used, which constitutes an engineering-based 
approach modeling an “ideal” green-field network while accounting for technical restrictions and 
principles. The modeled network is then related to real factor prices in order to calculate an “efficient” 
cost base. This approach is increasingly used in addition to other approaches in order to find a lower 
bound for the cost base but it cannot be relied on for defining X-factors because the established 
networks are not directly comparable with “ideal” networks. The third, productivity-based approach is 
nowadays widely used in US energy regulation. This approach is used to calculate general and 
industry-specific productivity changes by changes of input and output prices and thus approximate 
                                                     
2
 See Joskow (2006) for an overview of a number of incentive-based regulation models. 
3
 See PEG (2006) for an overview of international application of incentive-based regulation in the energy sector. 
3 
growth by technical progress. The fourth, the pure benchmarking approach, evaluates a company’s 
production by comparing it with other companies by means of different mathematical and econometric 
models to estimate efficient costs and the relative efficiency of companies. These benchmarking 
techniques are capable of predicting efficient costs, which is why they may be used in regulatory 
schemes based on yardstick competition or in order to estimate the relative inefficiency of a company 
and thus to set the individual X-factor by providing a company with a realistic target to reduce 
inefficiency within a specific time period.  
Besides countries such as the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, and Austria, who have already 
adopted benchmarking approaches for setting the X-factor within the regulation of energy utilities, 
Germany is also going to use these techniques in its incentive-based regulation scheme to be 
introduced in 2009. 
The energy sector reforms in Germany are based on different directives passed by the European Union 
in order to assure a single European market by liberalizing the electricity and natural gas markets in its 
member states. For the electricity sector these were the Directive 96/92/EC from 1996 and the so-
called Acceleration Directive 2003/54/EC from 2003, whereas for the natural gas sector it was the 
Directives 98/30/EC from 1998 and 2003/55/EC from. The European guidelines were gradually 
implemented in German law by amendment of the national Energy Industry Act 
(Energiewirtschaftsgesetz), enacted in 1935 and amended in 1998 and 2005, respectively. The latter 
amendment also provided the legal basis for the establishment of the Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) in 
2005, the federal energy regulator, with the objectives of designing and applying an incentive-based 
regulation scheme for the energy sector. 
The incentive-based regulation framework published by BNetzA (2006) and enacted on 6 November 
2007 (ARegV) proposes the implementation of revenue caps for two regulatory periods of five years 
each in order to remove individual inefficiencies. Balanced efficiency levels are a necessary condition 
for the implementation of yardstick competition, which is currently planned to be introduced after the 
second regulatory period. The regulation will cover electricity and natural gas transmission system 
operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs) representing the network businesses of the 
energy value chain commonly referred to as natural monopolies.4 
The individual X-factor is suggested to be calculated by parametric (Stochastic Frontier Analysis, 
SFA) and non-parametric (Data Envelopment Analysis, DEA) techniques with the choice between the 
values of relative efficiencies calculated by both techniques being balanced in favor of the companies, 
i.e. the higher value will be chosen. As there is a limited number of gas TSOs in Germany, which does 
not satisfy the data requirements of most analytical benchmarking approaches, a cross-country 
analysis is suggested; the benchmarking of the DSO businesses can be performed on the basis of the 
data of German companies. The benchmarking should be based basically on total expenditures 
                                                     
4
 An exemption from the inefficiency benchmarking process is granted to small electricity and gas DSOs in order to reduce 
the bureaucratic burden. Electricity DSOs with fewer than 15,000 customers and gas DSOs with fewer than 30,000 customers 
are allowed to choose an inefficiency level of 87.5% instead of being subjected to a detailed benchmarking procedure 
(BNetzA, 2006). 
4 
(TOTEX) that are controllable by the company; the age of the capital stock will thus have to be 
standardized.5 
The annual revenue caps are proposed not only to account for inflation and industry-specific and 
individual efficiency improvements but also for quality (in the second period) and quantity changes 
over time; the latter is done by means of a regulatory account for short-term changes and an 
“expanding element” for long-term changes, respectively. For electricity and gas TSOs there will be 
an additional investment account covering capital costs of special expanding and restructuring 
investments in the network according to macroeconomic and/or environmental policy objectives, such 
as the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (Erneuerbare-Energien Gesetz) and the Combined Heat 
and Power Act (Kraft-Wärme-Kopplungsgesetz) (BNetzA, 2006). 
Although this framework appears to be well-defined due to it being based on international experience 
and controls for several present drawbacks with RPI-X regulation, doubts by industry and politicians 
concerning the application of benchmarking techniques and, more importantly, the future industry 
structure remain. The regulation scheme is also based on experience with energy sector reforms in the 
US, where incentive-based regulation was introduced as early as 1994 and where the related data are 
published in a very detailed way.6 
This thesis addresses both, the application of benchmarking techniques as well as the future industry 
structure, in order to contribute to the current discussion of robust benchmarking and to provide 
political implications related to the industry’s structure. Therefore, the application of DEA and SFA 
constitutes the heart of the whole study. These techniques are applied on German electricity DSOs as 
well as on data for US electricity DSOs and US gas TSOs. The application to US data can then be 
used to derive information about business strategies and their success in a sector that is being 
restructured. The US experience will lead to relevant German policy implications with respect to the 
future structure of the energy industry in Germany.  
Focusing in our first application on the German electricity industry we will answer the following 
question: Should Eastern and Western German utilities be benchmarked separately? This 
heterogeneity among the companies is an important issue because there might be structural differences 
due to the German reunification and the basic reconstruction of the East German electricity network. A 
significant difference in the mean efficiency in favor of the East German companies was found by 
Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler (2006). Our first analysis tests the robustness of this finding 
concerning the cross-sectional data of German electricity DSOs, the model specifications, and the 
DEA technique applied. 
                                                     
5
 In the proposed regulatory scheme, total costs are split into permanently non-controllable, temporarily non-controllable and 
controllable costs; only the latter component will be used for benchmarking purposes. This proposed split of TOTEX appears 
to be a kind of consensus concerning the discussion about applying benchmarking on a company’s TOTEX or only on a 
component of it, i.e. capital expenditures (CAPEX) or operating expenditures (OPEX). TOTEX benchmarking cannot 
account for different efficiency potentials among the cost components, while partial cost benchmarking can affect shifts in 
the cost mix. See Pollit (2005) for a discussion of that point referring to the regulation in the UK.  
6
 The US is often used as a good example of energy sector reforms, such as the introduction of nodal prices in electricity 
networks or the unbundling of energy companies. See for example Weigt (2006) or Hirschhausen, Neumann, and Weigt 
(2007). 
5 
Normally, companies will react to changes in their political environment in order to assure or 
maximize profits given the new constraints. In the case of a transformation of the regulatory 
surrounding, regulated companies can react by choosing different business strategies, such as mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As). However, the analyses of M&As in the electricity industry in any nation 
correspond strongly to industrial organization because the models encourage antitrust agencies to 
assess the anticompetitive effects of a decreasing number of companies.7 Farrell and Shapiro (1990) 
analyzed the welfare effects of horizontal mergers in a Cournot setting. They found that under some 
circumstances the anticompetitive effect can be compensated for somewhat by the cost savings from 
learning effects or from the savings generated by economies of scale. Thus, mergers enhance welfare 
if the efficiency gain at least cancels out the anticompetitive effect. Although this argument for 
merging is well established in theory, the empirical evidence to date is scarce. The underlying question 
of our second application is therefore: What are the potential merger gains among German 
electricity DSOs? The model applied to a cross-sectional dataset by means of non-parametric DEA 
can also be of use for antitrust analysis of potential merger gains.  
Concerning the empirical analyses on US data, our third analysis again deals with the comparability of 
the companies used for benchmarking purposes but from a different point of view. Scholars have 
proposed several parametric approaches that explicitly model heterogeneity among companies in a 
panel data framework. These models can be used in the future by BNetzA in the case that they have an 
appropriate dataset, i.e. data covering several years. The third question to be answered is hence: How 
sensitive are efficiency estimates in a panel data framework? The third analysis applies parametric 
models that treat heterogeneity differently on a panel dataset of US electricity DSOs. 
In order to analyze not only potential but also actually realized gains from different business strategies 
the bulk of existing literature can be found in the field of financial economics. The studies analyze the 
impact of M&A on stock prices by employing case-study methodology. In this regard, Antoniou, 
Arbour, and Zhao (2006, p. 20) found this approach inadequate to analyze the sources of M&A gains 
and hence stated that “given the escalating macroeconomic significance of merger transactions in 
recent years, advancing the M&A value creation debate has never been more critical. Thus, new 
methods/techniques are very much needed to advance our knowledge on this critical issue and we 
believe that fundamental-based approaches represent more prolific avenues for new and future 
research”. Those fundamental-based approaches can be found in efficiency and productivity 
measurements that are based on production economics. The common question to be answered in our 
fourth and fifth application is: Are there gains to be realized by certain business strategies? In the 
fourth analysis, SFA is applied to a panel dataset of US electricity DSOs in order to investigate the 
                                                     
7
 The “drivers” for mergers and acquisitions are diverse. See Greer (1992) and Ray et al. (1992) for a discussion of several 
causes. For example, Diamond and Edwards (1997) identified the following five: (1) economic efficiency in the form of cost 
savings by synergy effects; (2) defensive motives in form of an increasing market value to guard against acquisition; (3) 
diversification in the form of investment risk diversity and smoothing business-cycle volatility (for non-electric acquisitions); 
(4) growth and personal aggrandizement meaning that more expansion than required by exogenous demand increase the 
personal responsibilities of executive management or the CEO (see Wilson 1996); and (5) market power by increasing 
market share to reap larger monopoly/oligopoly profits.  
6 
efficiency changes caused by mergers. In our fifth study, we use the same model but apply it to US gas 
TSOs and extend our analysis to efficiency changes due to observed strategies, i.e. acquisitions, joint 
ventures, and the formation of parent holding companies.  
1.2 Outline 
In Chapter 2, the analytical foundation of the benchmarking approaches concerning the production 
technology and the efficiency concepts are introduced. Beside the set theoretical representation, the 
assumptions and properties of the single-output and multiple-output production frontiers and the cost 
frontiers to be estimated in efficiency analysis are shown. The corresponding parametric and non-
parametric methods to estimate these frontiers and the relative efficiency as well as the models to 
evaluate the effects of restructuring are discussed in Chapter 3. The empirical analyses of efficiency 
and potential gains from restructuring of German electricity DSOs by means of non-parametric DEA 
applied on cross-sectional data is given in Chapter 4. The dataset for the first and second application 
on structural differences among German utilities shown in Chapter 4.4 consists of data of 323 utilities 
from 2004. Chapter 5 provides our empirical analyses of our three applications dealing with efficiency 
and restructuring in the US energy industry. These studies mainly apply parametric SFA to balanced 
panel datasets provided by the federal energy regulator FERC. The third study uses data of 108 
privately owned US electricity DSOs for the period of twelve years (1994-2005) and the fourth study 
uses data of 108 companies covering eight years (1994-2001). The third application given in Chapter 
5.6 focuses on the sensitivity of efficiency estimates using different techniques, whereby the fourth 
analysis provides evidence for efficiency changes caused by actual mergers in Chapter 5.7. The 
analysis of the success of different business strategies of the operators of US natural gas interstate 
pipelines is given in Chapter 5.8. This analysis is based on data from 47 companies covering ten years 
(1996-2005). A summary and conclusions are provided in Chapter 6. 
7 
2 Analytical Foundations of Production Economics 
2.1 Introduction 
This section mainly relies on Kumhakar and Lovell (2000), Coelli et al. (2005), and Greene (2006), 
and provides an introduction to the analytical foundations of the benchmarking approaches concerning 
production technology and efficiency concepts. In section 2.2, we describe the production process in 
terms of a set-theoretic representation that is subsequently used to introduce the different benchmarks 
relevant for our empirical analyses and their assumptions and properties, the benchmarks being 
production frontiers, input distance functions, and cost frontiers. Section 2.3 shows the efficiency 
concepts of technical efficiency, allocative efficiency, and cost efficiency, which are measured in 
relation to the specific benchmark. Cost inefficiency can generally arise from the inefficient use of 
production technology (technical inefficiency) and/or the inefficient input mix (allocative 
inefficiency). In section 2.4, we introduce briefly the concept of economies of scale that, once we have 
parametrically estimated a cost frontier, can be used to analyze if a company is operating on the 
optimal scale. 
2.2 Production Technology 
Extensive literature on measuring efficiency has evolved since 1951, when the pioneering work of 
Koopmans (1951) and Debreu (1951) was published. The first empirical application was provided by 
Farrell (1957), who proposed that a company’s total economic efficiency can be decomposed into 
technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical efficiency reflects a company’s ability to 
obtain a maximum output with a given set of inputs (output-oriented approach) or to produce a given 
output with minimum inputs (input-oriented approach), whereas allocative efficiency reflects the 
ability to use the inputs in optimal proportions at given input prices. In network industries, which face 
public objectives concerning the services supplied, the output can be assumed to be fixed, and thus, 
the input orientation approach is dominantly used by scholars. Therefore, we will focus mainly on this 
approach in describing the analytical foundations and the benchmarking approaches. 
2.2.1 Set-Theoretic Representation 
Generally, production is defined as a process that transfers a set of input vectors, denoted +ℜ∈ Kx , into 
a set of output vectors +ℜ∈ My . Formally, the state of knowledge within the production process is 
given by an input requirement set L(y) as specified in Definition 2.1 following  
Coelli et al (2005, p. 42). 
 
Definition 2.1: Let x be an input set and y be an output set as defined as above. Then, an input 
requirement set L(y) describes the sets of input vectors that are feasible for producing all 
output vectors, or formally: ( ){ }.producible is ,:)( yxxy =L   
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Any part of the input set is sufficient to produce the output vector y, however, not necessarily 
producing it efficiently. The corresponding isoquant describes the boundary of the input requirement 
set and is defined here as a contraction of inputs. In production literature, there also exists a more 
general approach of an input efficient subset Eff L(y), which is a subset of the input isoquants. 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 23), both boundaries are given in Definition 2.2 and 
Definition 2.3.  
 
Definition 2.2: Given the definition above of the set of input vectors x and the set of output 
vectors y, the input isoquants { }10 if )( and )(:)( Isoq <≤∉∈= ρρ yxyxxy LLL  are able to 
produce each output vector y but they are not able to produce the output vector if the input 
vector is radially contracted. 
 
Definition 2.3: Given the definition above of the set of input vectors x and the set of output 
vectors y, the input efficient subset { )( and )(:)( Eff yxyxxy LLL ∉′∈=  
}jk jkkk  somefor    when for xxxxx ≤′∀≤′′  is able to produce each output vector y but is not 
able to produce the output vector when the input vector is contracted in any dimension. 
 
Figure 2.1: Input Requirements 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Greene (2007, p. 13). 
 
The difference between these similar definitions can be seen in Figure 2.1, where ),( 21 AAA xx=x  is on 
the isoquant but not in the efficient subset, since there is a slack in Ax2 . If the input requirement set is 
xA 
xC
xB 
Isoq L(y) 
x1
 
x2
 
Eff L(y) 
L(y) 
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strictly convex, the distinction disappears as it is for xB, which is located on the isoquant as well as in 
the efficient subset.8 
2.2.2 Production Frontiers 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, pp. 26-27), the functional characterization of the boundary of 
the input-output combinations within the production process is usually done by a production frontier 
f(x) in a single-output case and is described in Definition 2.4.9 
 
Definition 2.4: Given the definition above of the set of input vectors x and the set of output 
vectors y, the production frontier is a function { }.)(:Max  )( yxyx Lf ∈=  
 
The corresponding major properties of a production frontier, albeit neither exhaustive nor universally 
maintained, are given by: 
 
1.  )f(x is non-decreasing in x; 
2.  )f(x is weak essentially; formally ; 0(0) =f  
3.  )f(x is concave in x; and 
4.  )f(x is non-negative. 
 
The production frontier describes the upper boundary of the production possibilities of output y, and 
the input-output combinations of each producer have to be on or beneath the frontier. The input-output 
combination and its distance to the “optimal” production frontier is the core of measuring technical 
efficiency.  
2.2.3 Input Distance Functions 
If multiple inputs are used to produce multiple outputs, input distance functions as developed by 
Shephard (1957) provide a functional characterization of the production technology by looking at the 
minimal proportional contraction of the input sets, with the output sets being given.10 Thus, the 
advantages are twofold: First, input distance functions provide a functional characterization of the 
production technology without the need to specify an underlying behavioral objective and second, they 
are directly related to the measure of technical efficiency introduced in section 2.3. As shown in 
                                                     
8
 The distinction between both approaches is less important for econometric analysis but rather relevant for Data 
Envelopment Analysis, which will be discussed in section 3.3.1. In the case of a technology satisfying only the weak 
monotonicity condition (for instance, a Translog technology), the isoquant is often chosen for estimation purposes because 
the efficient subset has some econometric disadvantages. See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, section 2.3.1) and Greene (2007) 
for further discussion. 
9
 As Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) stated, a single-output case can be analyzed not only if there is only one output but also if 
the multiple outputs can be aggregated, for instance by their monetary weights. The multi-output case will be discussed when 
the input distance function is introduced in this section 2.2.3. 
10
 Equivalently, output sets are described by output distance functions. See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, section 2.2.3) and 
Coelli et al. (2005, section 3.3.1) for further discussion. 
10 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, pp. 28-30), the input distance function is formalized in Definition 2.5 
and illustrated in Figure 2.2. 
 
Definition 2.5: An input distance function is a function .)(1:Max  ),(






∈




= yxxy LDI ρρ  
 
Figure 2.2: An Input Distance Function with Two Inputs 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 47). 
 
An input distance function gives the maximum amount by which the input set can be proportionally 
contracted in order to move them in line with the isoquant, i.e. to remain feasible for the production of 
the output set. As shown in Figure 2.2, the scalar input x is feasible for the scalar output y, but y can 
also be produced with the smaller input x/ρ. The non-negative distance given by DI(y,x) = ρ ≥ 1 and 
correspondingly, the isoquant consists of those inputs that are characterized by no distance or 
DI(y,x) = 1.  
The corresponding properties of the input distance function in relation to the properties of the inputs 
sets L(y) are: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x
x/ρ
Isoq L(y) 
x1
 
x2
 
L(y) 
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1.  ),(DI xy is non-decreasing in x and non-increasing in y; 
2.  ),(DI xy is linearly homogeneous in x; 
3.  ),(DI xy is concave in x and quasi-concave in y; 
4.  ),(DI xy ≥ 1 for x belonging to the input requirement set L(y) and  
     ),(DI xy = 1 for x belonging to the isoquant Isoq L(y); and 
5. 00 and 0 =+∞= ),(D),(D II yx . 
2.2.4 Cost Frontiers 
The production-function framework (single-output case) and the distance-function framework 
(multiple-output case) discussed so far are based on information about quantities and outputs. They 
describe the structure of production technology without specifying behavioral objectives of how the 
inputs and outputs should be allocated according to their prices. Both frameworks can be used to 
assess the level of technical efficiency that will be discussed in section 2.3. In order to measure the 
other component of economic efficiency, the allocative efficiency, prices and a behavioral objective 
have to be implemented.  
There are generally three types of frontiers associated with the measurement of economic efficiency 
which differ in the price information needed for the analysis and in their behavioral assumptions. First, 
cost frontiers assume cost-minimizing behavior using input prices at a given output. Second, revenue 
frontiers require output prices at a given input by following a revenue maximization objective. Both 
frameworks treat either the outputs or the inputs as exogenously given, independently from the 
underlying input-oriented or output-oriented approach of measuring technical efficiency. Thus, cost 
frontiers can be used to assess only the input allocative efficiency whereas revenue frontiers enable us 
to calculate the output allocative efficiency. The third framework is a more general one. A profit 
frontier can be utilized by means of prices of inputs and outputs allowing inputs and outputs to be 
endogenous by assuming profit maximization (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p. 51).  
As discussed above, in our empirical analyses we focus on electric and gas utilities, which basically 
have to provide pre-defined services. Hence, with the output exogenously given, we focus on input 
allocative efficiency by assessing cost frontiers. In the following, we describe the cost frontiers as 
given in Definition 2.6 based on Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, pp. 51-54).11  
 
Definition 2.6: Let x be an input set as defined above and let w be a strictly positive vector of 
input prices denoted ++ℜ∈ Kw . A cost frontier will then be a function 
{ } { }.1),(: )(:)( ≥=∈= xyxwyxxwwy T
x
T
x
IDMinLMin,c  
 
                                                     
11
 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3) for a detailed discussion of revenue and profit frontiers, and 
Coelli et al. (2005, section 3.4) for a further discussion of revenue frontiers. 
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The corresponding properties of the cost frontier evolve from the properties of the input sets L(y) and 
the input distance function ),( xy,DI  respectively: 
 
1.  ),c( wy is non-decreasing in y and w; 
2.  ),c( wy is linearly homogeneous in w; 
3.  ),c( wy is concave and continuous in w; and 
4.  ),c( wy is non-negative. 
 
A link between the production and the cost functions is derived by Shephard’s (1953) lemma, which 
stated that if a cost function is twice-differentiable, the conditional input demand of input n can be 
derived by the derivation of the cost function with respect to the corresponding input price wn. 
.
)(),(
n
n
w
,c
x ∂
∂
=
wy
wy                (1) 
Following duality theory, this approach is called dual approach, whereas the primal approach relates to 
the constrained minimization of the cost function. This implies that each cost function has one 
corresponding production function that can be revealed by cost minimization. The empirical 
implication of Shephard’s lemma is that it allows inferring certain features of the structure of the 
underlying production technology by means of  ),x( wy  with or without the linkage to  ),c( wy
    
(Coelli et al. 2005, p. 25). 
2.3 Technical and Cost Efficiency 
In the last section we introduced three types of frontiers. The distances between these frontiers 
represent measures of either technical efficiency (production frontier and input distance function) or 
cost efficiency (cost frontier) and the measurement of these distances, which are introduced in this 
section. As already mentioned, these measures are based on Koopmans (1951) and the two papers of 
Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957). The latter ones are often called Debreu-Farrell measures of 
technical efficiency which in this case refer to an input-orientated approach. Thus, technical efficiency 
is defined as an input set within the input-efficient subset (following Koopmanns’ definition) or the 
input isoquants (following Debreu-Farrell’s definition), respectively. Definition 2.7 shows a formal 
description of Koopmanns’ understanding of technical efficiency, whereas the Debreu-Farrell’s 
measure of technical efficiency is given in Definition 2.8 (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000, p. 43). 
 
Definition 2.7: Given the definition above of the set of input vectors x, an input vector is 
called technically efficient if, and only if  for  )( xxyx ≤′∉′ L  or, equivalently, )( Eff yx L∈ . 
 
Definition 2.8: Given the definition above of the set of input vectors x, an input-oriented 
measure of technical efficiency is a function { }.)(:Min  ),( yxxy LTE I ∈= θθ  
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In the following, we refer to the measure proposed by Debreu-Farrell in line with the vast majority of 
scholars due to its advantages in econometric estimation. Technical efficiency is thus measured as an 
equi-proportionate contraction of all inputs, even if not all inputs can be contracted feasibly. Following 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 44), the corresponding properties of this measure are: 
 
1. ),( xyITE  is bounded between zero and unity, or formally 1),(0 ≤< xyITE  and  
    ),( xyITE = 1 for x belonging to the isoquant Isoq L(y); 
2. ),( xyITE is non-increasing in x; 
3. ),( xyITE is homogeneous of degree -1 in x; and 
4. ),( xyITE is invariant with respect to the units x and y are measured in.  
 
We can now measure input-oriented technical efficiency in a production frontier or input-distance 
function framework. The single-output and the multi-output versions of this measure are given in 
Definition 2.9, which is based on Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 49). 
 
Definition 2.9: In the single-output case, the input-oriented measure of technical efficiency is 
given by the function { })(:Min  ),( xyxy θθ fTE I ≤= . The corresponding measure on a multi-
output case is represented by { }.1),(:Min  ),( ≥= xyxy θθ II DTE   
 
The definition is quite similar to the definition of an input-distance function because there is an inverse 
relationship between ),( xyITE  and ),( xyID . For instance, the ),( xyITE  is 1/ρ in Figure 2.2.  
Having introduced the measures of technical efficiency, we can enlarge our analysis within a cost-
frontier framework using input price information. Basically, the achievement of input-oriented 
technical efficiency is not sufficient for cost efficiency because input allocative efficiency as 
mentioned above has not yet been analyzed. Cost efficiency can be described as the ratio of minimum 
costs to actual costs and can be decomposed into technical and allocative efficiency as shown 
subsequently. Formally, the measure of cost efficiency is described in Definition 2.10 and illustrated 
in Figure 2.3 as shown in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, pp. 51-53). 
 
Definition 2.10: Given the definitions of the input set x, the output sets y and the vector of 
input prices w, a measure of cost efficiency is a function ./)()( xwwywx,y, T,cCE =  
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The measure has properties very similar to the measure of technical efficiency: 
 
1. )( wy,CE is bounded between zero and unity, or formally 1)(0 ≤< wy,CE  and  
    )( wy,CE = 1 for x= x(y,w) with )( wyxw T ,c= ; 
2. )( wy,CE is non-decreasing in y; 
3. )( wy,CE is homogeneous of degree -1 in x;  
4. )( wy,CE is homogenous of degree 0 in w. 
 
Figure 2.3: The Measurement and Decomposition of Cost Efficiency 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 52). 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2.3, cost inefficiency is not necessarily related to technical inefficiency. 
Following Definition 2.1, technical efficiency is θ and thus, cost efficiency is given by the ratio of 
expenditures at xE (being equal to expenditures at xB) to the expenditures at xA, whereas input-oriented 
technical efficiency is given by the expenditure ratio at θxA to xA. The remaining part of cost 
inefficiency can be explained by misallocation within the input mix at given input prices (input 
allocative inefficiency) and can be calculated by the expenditure ratio at xB to θxA. xE is a cost-
efficient company, meaning that there is neither technical nor allocative inefficiency. The technical 
description of input allocative efficiency relies on Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 53) and is given in 
Definition 2.11. 
 
Definition 2.11: Given the definitions of the input set x, the output sets y and the vector of 
input prices w, input allocative efficiency is a function )(/)()( xy,wx,y,wx,y, II TECEAE = . 
xA
θxA 
Isoq L(y) 
x1
 
x2
 
L(y) 
θw’xA 
w’xA 
xE
w’xE 
xB
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In other words, cost efficiency is a product of technical and input allocative efficiency, indicating that 
a necessary condition for cost efficiency is technical as well as input allocative efficiency.  
2.4 Economies of Scale 
The concept of elasticity of scale in a cost-frontier framework enables us to assess whether or not a 
company is operating at an optimal size.12 Basically, the concept allows us to measure the percentage 
change in costs related to a proportional increase in outputs by one percent. Thus, we can calculate the 
elasticity of scale (ES) as the inverse sum of the cost elasticities of output m (Berechmann, 1993, p. 
118):  
                   (2) 
In the case that ES > 1, it is generally referred to economies of scale because an increase in outputs 
lead to a disproportionally small increase in costs, which indicates that a company can decrease 
average costs by expanding its output. Respectively, there are diseconomies of scale if ES < 1. This 
implies that the company is operating at an unfavorably high output level because it can decrease 
average costs by decreasing its output level.  
                                                     
12
 The concept of economies of scale is related to the concepts of cost flexibility (see Chambers, 1988) and economies of 
density (see Caves et al., 1984). 
∑ ∂
∂
=
m
m
Y
cES
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)(ln1 wy,
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3 Benchmarking Approaches 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we have introduced theoretical definitions of production frontiers, distance functions, 
and cost frontiers as well as the respective concepts of technical, allocative and cost efficiency. This 
section will give a brief overview of the approaches generally used for benchmarking companies. 
Subsequently, a more detailed description of those approaches relevant for our empirical investigation 
of efficiency and restructuring in regulated energy networks in Germany and the US is given. The 
non-parametric frontier approaches applied to German data in section 4, namely Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA), an approach for evaluating potential gains from mergers, and outlier detection 
procedures are given in section 3.3. The class of parametric frontier approaches including the model 
used for analyzing the success of business strategies applied on US data in section 5 is introduced in 
section 3.4. 
3.2 Overview 
Within the modern approach of incentive-based regulation of network industries,13 a company’s 
performance is assessed either relative to a simulated optimal network (analytical cost models) or 
relative to the performance of other companies (peer group). This section will deal only with 
benchmarking methods using a peer-group approach, pictured in Figure 3.1. This decision is based on 
the fact that the peer-group approach is strongly related to economic analyses whereas analytical cost 
models focus more on the technical development of a simulated network by means of engineering 
principles.14  
                                                     
13
 See Joskow (2005) for a detailed survey of incentive-based regulation in network industries. 
14
 Analytical cost models generally construct an optimal network using real cost data to assess the minimal costs of operating 
such a network. The relative performance of a company can be measured by the ratio of observed costs to the minimal costs. 
There exist two types of analytical cost models: A model network is characterized by a great abstraction of network services, 
whereas a reference network describes the services in a very detailed way and is used for calculating the minimal costs. 
Consentec (2006) give a good overview of analytical cost models including a discussion of their application to the German 
energy networks in incentive-based regulation. 
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Figure 3.1: Overview of Benchmarking Approaches 
Source: Own illustration based on Auer (2002). 
 
Generally, the peer-group benchmarking methods can be categorized into partial and multi-
dimensional approaches. The partial approach is basically one-dimensional in the form of a ratio of 
two variables, such as revenue per employee or unit-costs per output. Those performance indicators 
are often used to classify and characterize companies but they are not appropriate to compare their 
respective complex production processes with each other.15 In contrast, multi-dimensional approaches 
deal with multi-input, multi-output production processes in different ways: by measuring Total Factor 
Productivity, by using average approaches, and by using frontier approaches.  
First, Total Factor Productivity (TFP) can be measured by applying the definition of productivity as 
output over input; in the case of a multi-input, multi-output company, the ratio of an index of all 
outputs to an index of all inputs is used instead. Thus, it is possible to cover the total production 
process; the relative performance of a company can then be calculated by comparing the TFP values of 
companies. It is possible to assess the static TFP of a company for one point in time but also to assess 
the dynamic development of TFP (the TFP trend) over time by means of TFP changes within one time 
period.  
In the dynamic context, there are several TFP indices depending on the weighting of the indices used, 
such as the Paasche index, Laspeyres index, Fisher index, and Tornqvist index. All these indices 
generally calculate the change of input and output indices by means of weighting actual quantities 
with actual and historic prices (price index numbers) or weighting actual prices with actual and 
historic quantities (quantity index numbers). Beyond these indices, there exists the well-known 
Malmquist index by which it is possible to decompose the change of TFP into technical change, shifts 
in a company’s scale, and changes in technical efficiency, but this index requires more complex 
                                                     
15
 A ranking of companies is often performed by using a simple average of ranks by several performance indicators. This 
represents equal weights of such measures but that does not necessarily represent the relative importance of an indicator 
correctly. It is obvious that partial approaches are hardly applicable for a multi-output, multi-input production process. 
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techniques of efficiency measurements, such as DEA and SFA, which are introduced in the following 
subsections.16 
Second, average approaches are usually used to measure the average relationship between inputs and 
outputs (production function framework) or between costs and outputs and input prices (cost-function 
framework), respectively. The estimated function then constitutes the benchmark for a comparison 
with individual companies. All average approaches are parametric due to the necessity of pre-
determining a functional relationship between independent and dependent variables. However, there 
exist different econometric estimation techniques that differ in their concepts and specific 
assumptions, like Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Maximum Likelihood (ML), or Generalized 
Methods of Moments (GMM); all techniques are usually stochastic because they add a stochastic term 
to the functional relationship.17 
Third, frontier approaches differ from average approaches in assessing a production or cost frontier, 
not an average function. This reference frontier serves as a benchmark to calculate efficiency by 
means of the distance of a company to the frontier, as mentioned in section 2.3. Two basic streams of 
measurement concepts have been put forward: the non-parametric and the parametric approaches that 
will be discussed in the following subsections. 
3.3 Non-Parametric Frontier Approaches 
This chapter gives an overview of non-parametric frontier approaches to assess a production or cost 
frontier in order to calculate a company’s efficiency relative to the frontier by means of distance 
functions.18 The basic method is the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) but further extensions have 
emerged that relax some of the basic assumptions. Given the sets of observed production units, the 
common idea is using linear programming methods based on envelopment techniques to construct a 
piecewise surface or frontier over the data and then measuring the efficiency for a given unit relative 
to the boundary of the hull of the input output vectors. We then introduce an extension of the DEA that 
is proposed for analyzing the potential gains from mergers within an industry. This approach is used in 
our analysis of efficiency and restructuring in the German electricity distribution business in section 4.  
3.3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis 
Originally, the term DEA was proposed by Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978). They extended the 
multiple-input, single-output measure of TE of Farrell (1957) to a multiple-input, multiple-output 
technology. The non-parametric DEA approach allows measuring the relative performance of different 
decision-making units (DMUs) or companies without the necessity of specifying a functional 
relationship. It relies on a production frontier which is defined as the geometrical locus of optimal 
production plans (Simar and Wilson, 1998). The individual efficiencies of the companies relative to 
this production frontier are calculated by means of distance functions. Thus, the basic DEA is defined 
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 See Coelli et al. (2005), Chapters 4 and 11, for an overview of using frontier methods to calculate the Malmquist index and 
further discussion of index numbers and productivity measurements. 
17
 See Greene (2003) and Baltagi (1995) for a detailed discussion of different econometric estimation techniques.  
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in a deterministic way, i.e. the hull enveloping the data points as well as the distance of each point to 
the hull does not consider stochasticity, such as measurement errors.  
One of the few a priori assumptions of the non-parametric models includes the returns to scale for the 
technology. In the simplest case of constant return to scale (CRS) technology and input-orientation, 
the determination of the efficiency score of the i-th company in a sample of N companies is equivalent 
to the following optimization (Coelli et el., 2005): 
 
0
0
0
.
,min
,
≥
≥−
≥+−
λ
λθ
λ
θ λθ
Xx
Yy
ts
i
i                (3) 
 
with λ being a N*1 vector of constants, and YX ,  representing input and output matrices, respectively. 
θ  is the measure for the radial distance between the observation yx, and the point on the frontier 
characterized by the level of inputs that is considered efficient. This reference point on the frontier is 
constructed by weighting the results of efficient companies by λ, so that the reference point is efficient 
and a linear combination of efficient companies. Thus, θ  is the efficiency score of the i-th company 
and a value of 1=θ  indicates that a company is fully efficient and thus is located on the convex hull, 
the efficiency frontier.  
Beside CRS, other specifications have been brought forward, such as variable returns to scale (VRS), 
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS), non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS), and free disposability 
hull (FDH). Within DEA analysis, the performance under the CRS approach includes technical 
inefficiency as well as scale inefficiency, as one optimal company size is assumed. In contrast, the 
VRS technology basically assumes increasing, constant, and decreasing returns to scale. Hence, the 
performance only reflects the pure technical efficiency of the decision-making units as one compares 
only companies with similar sizes by adding an additional convexity constraint ∑λk=1 to the 
optimization problem. NIRS and NDRS can be implemented by means of a combination of CRS and 
VRS; NDRS (NIRS) add the assumption to CRS that we cannot (can) reduce the scale of a DMU but it 
is (not) possible to expand the scale to infinity. FDH relaxes the assumption that the reference point is 
a linear combination of efficient companies and therefore finds one specific efficient company that 
defines the corresponding efficient input vector. Table 3.1 presents a list of the most-used assumptions 
along with their technical inclusion in the DEA problem specified above. With respect to the 
evaluation of the different approaches, CRS tends to have lowest efficiency scores on average, 
whereas FDH tends to have the highest. The three remaining approaches yield results in-between, 
whereas VRS tends to have higher scores on average because NIRS and NDRS partly refer to the CRS 
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 In the following, we will refer to the production frontier to display the basic concept for simplicity. 
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frontier. NDRS is favorable for small companies, whereas NIRS favors relatively large companies in 
terms of efficiency. 
 
Table 3.1: Returns to Scale Specifications in Data Envelopment Analysis 
Returns to scale  Constraints Reference 
constant  CRS { }0≥kλ  Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978) 
variable  VRS 






≥=∑ 0,1 kk λλ  
Banker, Charnes, and 
Cooper (1984) 
non-increasing  NIRS 






≥≤∑ 0,1 kk λλ  
Banker, Charnes, and 
Cooper (1984) 
non-decreasing  NDRS 






≥≥∑ 0,1 kk λλ  
e.g., Bogetoft (1996) 
free disposability  FDH { }






==∑ 1,0,1 kk λλ  
Deprins, Simar, and 
Tulkens (1984) 
Source: Own illustration based on Daraio and Simar (2007, pp. 31-35). 
 
The distance between the CRS frontier and the frontiers based on other return-to-scale technology can 
be interpreted as scale efficiency. Figure 3.2 displays the form of the enveloping hull with different 
assumptions of returns to scale for the technology as well as the scale efficiency measurement under 
an input-orientation. Let D be the observed input-output mix of a company, then the ratio AC/AD 
displays the technical efficiency under VRS (TEVRS), where the ratio AB/AD is the technical 
efficiency score under the CRS (TECRS) technology. The distance BC shows the scale efficiency, 
which can be calculated by the ratio of TECRS/TEVRS or (AB/AD)/(AC/AD)=AB/AC. 
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Figure 3.2: Scale Efficiency Measurement in DEA 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Coelli et al. (2005, p. 174). 
3.3.2 Investigating Potential Gains from Mergers 
Based on our considerations above, now we assume utilities that are geographically close to merge. 
After merging, the merged company is denoted DMUJ, with J determining the number of merged 
units. By direct pooling of the inputs and outputs we obtain COMPANYJ, which has used ∑ ∈Jj
jx  to 
produce ∑ ∈Jj
jy . Based on the model of Bogetoft and Wang (2007), a radial input-based measure of 
the potential overall gains from merging the J-companies under an input orientation with CRS 
technology is therefore: 
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              (4) 
θ J is the maximal proportional reduction of the aggregated inputs ∑ ∈Jj
jx  that still allows the 
production of the aggregated output ∑ ∈Jj
jy . In the case that θ J < 1, inputs can be reduced while still 
producing the given output. This implies potential savings in the form of inputs resulting from 
merging the utilities. In contrast, if θ J > 1, the merger appears to be disadvantageous.19  
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As shown by Bogetoft and Wang (2005) the measure θ J of the potential overall merger gains can be 
decomposed into several effects namely technical efficiency gains, scale and synergy effects which 
will be shortly shown subsequently.  
 
Technical Efficiency Effect (TE) 
The technical inefficiency of the individual utilities in J may be captured in θ J. These inefficiencies 
might be eliminated by the new management processes itself, e.g. by imitating the better performers, 
sometimes referred to as the peer units, without any benefit from scale or synergy effects. This effect 
is defined as the technical efficiency effect; it is advisable to adjust the overall gains caused by 
mergers to account for this technical efficiency effect.  
Bogetoft and Wang (2005) propose to project the original units to the production possibility frontier 
and use the projected plans as the basis for evaluating the remaining gains from the merger. Thus, we 
implicitly merge the same units again, which are now technically efficient. This can be done by 
calculating the individual efficiency scores θ j for each merging company Jj ∈  and adjust the 
individual input-output combination (xj,yj) into an efficient one (θ jxj,yj). In a second step the projected 
plans (θ jxj,yj) are used as the basis for calculating the adjusted overall gains from the merger 
following: 
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Letting JJJT */θθ=  we obtain JJJ T *θθ = . JT  indicates the savings potential resulting from 
individual adjustments in the different units in J.  
We now analyze the two most interesting effects of a merger on production economics: First, the 
synergy effects (HE) and second, the scaling or size effects (SE).20  
 
Synergy or Harmony Effect (HE)  
The synergy effect (HE) describes the potential savings resulting from pooling the inputs while 
producing an average output, i.e. a kind of portfolio effect within the inputs and outputs of the merging 
units. There appears to be room for improvements if a merger leads to a more “productive” use of the 
product space. Bogetoft and Wang (2005) propose to capture the synergy gains by examining how 
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 Bogetoft and Wang refer to the synergy effect as harmony, scope or mixture effects. That is the reason why HE was used 
as an abbreviation because it is used in their paper and it does not correlate with the appreciation of scale effect, SE.  
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much of the average input could have been saved in the production of the average output, i.e. by the 
measure (HE), which can be expressed in the DEA optimization by 
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with J being the number of merging units. HJ < 1 indicates a savings potential due to improved 
harmony, while HJ > 1 indicates the cost of harmonizing the inputs and outputs.  
 
Size Effect (SE) 
Focusing now on the real size after merging and not on an average scale, the properties of the 
underlying production technology have to be considered in order to analyze the scale or size effects 
(SE). A merger leads to a unit that operates at a larger scale. The outcome depends on the scale 
properties of the underlying technology. A positive size effect is characterized as follows: Under the 
assumption that the original productions of company A=(x1,y1) and company B=(x2,,y2) are efficient 
and improvement potentials are present in the merged unit A+B using x1+x2 to produce y1+y2, it is 
sufficient for unit A+B to use in the production process (θJ*(x1+ x2)) to produce (y1+y2). 
In the next linear optimization, size effects describing the potential input savings resulting from 
operating at full scale rather than on the average scale are measured by SJ. 
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SJ <1 indicates that we deal with economies of scale, thus rescaling is advantageous, whereas SJ >1 
shows that the return-to-scale property does not favor larger units and therefore the merger is costly. 
Obviously, the measure SJ is calculated by using inputs that are adjusted to individual inefficiency by 
θ j as well as by synergy effects by HJ  
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To summarize the effects, using the definition from the linear optimization leads to * *J J JH Sθ =  and 
by means of **J J JTθ θ=  one obtains the basic decomposition * *J J J JT H Sθ = . This corresponds to 
a decomposition of the basic merger index Jθ  into a technical efficiency index TJ, a harmony index 
HJ and a size index SJ.21  
3.3.3 Outlier Detection and Bootstrapping Procedures 
A data robustness check is appropriate considering the fact that DEA is a non-parametric, 
deterministic, linear programming-based frontier approach. The results may be severely biased by the 
presence of extreme observations, or outliers in the data. Outliers are atypical observations and some 
of them might arise from measurement errors and should be corrected or deleted from the data sample 
because these observations may disproportionally, perhaps misleadingly, influence the evaluation of 
other companies’ performance. Generally, two streams of approaches dealing with those observations 
have been proposed. The first approach is to identify outliers in the data and correct them (if possible) 
or delete them if they are based on corrupted data; a number of specific techniques for detecting 
outliers have been developed (e.g., Wilson, 1993). The second approach is based on recently 
developed robust estimators, which offer additional advantages.  
A commonly used statistical method of detecting outliers in the production data set ex ante was 
developed by Andrews and Pregibon (1978), who derived a statistic for the case of only one output. 
Wilson (1993) extended the approach for the multiple-output case. Generally, the approach employs 
an influence function based on a geometric volume spanned by the sample observations and the 
sensitivity of the volume with respect to deleting singletons, pairs, triplets, etc. from the sample (Simar 
and Wilson, 2008). In other words, outliers are identified by comparing the geometric volume of a 
subset (S-L(i)) of the data with the entire data set S where the excluded set L(i) contains i observations. 
This implies that outliers can be defined by looking at the values of the geometric volume produced 
with different sets of observation L(i) deleted from the sample. If (S-L(i)) produces small values of the 
geometric volume, the observations i in L(i) are considered as outliers.  
The robust estimators are based on a concept of “partial” frontiers within the DEA calculation 
procedure in contrast to the “full” frontier that envelops all observations. Basically, “partial” frontiers 
do not calculate the absolute lowest level of inputs but rather a value lying nearby resulting in less 
restrictive estimations. Moreover, two concepts of estimating such a “partial” frontier have been 
suggested: The order-m frontiers have been proposed by Cazals, Florens, and Simar (2002) and follow 
the idea of comparing the actual input usage of a company with its expected minimum input usage, 
where the expected minimum is obtained by drawing k samples of m companies producing at least as 
much output as the company of interest. Thus, m can be seen as a trimming parameter that allows 
tuning the percentage of points that will lie above the order-m frontier. Order-α quantile frontiers 
proposed by Aragon, Daouia, and Thomas-Agnan (2005) are analogous to traditional quantile  
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functions, which have been adapted to frontier problems. This approach first fixes the probability  
(1–α) of observing points above the corresponding order-α frontier and then calculates the frontier 
itself. These partial frontiers are consistent estimators of the full frontier by allowing the order of the 
frontier (m or α) to grow with increasing sample size. In finite samples, this theoretical result may be 
of limited use but these estimators do not envelope all observations, and thus, the frontier is more 
robust when detecting outliers and extreme value than traditional DEA (Daraio and Simar, 2007, 
Simar and Wilson, 2008). 
Another advantage of the robust non-parametric frontiers is that they do not suffer from the “curse of 
dimensionality” and “sample size bias”. The first problem describes the circumstance that in order to 
avoid large variances and wide confidence interval estimates a large quantity of data is needed. The 
second one refers to biased efficiency estimates that can emerge by comparing the results of different 
sample sizes. This bias arises because DEA indicates that certain units are fully efficient (the peers). 
The extent of the bias, which is upward, will vary with the sample size because other efficient 
companies may be included, which may result in shifting the frontier upwards. This could be quite 
important for small samples (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2004). In other words, the DEA estimators 
measure efficiency in relation to an estimate of an unobserved true frontier. It is conditional on 
observed data sets of a specific size resulting from an underlying data-generation process (DGP), the 
process through which inputs are obtained. It is also conditional on outputs and the input proportions. 
Associated with this estimation, there is a difficulty in making statistical inference, mainly based on 
the non-parametric approach with very few assumptions. Recent developments have suggested 
solutions to enable statistical inference by means of asymptotic results or bootstrapping.22 The use of 
asymptotic results is potentially appropriate for the calculation of asymptotic bias and variance, as 
well as asymptotic confidence intervals. However, they remain asymptotic, which may result in 
problems with small samples (Bonaccorsi and Daraio, 2004).  
A useful alternative is the bootstrapping procedure, originally developed by Efron (1979, 1982) and 
Efron and Tibshirani (1993). The idea behind bootstrapping is that the underlying DGP for a sample of 
observations is not completely known and the essence of the bootstrap approach is to approximate the 
sampling distribution of interest by simulating (or mimicking) the DGP. Therefore, the given sample is 
used to generate a set of bootstrap samples from which the parameters of interest can be calculated. An 
empirical sampling distribution of the variables of interest is then constructed by means of repeated 
sampling of the original data series. The first use of frontier models was made by Simar (1992).  
The normal (or naïve) bootstrap just draws randomly (independently, uniformly, and with 
replacement) a specific number of observations from the original sample forming the bootstrap sample 
and then calculates the corresponding DEA efficiency estimates. The construction of a bootstrap 
sample and the efficiency estimation based on this sample is conducted multiple times providing 
information about the distribution of the efficiency estimate and the bootstrap bias associated with the 
estimates of the observed data sample. As the normal bootstrap estimator is not consistent, Simar and 
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Wilson (1998, 2000a) suggested two approaches to overcome this problem: the smoothed homogenous 
and the heterogeneous bootstrapping procedure. These approaches resample from a semi-artificial 
sample generated from a density function for the inefficiency values (that is the same for all values in 
the homogeneous case) based on a smoothed representation of the observed distribution of efficiency 
estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2008).23 
In our empirical analysis we apply the outlier detection procedure of Wilson (1993) and the 
homogenous bootstrapping procedure of Simar and Wilson (1998) because of their easy computing. 
The combination of both methods ensures that the resulting efficiency scores are less likely to be 
prone to distortions from outliers, extreme values, a finite sample size, and the inherent upwards bias 
of DEA efficiency estimates. 
3.4 Parametric Frontier Approaches 
In this section, the parametric frontier approaches to estimate a company’s efficiency are introduced.24 
In contrast to the non-parametric approaches, the parametric ones have the common feature that they 
require a pre-defined functional form of the production frontier, distance function, or cost frontier, as 
the average approaches do. The functional forms often applied in the corresponding literature and also 
used in our applications are the transcendental logarithmic (Translog) function of Christensen, 
Jorgenson, and Lawrence (1973) and the Cobb-Douglas function introduced by Cobb and Douglas 
(1928). The first is generally favorable due to its flexible form. It places no restrictions on the 
elasticity of substitution at the outset. The latter function is a more restrictive variant of the first and is 
characterized by reduced data requirements for estimation purposes but assumes a constant elasticity 
of substitution.25 
Figure 3.3 gives an overview of different parametric frontier approaches as well as the panel data 
models discussed in section 3.4.2. 
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 For an overview about recent trends see Simar and Wilson (2000b, 2008). 
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 See Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a) for a discussion of the inconsistency problem with naïve bootstraps.  
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 Please note that we use the output-oriented Debreu-Farrell measure here for introducing the parametric techniques because 
of its simplicity. The interested reader might be referred to Coelli at al. (2005), pp. 264-265, and Kumbhakar and Wang 
(2006), pp. 34-37, who describe the derivation of a production function with input-oriented technical efficiency.  
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 See Kuenzle (2005) for a good description of various functions and selection criteria, such as the often used Likelihood-
ratio test.  
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Figure 3.3: Overview of Parametric Frontier Approaches 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Kuenzle (2005, p. 33). 
 
Two classes of models can be differentiated: First, the earliest approaches of frontier estimation are 
often referred to as deterministic frontier models because they incorporate only a one-sided error term 
representing inefficiency. Second, the stochastic frontier models add a second error term to the 
deterministic frontier representing statistical noise. Depending on the data structure, we can 
distinguish between cross-sectional models with a dataset of different companies at one point in time 
and panel data models that analyze companies over a time period. The latter contains more 
information about the underlying technology: It can be used to estimate time-specific effects that can 
lead to analyze time-invariant or time-variant inefficiencies depending on the model’s specification. 
The class of deterministic frontier models is based on OLS estimation with the one-sided error being 
interpreted as inefficiency. In a production-frontier framework these models can be written as: 
 
iii uxfy −= );(ln β ,              (8) 
 
with ln yi being the logarithm of output, f(.) being the functional form of the production function, xi 
being the vector of inputs, β being the vector of parameters to be estimated and ui being the error term.  
The two approaches are based on the result that the OLS estimator of the slope parameters is 
consistent and unbiased, leading to point-wise consistent estimators of linear translations of the 
original inefficiencies by the OLS residuals. The simplest way to construct a frontier was initially 
suggested by Winsten (1957) and is referred to as corrected OLS (COLS). In the production (cost) 
frontier framework, the estimated function is shifted upwards (downwards) until all residuals except 
one are negative (positive). Equivalently, the intercept is shifted so that all observed data points except 
one lie below (above) the frontier. An alternative approach is called modified OLS (MOLS) and was 
proposed by Afriat (1957) and extended by Richmond (1974). The intercept is shifted by the 
expectations of the inefficiencies and not by the residuals. Therefore, a distributional assumption 
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regarding the inefficiencies is necessary. The MOLS method is a bit less orthodox than the COLS 
approach because it is unlikely to yield a full set of negative (positive) residuals (Greene, 2007, and 
Coelli et al., 2007). 
The main drawback of deterministic frontier models is the attribution of total stochastic variation to 
inefficiency. The less realistic assumption is relaxed in stochastic frontier models treating inefficiency 
and noise in the data separately as described in the following subsections.  
3.4.1 Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
The original stochastic frontier model was developed for cross-section data by Aigner, Lovell, and 
Schmidt (1977), and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), to overcome the drawback of the 
deterministic frontier models. In its production function form, a maximum output function that 
depends on the inputs and on a composite error term that consist of statistical noise and inefficiency is 
estimated. The model can be written in the form of:  
 
iiii uvxfy −+= );(ln β ,             (9) 
 
where iy  represents the output vector of company i, f(.) is the functional form of the production 
function, ix  is a (K*1) vector containing the inputs, β  is a vector of parameters to be estimated, iv  is 
a random error term accounting for statistical noise, and iu  is a non-negative random variable 
associated with technical inefficiency. Both error components are considered to be independent from 
each other and require a distributional assumption. The model is therefore estimated by Maximum 
Likelihood Estimation. The stochastic term iv  is assumed to be normally distributed, iid. ),0( 2σN , 
whereas multiple assumptions of the distribution of the inefficiency term are made. The common 
distributions found in literature are half-normal, truncated-normal, exponential, or gamma. The 
maximum output of a company is then given by ( )ii vxf +);(exp β  and the corresponding technical 
efficiency can be estimated by the ratio of observed to frontier output: 
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,         (10) 
 
According to the definition of technical efficiency, it is restricted between zero and unity because of 
non-negative ui. Figure 3.4 shows the concept of equation (8) with company A producing output YA 
with input XA and company B producing output YB with input XB. Company A’s frontier output lies 
above the deterministic frontier only because of a positive noise effect, while the frontier output of 
company B lies below the deterministic frontier due to a negative noise effect. Because company A’s 
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ratio of actual to frontier output is obviously smaller than for company B, company A is less efficient 
than company B (Coelli et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 3.4: The Stochastic Production Frontier 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Coelli et al. (2005, p. 244). 
 
The inefficiency estimator can be calculated by using the conditional-mean model of Jondrow at al. 
(1982) in the case of half-normal distribution of the inefficiency. The model deduced from an ML 
estimate of the composed error iii uv −=ε  an estimator for the inefficiency term by )ˆ(ˆ iii uEu ε= , 
which depends on the distributions of the two random variables. Battese and Coelli (1988) developed 
an alternative point estimator for the case of a truncated distribution.  
At this point, we assume homogeneous companies to have the same parameters both in their 
production and in their inefficiency distribution. Generally, it is possible to include some kind of 
heterogeneity into the model following two objectives: First, to control for obvious differences that are 
likely to influence the production technology or the inefficiency distribution but are neither inputs nor 
outputs. This type of heterogeneity, modeled by incorporating environmental variables (or z-variables) 
among the models, is called observed heterogeneity. Second, unobserved heterogeneity enters the 
model by company-specific “effects” that control for (in principle) missing variables that are usually 
time-invariant.26 
As already mentioned, the cross-section models suffer from limited content of information because 
dynamics and company-specific effects can only be analyzed in panel data models, which are 
introduced in the next subsection. 
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3.4.2 Panel Data Models  
Generally, datasets with a cross-section and a time dimension have several advantages in relation to 
simple cross-section models in benchmarking exercises. Following the econometric literature three 
main advantages of panel data models can be identified that are all based on the larger content on 
information. First, they can control for heterogeneity in the form of time-invariant and individual-
invariant effects, through which the risk of obtaining biased results is reduced. Second, panel data are 
better suited to study the dynamics of adjustments than studying the repeated cross-section of 
observations. Third, using panel data in efficiency analysis produces consistent individual efficiency 
scores (Horrace and Schmidt, 1996; Jensen, 2000). Summarizing the advantages, we expect to obtain 
more efficient estimators of the unknown parameters and more efficient estimators of efficiency due to 
the larger content of information (Baltagi, 1995). 
Given some advantages of using panel data, several parametric frontier approaches dealing with panel 
data have emerged but all models have their specific advantages and disadvantages with respect to the 
corresponding assumptions of each model. Figure 3.3 lists the basic panel data models mainly relevant 
for our empirical analysis, which will be introduced below.27 
The general panel data model can be written as: 
 
ititit rxy +′+= βα 0ln  with itiitr εα +=          (11) 
 
assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function where the subscript t represents the time dimension, α0 
is a constant, and a residual term rit that consists of a company-specific and time-invariant component 
iα  and a random error itε . The differences of the following panel data models are related to the 
assumptions imposed on the stochastic components iα  and itε  (Farsi, Filippini, and Kuenzle, 
2003). 
The simplest way to consider a panel data structure is to neglect the time dimension and thus to pool 
the data set. The pooled model is the panel data version of the model of Aigner, Lovell, and Schmitt 
(1977), which basically estimates one frontier with observations of different points in time. The 
corresponding assumption regarding the residual term rit is that there is no company-specific 
component ( 0=iα ) and the time-varying error term consists of the noise term and inefficiency 
( ititit uv −=ε ). This approach presumes one common technology over time by implicitly assuming 
that there is no technological change. Although the pooled cross-section model uses a larger data set 
than the corresponding cross-section model, it is considered as a “pseudo” panel data model because it 
might lead to biased results due to ignoring within-company correlations between error terms, 
company-specific unobserved factors (heterogeneity), as well as violating the assumption of 
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independently distributed efficiencies.28 On the other hand, the model allows for a random variation of 
efficiency over time because it treats every observation as a different company and thus, it estimates 
efficiencies for every company separately (Coelli et al., 2005). 
3.4.2.1 Time-Invariant Inefficiency Models 
The first class of “real” panel data models that account for company-specific effects αi over time 
incorporate time-invariant inefficiencies was developed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Pitt and 
Lee (1981). Although the respective models use different measurement concepts, they share the 
common idea of constant inefficiencies over time that can be written as: 
 
iit uu = .             (12) 
 
The two models of Schmidt and Sickles (1984) do not require a distributional assumption of the 
inefficiency term (distribution free models) that can be estimated by OLS in form of fixed effects 
estimation or by its generalized form (Generalized Least Square, GLS) for a random effects approach. 
Generally, a model treating the company-specific and time-invariant effect αi, also known as 
unobserved heterogeneity, in the form of a fixed effect is called fixed-effects (FE) model. The 
regressors are assumed to be independent of the vit for all i and t but ui is allowed to be correlated with 
the regressors and vit. In the opposite case, we assume the company-specific effect αi to be randomly 
distributed with constant mean and variance but ui not to be correlated with the regressors. This model 
is called random-effects (RE) model (Greene, 2007).  
In the FE model, the non-random company-specific effects can be directly estimated along with the 
other coefficients either by incorporating company dummies or by a transformation. Deriving the FE 
model from the general panel data form in equation (6) with the definition that company-specific 
effect αi is interpreted as a deviation from the constant caused by inefficiency ( ii u−= 0αα ) and the 
time-invariant error term is statistical noise ( itit v=ε ): 
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After estimation, we can calculate the company’s inefficiency by: 
 
{ } iiiu αα ˆˆmaxˆ −= .            (14) 
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This model assumes at least one company to be operating efficiently. Thus, efficiencies of the other 
companies are calculated in relation to the frontier defined by the efficient company(ies) using 
( )ii uTE ˆexp −= . 
The second model of Schmidt and Sickles (1984) is an RE model very similar to their FE model. The 
assumption of constant means of the inefficiency term is treated by adding additional assumptions to 
the equation (12) in the form that the constant and the inefficiency are expressed as deviations from 
the expected value of the inefficiency, i.e. ][0*0 iuE−= αα  and ][* iii uEuu −= . This normalization 
enables us to use GLS panel data technique while treating *it uv −  as the disturbance term because it 
now has zero mean. So, the general panel data model can also be rewritten as in equation (8) of the FE 
formulation (Kumbhkar and Lovell, 2000).  
Pitt and Lee (1981) were the first to implement a panel data structure within the SFA using ML 
estimation. Contrasting the pooled cross-section model, they included a company-specific effect in the 
model. Pitt and Lee (1981) assumed the random error to be normally distributed )),0(~( 2vitit Nv σε =  
and the company-specific effect to be half-normally distributed )),0(~( 2
uii Nu σα
+
= . The 
inefficiency estimator can also be calculated using the conditional mean model of Jondrow at al. 
(1982) or Battese and Coelli (1988). The composite error is then iitit uv −=ε  and the estimator for the 
inefficiency term can be written as )ˆ(ˆ itii uEu ε= . Each estimator is unbiased and consistent due to the 
fact that inefficiency is assumed to be time-invariant. 
3.4.2.2 Time-Variant Inefficiency Models 
Having introduced some basic panel data models that assume the inefficiency to be time-invariant, we 
now discuss some recent models that relax the assumption and are able to estimate inefficiency 
varying in time. 
Recent research conducted by Greene (2004, 2005) has developed extensions of the conventional 
stochastic frontier model that decouple inefficiency from unobserved heterogeneity by introducing a 
separate company-specific effect into the production function. The maximum likelihood estimators 
proposed by Greene have been referred to as “true” effects models and have already been applied 
successfully in analyses of network industries.29  
There are two variants of the basic model – the so called “true” fixed effects and the “true“ random 
effects model, varying only in the underlying assumption of the distribution of the company-specific 
effect and the corresponding estimation procedure. In the true FE case dummy variables are 
introduced in the model representing the fixed iα , whereas the true RE model assumes the iα  to be 
randomly distributed with constant mean and variance and thus, the constant 0α  can be interpreted as 
the mean. In both models the random error consists of noise and inefficiency as in the basic stochastic 
frontier model, i.e. ititit uv −=ε . In the simplest case, the noise term is assumed to be normally 
33 
distributed )),0(~( 2vit Nv σ  and the inefficiency component is assumed to be half-normally distributed 
( )),0(~ 2
uit Nu σ
+
. The models can be written as: 
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βαα
βα
          (15) 
 
The estimator for the time-invariant inefficiency term can be deducted in the two models by the 
conditional mean model of Jondrow at al. (1982) or the model of Battese and Coelli (1988), too.  
As mentioned above, in the time-invariant specifications, the time-invariant term, which is constant 
over time, is tantamount to inefficiency, and time-invariant heterogeneity is either assumed to be non-
existent or is inadequately considered. Contrastingly, in both “true” effects models all time-invariant 
effects are interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity and the inefficiency component can vary freely 
through time. As Greene (2007, p. 74) argues “doubtless ‘the truth’ is to be found somewhere between 
these two extremes. Unfortunately, there is an identification issue that is only resolved through non-
sample information (i.e., additional assumptions).” Table 3.2 summarizes the specifications of the 
panel data models used for the company-specific term and the error term.30 
 
Table 3.2: Econometric Specification of the Stochastic Production Frontier 
rit = αi + εit Pooled  
(ML) 
FE  
(OLS) 
RE  
(GLS) 
RE  
(ML) 
True FE True RE 
Developed by Aigner, Lovell, 
Schmidt (1977) 
Schmidt, 
Sickles 
(1984) 
Schmidt, 
Sickles 
(1984) 
Pitt, Lee 
(1981) 
Greene 
(2004, 2005) 
Greene  
(2004, 2005) 
Company-
specific term 
αi 
none fixed iid(0, σα2) Half-normal 
N+(0, σα2) 
fixed iid(0, σα2) 
Random 
error εit 
εit=vit-uit 
uit ~N+(0,σu2) 
vit ~N(0,σv2) 
iid(0,σε2) iid(0,σε2) iid(0,σε2) εit=vit-uit  
uit~N+(0,σu2) 
vit~N(0,σv2) 
εit=vit-uit  
ui~N+(0,σu2) 
vi~N(0,σv2) 
Inefficiency E[uit|vit-uit] max{αi}-αi max{αi}-αi E[uit|vit-uit] E[uit|vit-uit] E[uit|αi+vit-uit] 
Source: Own illustration based on Farsi, Filippini, and Kuenzle (2003). 
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 See Farsi and Filippini (2004) and Farsi, Filippini, and Greene (2006) for examples.  
30
 For a similar summary for the stochastic cost frontier, see Farsi, Filippini, and Kuenzle (2003). 
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3.4.2.3 Investigating the Sources of Inefficiency 
As already mentioned, observed and unobserved heterogeneity between companies can be treated 
either by introducing environmental variables (z-variables) or by estimating company-specific effects 
in the production function. The underlying assumption of both approaches is that heterogeneity 
influences the production technology. Theoretically, one can assume that heterogeneity influences the 
mean and/or the variance of the inefficiency instead.31  
Beside the information about the production technology and the inefficiencies generated by parametric 
frontier approaches, it is possible to test the influence of structural variables on the output by 
incorporating structural variables in the frontier. Assuming that heterogeneity that is observable by 
structural variables affects the inefficiency directly, it is generally possible to test for a significant 
impact on efficiency and thus, it can be interpreted as an explanation of inefficiency. 
Earlier analyses have utilized a two-stage approach: In the first stage, the inefficiencies are calculated 
by a frontier model omitting environmental – or structural – variables, and in a second stage, the 
estimated inefficiencies are regressed on those exogenous environmental variables to assess their 
impact on efficiency. This two-stage approach has been criticized because of econometrical 
inconsistencies in the assumptions made about the distribution of the inefficiencies. A solution for this 
problem was proposed, which involves the inefficiency effects being expressed in stochastic frontier 
models as an explicit function of a vector of company-specific variables and a random error. In the 
first stage, the inefficiency effects are assumed to be distributed independently and identically, but in 
the second stage, the predicted inefficiencies are assumed to be a function of company-specific effects, 
which implies that they are not distributed identically (Kumbhakar, Ghosh, and McGukin, 1991; 
Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991). 
Battese and Coelli (1995) accounted for this drawback by developing an extension of the RE 
stochastic frontier model for panel data that estimates the production function and the effects of 
structural variables on the inefficiencies in a one-step procedure. The model incorporates structural 
variables in the underlying mean of the truncated distribution of the inefficiencies, such that: 
 
ititit zu τδ +′= ,            (16) 
 
where δ  is an vector of parameters to be estimated, zit a vector of observable explanatory variables 
(structural variables), and τit is a random error defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with 
zero mean and constant variance. The inefficiencies are assumed to be truncated, normally distributed 
with company-specific and time-specific mean itit z
′
= δµ  and variance 2
u
σ .32 The estimated 
efficiencies mirror gross efficiency scores that do not fully adjust for the exogenous influence. The net 
                                                     
31
 The interested reader may refer to Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), Coelli et al. (2005), and Greene (2007) for a summary of 
the corresponding models found in literature. 
32
 See Battese and Coelli (1993) for a derivation of the likelihood function. 
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efficiency scores can be obtained by assuming a half-normal distribution for the inefficiency and by 
including the exogenous factors into the frontier.33 
Having described all the relevant theoretical aspects and the benchmarking approaches to assess the 
production or cost frontier, in the next two chapters, some of these models will be applied to German 
and US data samples. 
                                                     
33
 See Coelli, Perelman, and Romano (1999) for an analysis of gross and net effects. However, we focus on the effects of 
business strategies in efficiency (relative values) instead of their effects on the production technology (absolute values) in our 
analyses. 
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4 Efficiency and Restructuring in Germany 
4.1 Introduction 
The electricity distribution industry in Germany is a typical example of a network industry that is 
considered as a natural monopoly due to subadditivity in its costs. This characteristic generally leads 
to a market situation where competition does not emerge and therefore, the industry is under 
regulation. The issue of efficiency analysis in the regulation of electricity distribution did not receive 
very much attention in Germany until 2005, when the German energy regulator BNetzA was 
established in order to review the energy industry’s regulatory regime.  
Following the tradition of other European countries, BNetzA is to introduce an incentive-based 
regulation scheme for German electricity distribution system operators (DSOs) in 2009, which 
constitutes a significant challenge for the industry. The present cost-recovery scheme will then be 
replaced by revenue caps, which will decline over time in accordance with industry-specific 
productivity levels as well as the individual efficiency levels of companies. As a result, network 
operators will face cost cutting requirements but can also generate extra profits through additional cost 
reductions. 
In this setting, the allocative and technical efficiency of network operation will become a key 
performance driver. As most of the output of electricity DSOs is exogenously determined, efficiency 
levels can typically be improved by reducing costs or by utilizing scale and synergy effects from 
mergers. Nevertheless, German DSOs have already responded to the new challenge by initiating 
several mergers, both at the regional and inter-regional level. Beginning in the mid-1990s, Europe and 
the US have seen a substantial wave of mergers34 in the energy industry, which resulted in assets of 
about $ 180 bn being acquired in Europe in 2006 and Europe becoming the key market in terms of 
ownership changes (PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), 2007).35  
Our first application focuses on regional differences between East and West German DSOs and tests 
the robustness of previous findings (see Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler, 2006) concerning the 
data used, the applied benchmarking method, and especially the specified models by variations of the 
variables used. The objective of our second analysis is to provide first evidence for Germany on how 
much of the potential gains can be attributed to cost reductions, scale and synergy effects.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.2 provides an overview of the 
restructuring process in the German electricity industry. Section 4.3 reviews existing literature 
focusing on benchmarking especially German DSOs and on the analyses of merger gains within the 
electricity distribution industry, both related to the application of non-parametric approaches.36 The 
                                                     
34
 The term merger used in this thesis differs from acquisition in such that a merger is analyzed by evaluating the company 
(‘buyer’) that buys another company (‘target’) while our analysis of an acquisition focuses on the target company solely. 
35
 See Codognet et al. (2003) and Lévêque and Monturus (2007) for a detailed survey of M&A activities in the European 
energy sector. 
36
 A review of the literature applying parametric approaches is given in section 5.4. 
37 
relevant data set used for our analyses is introduced in section 4.4. The two empirical applications we 
used, mainly relying on non-parametric techniques, are provided in section 4.5 and section 4.6, 
respectively. Our conclusions are provided in section 4.7. 
4.2 Industry Restructuring in the German Electricity Industry 
The restructuring process in the German electricity industry can be seen as an adjustment process, 
wherein the companies involved change their business strategies in reaction to reforms in the 
underlying political framework. In the 1990s, there were two major changes that resulted in a 
realignment of the German electricity industry. First, the German reunification required an integration 
of the East German transmission network into the West German electricity grid. This resulted in the 
full privatization of the transmission grid owned by Vereinigte Energiewerke (Veag) as well as in the 
sale of the majority shares (often 51%) in regional DSOs to the West German transmission system 
operators (TSOs) in 1994 (Horn, 1995). 
The second restructuring period started when the local utilities (Stadtwerke) had just started to form in 
East Germany. The European Union pressed ahead with the creation of a single European energy 
market by adopting the Council Directive 96/92/EC relating to the liberalization of the electricity 
market. The German Energy Industry Act (Energiewirtschaftsgesetz) was amended accordingly in 
1998, by which the monopolistic character of the existing demarcated electricity supply areas was 
weakened immediately (Stahlke, 2007). 
The industry’s landscape changed notably when the four big players in the German electricity market 
were established. Even before the law was enacted, EnBW was created by a merger of 
Energieversorgung Schwaben AG, Stuttgart and Badenwerke AG in 1997. In 2000, E.ON (a merger of 
Vereinigte Elektrizitäts- und Bergwerks-Aktiengesellschaft (VEBA) and Vereinigte Industrie-
Unternehmen AG (VIAG)) and RWE (a merger of Rheinisch-Westfälische Elektrizitätswerke AG 
(RWE) and Vereinigten Elektrizitätswerke AG (VEW)) were formed. The fourth big electricity 
company, Vattenfall Europe AG (VE), was established in 2002 by Vattenfall’s acquisition of 
Hamburgische Electricitäts-Werke AG (HEW), Berliner Bewag AG (Bewag), Vereinigte 
Energiewerke AG (VEAG) and Lausitzer Braunkohle AG (Laubag) (Stahlke, 2007).  
Besides these major acquisitions, which covered the transmission grid as displayed in Figure 4.1, the 
electricity industry has been subject to further, manifold restructuring activities with one aim: the 
privatization of publicly owned utilities. Apart from the full acquisitions that lead to a decrease of 
about 900 to about 600 utilities in the last years, an increasing number of municipal governments have 
forced the sale of shares in public utilities of up to 49.9% due to serious financial difficulties. This 
enabled the governments to acquire a notable amount of fresh capital without losing influence. From 
today’s perspective it may be said that even though some expectations of the acquirers as regards the 
liberalized market have not been met (e.g. the rate of return on investment projects) and the prices 
have fallen, national and international energy companies are still showing their interest in acquiring 
German utilities. Since 2003, there have been fewer acquisitions of the “big four” due to antitrust 
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concerns. The introduction of incentive-based regulation in 2009 in Germany will increase the 
pressure on DSOs to cut costs, which also includes exploiting cost savings that go along with mergers. 
A map illustrating the number of German DSOs in 2004 is given in Figure 4.2 (Stahlke, 2007). 
 
Figure 4.1: Restructuring within the Transmission Business in Germany 
 
Source: Leuschner (2007). 
 
Figure 4.2: German Electricity Distribution System Operators 
 
Source: VDN (2005).  
4.3 Literature Review 
Although electricity distribution benchmarking becomes more and more important, the scientific 
analysis for Germany so far is scarce. However, there exists wide theoretical and applied literature on 
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benchmarking of electricity distribution utilities driven by its importance for incentive-based 
regulation in other countries. This section gives a brief review of former studies related to non-
parametric approaches in order to give an insight into the findings and the techniques for analyzing 
merger gains suggested by different authors. 
Numerous studies have estimated the potential for efficiency improvements through input/cost 
reductions at the company-level. The first analysis of the efficiency of German electricity distributors 
was carried out by Frontier Economics and Consentec (2003) that undertook a brief analysis of the 
technical efficiency scores for 27 German DSOs. A larger sample is used in Hirschhausen, Cullmann, 
and Kappeler (2006; hereafter referred to as HCK) who applied DEA on physical inputs for up to 307 
German DSOs to assess the technical and scale efficiency scores. The former study found only a 
couple East German distributors to have high efficiency scores whereas the latter paper stressed the 
fact that the East German DSOs feature a higher technical efficiency (77%) on average than its 
Western counterpart (65%). HCK developed a wide range of different model specifications addressing 
the issues of population density, transformer capacity, quality of the network, grid composition and the 
customer structure. The authors also found the share of residential customer and population density to 
be efficiency enhancing. In contrast, there was weak empirical evidence for returns to scale and no 
evidence for the weighted grid composition and the peak load capacity to affect to efficiency.  
Amongst others, case studies for single countries have been carried out for the UK by Burns, Davies 
and Riechmann (1999). They used DEA for calculating productivity changes (i.e. the Malmquist 
index) and found evidence for strategic behavior by the companies revealed by observed cyclical 
efficiency growth and increasing capital intensity. Korhonen and Syrjänen (2003) applied DEA on 
Finnish distributors and found an improvement in technical efficiency after controlling for quality of 
service (interruption time per customer). Cullmann and Hirschhausen (2007) used non-parametric as 
well as parametric benchmarking techniques and they found that the Polish utilities featured scale 
inefficiency. While the technical efficiency increased over the years from 1997-2002 the allocative 
efficiency decreased in the Polish distribution sector. 
Moreover, comparative country studies exist but, as Jamasb and Pollitt (2003) stated in their cross-
country study for six European countries, one has to account for country-specific effects in order to 
guarantee comparability. They applied DEA, COLS, and SFA on 63 utilities focussing on the capital 
stock variable and showed how to achieve a comparable measure. Estache, Rossi, and Ruzzier (2004) 
assessed technical efficiency for six countries from Latin America by using DEA and SFA and found 
that a regulator's information disadvantage can be mitigated by increasing international coordination 
and the use of comparative measures of efficiency. Comparing distributors from the UK and Japan by 
applying DEA and SFA, Hattori, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005) found the companies from UK facing 
higher productivity gains than the Japanese companies over the period 1985-1998. 
The application of frontier approaches in order to analyze mergers in the electricity distribution 
industry has been done very rarely in literature so far. One of the first were Nillesen, Pollitt and Keats 
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(2001) and by Nillesen and Pollitt (2001) that used DEA in a simple framework to estimate technical 
efficiency scores for a cross-section dataset of more than 130 US distributors in 1990. The first paper 
estimated the potential gains from three mergers by comparing pre-merger and post-merger potential 
cost savings, and the latter assessed the optimal customer base for a company to achieve technical 
efficiency. Both papers suggested that mergers and acquisitions were feasible instruments to increase a 
company’s efficiency.  
Bagdadioglu, Price, and Weyman-Jones (2007) were the first that analyzed potential merger gains in 
the more sophisticated DEA-framework based on Bogetoft and Wang (2005) that estimated efficiency 
gains as well as synergy and size effects created by merging using a panel dataset of 82 Turkish DSOs 
for the period 1999-2003. Their main results are that efficiency can be improved mainly by synergy 
effects and that predefined merger parties operating in adjacent areas are performing worse than freely 
chosen parties.  
In another framework, Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007) used a two-stage procedure for US distributors 
and than applied it on 78 investor owned utilities (IOUs) from 1994-2001. Efficiency was calculated in 
a first stage by DEA and in a second stage, a Tobit regression was estimated to assess several effects 
of realized mergers on efficiency.37 The results indicated that the acquired distributors were 
technically more efficient than the control-group of non-merging companies before consolidation, and 
that the buyers faced lower efficiency scores than the target companies. With regard to the post-merger 
period, the authors found that the activities of merging parties were less efficient than those of non-
merging company. Thus, the merging parties did not appear to increase efficiency.  
4.4 Data  
This section gives an overview about the data used for our two analyses of efficiency and restructuring 
in the German distribution sector. Generally, the public data availability of German electricity 
distributors is still very limited and therefore, the focus of our analyses is on physical data due to the 
lack of cost data.38 
As already mentioned, the objective of our first application is to provide additional evidence for the 
structural differences in form of higher efficiency on average for the East German distributors found 
by Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler (2006). We make use of a similar data structure and similar 
data sources as used for their consistent analysis of the efficiency of German electricity distributors 
which is here based on a static sample updated for the year 2004 and it is therefore described very 
briefly. The year 2004 is most relevant for the benchmarking of German DSOs because this year is the 
base year for the data collection of the BNetzA.  
                                                     
37
 As already noted in section 3.4.2.3, the two-stage procedure used by Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007) is subject to an 
inconsistency problem. See Simar and Wilson (2007) for a further discussion. 
38
 We are aware of two facts: Firstly, the data do not display the current structure of the energy sector correctly due to recent 
industry reforms but our aim is to examine the sources of structural technical efficiency differences observed. Secondly, 
detailed examinations with more recent data (especially cost data) are necessary to achieve robust results that can be used for 
regulatory purposes. 
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The sources of the data are the following: (1) Verlags- und Wirtschaftsgesellschaft der 
Elektrizitätswerke m.b.H. – VWEW “Jahresdaten der Stromversorger 2004“, VWEW Energieverlag 
GmbH, Frankfurt am Main, Heidelberg, (2005) for number of customers, units sold, number of 
workers,39 and grid data and (2) Verband der Netzbetreiber VDN .V. beim VDEW “Strukturmerkmale 
der deutschen Netzbetreiber” (2005) for the population density on the low voltage level. Some data 
were also discovered by internet research on the utilities’ homepages. The original dataset consists of 
335 electricity distribution companies of the year 2004 but an outlier detection procedure reduces the 
original dataset slightly to 323 DSOs which is shown in the application. The summary statistics of the 
data sample is outlined in Table 4.1.  
Following the literature, especially HCK, the outputs used over all models are the total amount of 
electricity delivered to end users as well as to other DSOs (units sold measured in MWh) and the total 
number of customers. We also included the inverse density index as a structural variable (defined as 
the ratio of settled area in km2 and inhabitants, the reciprocal value of the population density) on the 
output side. The variable is included in the models in order to compensate companies which are 
operating in less densely settled areas. The inputs are labor (approximated by the number of workers) 
and capital (estimated by the length of the grid in km, controlling for different voltage levels as well as 
for aerial and cable lines).40 An intensive discussion of the variables used will be given in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics; German Electricity Distribution Companies (323 Observations) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Output      
Electricity sold to end-users  
- Households and industry  
- Other DSOs  
     
MWh 248,864 445,595 398 3,808,108 
MWh 51,491 394,262 0 6,765,749 
Number of households and industry  33,136 55,630 43 474,83 
Number of other DSOs  10 31 0 406 
Inverse density index, low voltage km2 / Population 0.00056 0.0013243 0.0001237 0.012308 
Input      
Number of workers  62 108 2 1,026 
Total grid size  km 969 1,576 7 11,508 
Aerial lines* km 151 479 0 4,684 
Cable lines* km 818 1,293 3 8,927 
* Weighted aggregate over voltage levels. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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 As described in Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler (2006), employment data is adjusted for labor use in generation 
and general administration. Following Auer (2002, p. 128), the number of workers in generation and administration is 
approximated by assuming that one worker is necessary for the generation of 20,000 MWh and 10% of remaining workers is 
allocated to administration. 
40
 An aggregation of the different voltage levels was done using the weights applied by the Association of German network 
operators (VDN): 1, 1.5, and 5 for low, medium and high voltage lines, respectively. 
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4.5 Evaluating Structural Differences 
4.5.1 Introduction 
In the context of the introduction of incentive-based regulation for German DSOs and the associated 
use of benchmarking approaches (DEA and SFA), the comparability of companies is an important 
topic. In the case that the company is operating in an unfavorable environment that is not accounted 
for in benchmarking, the company will have to cut costs due to regulation that are not appropriate. 
The study of HCK (2006) found evidence that the East German DSOs on average are more efficient 
than the West German DSOs. In the case that the efficiency difference is structural the regulator 
should account for this structure to avoid an additional burden raised by the missing accounting for the 
environment in the regulatory context.  
Moreover, Agrell (2006) stated, that in the process of defining well specified models by the BNetzA, a 
hypothesis of structural differences in the real valuation of the capital stock between West and East 
German distributors was tested. Although no statistical significance of efficiency differences could be 
found, and thus no location factor is likely to be used in the regulatory framework, slight cost 
differences could be observed. This result contrasts the former practice where the assessment of 
network charges was based on the German association agreement (Verbändevereinbarung Strom II+) 
containing a structural parameter to control for a structural disadvantage in East Germany by 
decreasing industrial electricity demand. In the light of this discussion, it is even more important to 
verify HCK's findings of regional efficiency differences actually favoring the East German 
distributors. 
The objective of this analysis is to apply a robustness analysis of the findings of HCK concerning the 
used data, the model specifications, as well as the applied methods. These models account for regional 
differences in order to reflect on the one hand a consistent and robust pattern of the German situation, 
and on the other hand to point out potential efficiency drivers explaining the differences. An additional 
goal of the paper is to contribute to the current discussion on modeling technical efficiency 
benchmarks of German electricity distributors.41 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: 4.5.2 describes the methodology applied and section 
4.5.3 describes the concept of testing the model specifications based on differed hypotheses and the 
corresponding models applied. In section 4.5.4, the empirical results of our robustness analysis based 
on the data introduced in section 4.4 is given. Section 4.5.5 concludes. 
4.5.2 Methodology 
As we want to explain the technical efficiency differences between East and West German DSOs, we 
apply a robustness analysis on the HCK framework focusing on the specification robustness but also 
covering the issues of data robustness and methodical robustness because the relative performance 
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might vary according to the models used, the data sample selection and the efficiency measurement 
approaches. The analysis of specification robustness concentrates on the correct choice of inputs and 
outputs for assessing the technical efficiency. The specified models are based on hypotheses that 
assume specific structural characteristics not to be addressed in a satisfying matter in the base model. 
The formulation of the hypotheses is described in section 4.5.3. 
For efficiency measurement purposes, we adopted the methods used in the base models focusing on 
non-parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) which is a linear programming approach for 
estimating the relative technical efficiency (TE) of production activities.42  
Our data robustness approach is threefold. First, we apply our whole analysis on a newer and slightly 
richer dataset of the year 2004 that is also more relevant for the regular’s benchmarking. Second, we 
use an outlier detection procedure to clean the dataset from extreme values that are likely to bias the 
DEA results. Third, in order to increase the robustness of the efficiency estimates, we apply a 
bootstrap procedure adjusting for a bootstrap bias. The outlier detection procedure and the 
bootstrapping follows the approaches described in section 3.3.3.  
The methodical robustness is analyzed due to another shortcoming of DEA. The technique fails to 
account for statistical noise due to the inadvertent omission of variables from the set of input variables, 
to measurement errors as well as approximation errors associated with the choice of the functional 
form. To overcome this problem we adopted the parametric SFA for verification purposes (methodical 
robustness) that requires assumptions about an underlying cost or production function.43  
We are interested in the relative performance of the average Eastern and Western DSO. The mean 
value of each variable is summarized in Table 4.2. These differences will be further discussed in the 
next section while specifying the models used. 
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 Using a similar approach Hess and Cullmann (2007) tested the robustness of structural differences by means of the original 
dataset of HCK und the findings mainly support the initial findings of advantages favoring the East German DSOs. 
42
 The DEA results are calculated by using the software R and the package FEAR, developed by Paul W. Wilson. 
43
 The SFA results are calculated by using the software STATA. 
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Table 4.2: Regional Differences of the Sample of East and West German Utilities 
Variable Mean East 
71 Obs. 
Mean West 
252 Obs. 
Units sold to (MWh): 
- Households and industry  
- Other DSOs 
  
213,813 258,739 
49,923 51,933 
No. of Households and industry 33,397 33,063 
No. of other DSOs 20 7 
Inverse density index 0.0003323 0,0006241 
Total grid size (km) 804 1,016 
Aerial line (km) 63 176 
Cable line (km) 741 940 
Labor 56 63 
Ratio of cable lines to total lines for  
low / medium / high voltage 
0.87/0.96/0.04 0.87/0.85/0.05 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
For the use of SFA, we follow HCK in specifying a company’s Translog input distance function with 
M outputs ym and K inputs xk that meets the requirements of homogeneity of degree +1 and symmetry 
as well as the linear homogeneity condition by normalizing the inputs by the input xK as introduced in 
section 2.2.3. 44 The equation estimated can be written in the form: 
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4.5.3 Hypotheses and Model Specification 
This section gives an overview about the concept applied for analyzing the specification robustness as 
well as the model specifications derived from different hypotheses that are tested. 
According to the goal of testing the robustness of regional efficiency differences, in a first step we 
formulate the null hypothesis that structural efficiency differences between the regions favoring the 
East German distributors actually existent.  
In a second step, we develop the alternative hypothesis that there are no structural differences in the 
mean efficiency scores between the regions. In this regard, the efficiency difference found in the base 
model of HCK is not due to the better adoption of the technology in the East but rather due to different 
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 In the SFA models the inverse density index enters as a company-specific variable which may influence the companies' 
production function. We assume a truncated distribution of the inefficiency term following Battese and Coelli (1988) and 
correct all variables by their mean. See Appendix B for a technical proof of the appropriateness of mean correction in a cost 
frontier framework. 
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production environments in both regions. Thus, we assume that the base model does not control for the 
production structure in a satisfying manner. 
In a third step, we specify DEA models for the efficiency analysis that appear to control more 
effectively for differences in customer services (output side) and the network characteristics (input 
side), respectively. 
The calculation of the technical efficiency using the specific models and the average scores of the East 
and West German electricity distributors is done in the fourth step. 
In the last step, we decide either to reject or to accept the null hypothesis of structural efficiency 
differences. In the case that no DEA model shows notable efficiency differences between East and 
West Germany, the null hypotheses can be rejected, whereas we have to accept it in the case of a 
persistent efficiency gap. The latter case can be seen as a confirmation of the specification robustness. 
4.5.3.1 Customer Services 
The number of customers and the amount of energy delivered are often used as variables in 
benchmarking electricity DSOs. The variables approximate the major outputs in form of providing 
network access to the customers as well as actual delivery with electricity. As mentioned in the data 
section, we also include the inverse density index (IDI) as an output to control for the disadvantage of 
operating in a densely settled area, implying the provision of electricity supply in such areas to be a 
separate output. The three variables represent the output side in the base model. 
Laying the focus on outputs for end users only results in biased efficiency estimates when other issues 
that affect the relative performance of a DSO remain disregarded. Table 4.2 displays the regional 
differences at the output side of the DSOs: On the one hand, the East German distributor on average 
serves a similar number of households and industry (end users) but it sells 17% less electricity to them 
than its West German counterpart. On the other hand, the mean East German DSO serves about three 
times the number of DSOs but delivers a similar amount of electricity units than the mean West 
German DSO.45 Although, the units delivered for DSOs is quite similar between both regions, the 
service for other DSOs motivated by third party access appears to be of particular importance. It 
represents a share of 15% to 6% of the total delivery in Germany for the average East German DSO 
and the West German DSO, respectively. In particular, the high disparity in the composition of all 
customers and the electricity sold to displays the difference in the output structure. Hence, 
disregarding the distribution service for other DSOs in the efficiency analysis will lead to biased 
results. 
Therefore and in contrast to the base HCK model, we account for the service to other DSOs and thus, 
we expect higher efficiency scores for the West German DSOs on average due to the more explicit 
consideration of higher grid utilization. This is done by summing up the electricity sold to the end 
users as well as to other DSOs resulting in a measure for the total energy delivered in Germany. 
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Equivalently, we create a measure for the total number of customers by adding the number of DSOs, 
electricity is sold to, to the number of end users. Finally, we use both variables - the total amount of 
electricity delivered and the total number of customers - in the H1 model. 
4.5.3.2 Network Characteristics 
Another issue that has to be addressed in efficiency analysis of electricity DSOs is the network the 
company is operating. In this analysis the line length is used as an approximation of capital as an input 
factor because cost data is not available. Basically, the grid composition of the DSOs in our sample 
consists of cable lines with the lion's share of about 88% and of aerial lines, both covering low, 
medium and to a marginal extent high voltage levels.  
The aggregation of cable and aerial lines controls for the voltage levels by using weight as suggested 
by the Association of German network operators (VDN). This appears to be appropriate, whereas 
summing up both line types to an aggregated total grid size is likely to make difficulties for at least 
three technical reasons. First, each line type requires a higher amount of maintenance over time that 
results in a lower capital labor ratio. Driven by the high investments in the East German electricity 
grid in the 90s, the average age of the network appears to be smaller than in West Germany resulting 
in a higher capital labor ratio.46 Second, cable lines are subject to higher total costs (investment plus 
operating and maintenance costs) per km cable line over the economic life-time compared to aerial 
lines. As an approximation of the capital stock, a km of cable line corresponds to a higher share of the 
capital stock than a km of aerial line. Third, cable lines are less labor intensive due to lower 
maintenance requirements. Thus, a high cable share of cable lines goes along with a high capital labor 
ratio. 
These three aspects should be addressed to achieve an unbiased input measure. Concerning the age of 
the grid, BNetzA (2006) suggests an adjustment procedure for the capital stock for German DSOs. 
This adjustment procedure requires detailed information and thus, cannot be applied in our analysis on 
the dataset. 
The regional usage of cable lines can be seen in Table 4.2, displaying major differences in the ratio of 
cable lines to total lines between East and West Germany, at least for the medium voltage grid – 96% 
to 85%. 
Although the second issue of higher costs associated with cable use is addressed by HCK in one model 
specification by assuming cable prices to be 125% of the prices for aerial lines, the extent of extra 
costs remains unclear. In a different approach, Brakelmann (2004) estimated total cost factors, which 
also include labor costs, for cable lines varying between 130% and 310% for the medium voltage grid 
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 Interestingly, the argument that industry is more agglomerated in West Germany holds only on an absolute basis but not 
relatively. The share of electricity sold to industry is quite similar with about 44% between the regions in both samples. 
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 Especially in cost benchmarking, controlling for the age of the grid is a very important. For example, the West German 
DSOs are expected to perform significantly better when cost benchmarking is applied without age adjustments because the 
decrease in capital costs due to depreciation is likely to be greater than the increase in labor usage for operating and 
maintenance purpose. 
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and about 450% for the high voltage grid. The main criticism in using an extra weight to account for 
higher share of a km cable line on the capital stock is that there is neither a general specification of the 
degree of the extra costs nor a measure of the lower labor requirements. 
Given the fact that we cannot control for the grid age, we will treat the two aspects that are related to 
the different endowment with cable lines. Instead of using one aggregated capital approximation - the 
grid size - we use the total length of cable lines and aerial lines as two different inputs in the H2 
model. This will enable us to compare only DSOs with the same grid composition by controlling for 
different impacts on the capital stock as well as for different capital labor ratios that are only due to the 
use of cable lines. As a result, we would expect an ambiguous effect on the regional efficiency gap: 
On the one hand the average East German DSO will be compared only with companies which have a 
similar high share of cable lines. Thus, the effect on the average efficiency is unclear. On the other 
hand, the average East German DSOs is expected to require less labor due to being cable intensive that 
appears to result in lower efficiency scores because the low level of employees is now associated to 
the line composition or input substitution (production process) and not to the adoption of technology 
(technical efficiency). 
In addition to the models H1 and H2, we use the variable variation of the input and the output side in 
model H3 to assess the total impact on the efficiency gap. Table 4.3 summarizes the different model 
specifications in comparison to their base model, whereas the next section presents the results of the 
robustness analysis concerning the three issues: Data, model specification, and methods used. 
 
Table 4.3: The Model Specification Used 
Models Inputs Outputs 
 Grid Size Labor Units Sold Customers Inverse Density 
 Total Aerial + Cable  EU EU + D EU EU + D  
Base I  I O  O  O 
H1  I I O  O  O 
H2 I  I  O  O O 
H3  I I  O  O O 
Note: I, input; O, output; EU, end user e households and industry; D, other DSOs. 
Source: Own calculations. 
4.5.4 Empirical Results 
4.5.4.1 Data Robustness 
Using the outlier detecting procedure, as proposed by Andrews and Pregibon (1978) and Wilson 
(1993), we find atypical observations in the data sample. Figure 4.3 presents the plot of the log-ratio of 
the geometric volume for the East/West model of HCK. We can observe a major peak with a value of 
about three that indicates a small value of the geometric volume; i.e. reducing the data sample by 
certain companies will result in a sounder dataset. This examines a value that is about 20 times higher 
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than the minimum value (=exp(3)=20). Thus, in the sample there are twelve companies found to be 
outliers and hence, they are removed from the sample of 335 distributors. Those skipped distributors 
contain the largest DSOs in the data amongst others when size is defined as the annual amount of 
electricity delivered. However, the representativeness remains almost untouched. The sample data 
covers 55% of the total number of distributors and 43% of the total electricity delivered.47 
 
Figure 4.3: Outlier in DEA Model 2 of Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler (335 obs.) 
 
Source: Own calculation. 
 
After controlling for outliers we re-examine the technical efficiency scores of the DSOs for the first 
three HCK models using DEA with bootstrapping with the reduced data set.48 In addition, we figured 
out the mean efficiency scores for both regions. The DEA results are outlined in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4: DEA Results under CRS of the Models of Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler  
Model  Note Average 
sample 
Average 
East 
Average 
West 
DEA 1 323 0.41 0.49 0.38 
DEA 2  323, Inverse Density  
Index East/West Model 
0.42 0.51 0.44 
DEA 2, VRS 323, Inverse Density Index 0.45 0.49 0.40 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
We observe two major results: First, the average efficiency scores of approximately 42% are far less 
than the scores ranging from 60% to 70% found by HCK that appear to result from the different 
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outlier detecting for the models developed in this paper, because these models mainly use the data specified in HCK. 
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datasets; the bootstrapping bias accounted only for a reduction of about 5 percentage points in our 
calculation. Second, we find that the good performance of the East German DSOs is consistent across 
all model specifications. Thus, we can state that the atypical observations deleted from the sample 
only have a small impact on the sample results and hence, data robustness can be confirmed. 
4.5.4.2 Specification Robustness 
The TE scores of the models defined in section 4.5.3 are calculated using DEA CRS and VRS 
technology structures.49 Table 4.5 shows the average efficiency scores for the DSOs of the total 
sample as well as for the average East and West German DSO in contrast to the base HCK model 
(Base). 
 
Table 4.5: DEA and SFA Results 
Models Average sample Average East Average West 
 DEA SFA DEA SFA DEA SFA 
 CRS VRS  CRS VRS  CRS VRS  
Base 0.42 0.45 0.80 0.49 0.51 0.82 0.40 0.44 0.79 
H1 0.42 0.47 0.82 0.49 0.52 0.83 0.40 0.46 0.82 
H2 0.43 0.45 0.81 0.50 0.52 0.84 0.40 0.43 0.81 
H3 0.42 0.47 0.83 0.50 0.53 0.84 0.40 0.45 0.82 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
First, considering model H1 that also accounts for services for other DSOs as an output, we found that 
the efficiency scores are slightly increasing under VRS, but for the West German DSOs even to a 
greater extent. This supports our expectation that accounting for the utilization of the grid more 
explicitly affects efficiency positively but it also indicates that services subject to third party access 
not necessarily increase efficiency because there is no change under CRS technology. The results of 
the second models H2 considering the grid composition indicates slightly higher efficiency scores for 
the mean East German DSO but slightly decreasing scores for the mean West German DSO, indicating 
that the efficiency gap has even increased slightly. Turning to the third model that incorporates both 
issues of customer services and the grid composition, the results show slight efficiency increases under 
VRS for both average DSOs. However, we cannot observe remarkable changes neither in the 
efficiency scores nor in the efficiency gap.  
Summing up, there are two main findings: First, our model specifications do not alter the efficiency 
scores remarkably. Second, the efficiency gap cannot be closed by accounting neither for different 
customer services nor for the grid composition under our base technology CRS as well as under VRS. 
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 The composition of the peers shows that the initial DEA frontiers are generated jointly by East and West German 
distributors. Hence, we can conclude that our assumption of one technology for all DSOs is justified. 
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Referring to the robustness analysis, the alternative hypothesis of no efficiency differences under CRS 
has to be rejected and the null hypothesis of specification robustness can be confirmed. 
4.5.4.3 Methodical Robustness 
In order to evaluate the methodical robustness we apply the alternative benchmarking technique SFA 
in a first step for calculating efficiency scores for verification purpose and in a second step we assess 
the correlation among the models. 
The SFA results are presented in Table 4.5 and show efficiency scores that are notably higher than the 
corresponding DEA scores among almost all models.50 Importantly, on the one hand, we also find a 
low variance of the TE scores but on the other hand, the results show the efficiency gap to be nearly 
vanished compared to the DEA results.  
 
Table 4.6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Sample size: 304 DEA, CRS SFA 
 H1 H2 H3 H1 H2 H3 
DEA H1 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.35 0.42 0.35 
DEA H2  1.00 0.98 0.34 0.42 0.35 
DEA H3   1.00 0.35 0.42 0.36 
SFA H1    1.00 0.94 0.99 
SFA H2     1.00 0.95 
SFA H3      1.00 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Table 4.6 shows the statistical significant Pearson correlation coefficients of the TE scores of the 
model specifications. Among the group of DEA and SFA models, the correlation of over 90% support 
the low variation of the different model specifications. Comparing the DEA models with the 
corresponding SFA models indicate low correlation ranging from 34% to 42%. Although Model H2 
shows the highest correlation between the estimates of both techniques, such small values provoke us 
not to confirm coherence of the efficiency results based on the Pearson correlation coefficients. In 
addition, the higher efficiency scores for the East German DSOs almost disappear when applying SFA 
induces that the structural efficiency differences between the regions appear to result from data noise 
DEA does not control for. 
4.5.5 Conclusion 
In this application we test the robustness of structural difference of technical efficiency scores between 
East German and West German electricity distribution companies found by Hirschhausen, Cullmann, 
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as inefficiency due to the decomposition of the variation into a stochastic and an inefficiency term. 
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and Kappeler (2006). On the basis of a similar dataset, the robustness analysis addresses three issues: 
the data, the specified models, and the methods applied. 
In a first step, the data set is subject to an outlier detection procedure following Wilson (1993) and a 
bootstrapping procedure to achieve a sound data set and unbiased efficiency estimates of the following 
DEA application. The small number of discarded outliers and the bias correction do not alter the 
findings of the previous paper. Although, the estimated efficiency scores are notably lower, the 
efficiency gap appears to be robust given the data set. 
In a second analysis, we apply the traditional DEA with bias correction on specified models that 
account for regional differences of the services for other DSOs on the one hand and for the network 
characteristics, namely the grid composition, on the other hand. The results of all DEA model 
specifications show low variability in the TE levels but a robust efficiency gap under CRS and VRS 
technologies. Thus, the specification robustness can be confirmed independently from the underling 
technology.  
Finally, the methodical robustness is analyzed by applying SFA with a Translog distance function. The 
efficiency scores consistently show the average East German DSOs to be more efficient but to a small 
extent resulting in a gap of 1 to 3 percentage points only. In addition, the correlation among the DEA 
and the SFA is not very high. As a consequence we cannot confirm methodical robustness of the 
efficiency puzzle. 
Hence, concerning the initial question raised we found that the "Ossis" do really beat the "Wessis" in 
terms of technical efficiency at least for DEA models under CRS technology. Now we can suppose 
that the regulator should apply intensive proofs based on a more detailed dataset concerning possible 
structural differences. Possible reasons for the puzzle are the investment boom in East German 
electricity, a less excess use of labor compared to West Germany and more rapid adaptation of best 
practice. The necessity of the energy sector reconstructing in the 1990s in East Germany induced state 
of the art planning of and great investments in the electricity network. 
Further research should additionally address the time dimension in form of using panel data. 
Unfortunately, accurate data will be available only in a few years due to the fact that BNetzA has 
launched the systematic collection in 2005. 
4.6 Evaluating Potential Gains from Mergers 
4.6.1 Introduction 
The planned incentive-based regulation scheme for German electricity distribution system operators 
(DSOs) will result in the allocative and technical efficiency of network operation becoming a key 
performance driver. As mentioned above, the increase in efficiency required of inefficient companies 
can be realized via direct cost cuts or by utilizing scale and synergy effects from mergers. To some 
extent, the industry has already responded to that challenge over the last years by initiating several 
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mergers that were expected to show positive effects of some kind. Increased industry consolidation is 
expected to take place following the introduction of incentive-based regulation.  
As outlined in section 4.3, numerous studies have estimated the potential for efficiency improvements 
through cost reductions at company level. Little, however, is known about the quantitative impact of 
mergers through scale and synergy effects. In view of this background the motivation of our study is to 
provide first evidence for Germany as regards the extent to which mergers can improve technical 
efficiency levels, and how much of the potential gains can be attributed to cost reductions, scale and 
synergy effects. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 4.6.2 describes the empirical analysis 
covering the model specification and the analyzed scenarios. The relevant framework was introduced 
in section 3.3.2 and the data were discussed in section 4.4. The empirical results are given in section 
4.6.3 and section 4.6.4 offers conclusions and suggestions for future research.  
4.6.2 Methodology 
Our empirical analysis is based on traditional deterministic non-parametric efficiency estimates (Data 
Envelopment Analysis, DEA) for German electricity distribution network operators. Following the 
framework proposed by Bogetoft and Wang (2005), as shown in section 3.3.2, we decompose 
efficiency gains from mergers into cost reductions in the form of technical efficiency as well as 
economies of scale and synergies from joint operation. The results allow us to quantify the overall 
potential gains from mergers for German electricity DSOs as well as the separate role of each of the 
three components. Our analysis focuses on the assumption of non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) 
for the underlying technology and this is motivated by the fact that, on the one hand, the variable 
returns to scale (VRS) are, from a technical point of view, not always feasible, as stated by Bogetoft 
and Wang (2005). On the other hand, we follow the practical implementation of the German regulator 
BNetzA, who argues that NDRS assumption is more plausible because it addresses the issue that 
especially small companies have to put a lot of effort into a change of their size.  
Following up on our previous research, the basic model specification follows the previous study in the 
choice of variables. The models for benchmarking electricity DSOs used in our analysis correspond to 
the Model H2 used in the previous empirical analysis due to its highest correlation with the SFA 
efficiency score. Thus, the model considers input orientation because of pre-defined outputs. The 
variables entering the model on the output side are the electricity delivered to end users, i.e. 
households and industrial users, the number of customers, and a structural variable – the inverse 
density index (IDI) on the low-voltage level. The inverse density index is used as an exogenous cost 
driver beyond the control of the company. As inputs, we specify the number of workers (as an 
approximation for labor costs) and the grid length, separately for aggregated cable and aerial lines (as 
an approximation for capital costs). 
As outlined in the previous section, the results allow us to quantify the overall potential gains from 
mergers for German electricity DSOs as well as the separate role of each of the three components. For 
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our application we define different scenarios in order to analyze different potential merger 
combinations and in order to relate the findings to significant trends and characteristics of the units.  
In a first instance, the framework allows us to assess scale and synergy. We are further able to relate 
the findings to the size of the pre-merged units. In addition, the framework allows us to identify the 
most promising merger combinations and their respective characteristics. Furthermore, we compare 
the similarity of the pre-merger DSOs in relation to the merger effects by defining two measures of 
relative similarity.  
The possible merger cases that we analyze include regional and inter-regional co-operations between 
two or three neighboring companies all over Germany as well as the formation of large-scale 
distribution companies at federal-state level. The spatial proximity is hereby defined from postal city 
codes.  
4.6.3 Empirical Results 
We now turn to the discussion and interpretation of our empirical results based on the different criteria 
established in section 3.3.2. We further limit our interpretation on the combination and mergers of two 
different companies, given the fact that the reflected trends from mergers of three DSOs are very 
similar. We start with the comparison of scale and synergy effects; subsequently we relate the size of 
the companies to the calculated scale and synergy effects and determine the mergers with the highest 
synergy effects. In order to detect certain trends and regularities we evaluate the similarity of pre-
merger and post-merger DSOs. We eventually obtain a general description on state level as to which 
extent inputs or costs could be reduced by merging and adapting to the optimal company size. An 
overview of the effects estimates is provided in Table 4.7. 
 
Table 4.7: Summary of Merger Effects with (Pair-wise Merger, 322 obs.) 
 
θJ TJ θJ* HJ SJ 
Mean 0.448 0.492 0.912 0.952 0.958 
Median 0.437 0.474 0.934 0.976 0.990 
Min 0.175 0.197 0.495 0.698 0.525 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
95th percentile 0.696 0.753 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
As already noted, the total potential merger gains (θJ) are the product of individual improvement in the 
form of technical efficiency of the merging units (TJ) and the pure merger effect (θJ*), where the latter 
effect itself is a product of synergy (HJ) and scale effects (SJ). Obviously, the results show that potential 
gains mainly result from individual improvement, indicating a mean technical efficiency of 
approximately 50%, which is similar to the efficiency scores found in our analysis in 4.5. Beside gains 
from individual improvement, we also found potential gains resulting from synergy and scale effects 
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both of approximately 95% on average. The median values of both pure merger effects also indicate 
that there are more gains associated with synergy than with scale effects.  
As we are more interested in the pure merger gains than in individual technical efficiency 
improvements we now relate the post-merger size of the companies to the scale and synergy effects 
that could be realized. We defined different company characteristics to indicate the size of the 
companies such as the annual amount of electricity supplied or the number of customers. As all 
different definitions point in the same direction we limit our discussion to the size of the companies 
defined as the amount of electricity supplied. In Figure 4.4 we relate the size of the units to the 
respective scale and synergy effects. Here, the units are ordered by size, starting with the smallest 
post-merger unit on the left-hand side and ending with the largest unit on the right-hand side.  
 
Figure 4.4: Synergy and Scale Effects According to Size 
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Source: Own calculations. 
 
The comparison of size with scale and synergy clearly shows one general tendency: the smaller the 
merged unit the higher the scale effect, indicating an optimal size of about 500 GWh (or 
70,000 customers, respectively) shown by values around unity. This describes well the effect of NDRS 
technology, which compares small companies with each other and larger companies with an efficient 
company, which constitutes the CRS frontier. In addition, the synergy effect appears to increase 
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slightly with the size of the company but this trend is less obvious than for the scale effect.51 For large 
units both effects are small, with the scale effect converging to zero. Therefore, potential merger gains 
by means of scale and synergy advantages could be realized rather within the smaller units.  
Having detected general trends we now look in more detail at the company level and at the mergers 
with the highest synergy effects. In Table 4.8 we show the ten most promising mergers with the 
highest-potential pure merger effects (θJ*) related to synergy (HJ) and scale effects (SJ). In addition, 
the overall potential merger effect (θJ), which includes individual technical efficiency improvements 
(TJ), is given. Interestingly, eight of these mergers are between Bavarian utilities, despite the fact that 
Bavarian DSOs cover only about 25% of all DSOs in the sample. In addition, the first five mergers 
located in one region are mainly gaining by scale effects, whereas the synergy effect is more dominant 
for the second group of mergers. 
 
Table 4.8: Ten Most Promising Mergers 
Merger City 
Code 
Name of merged units State θJ TJ θ*J HJ SJ 
M244 83342 
Elektrizitäts-Genossenschaft Tacherting-
Feichten eG Bavaria 0.48 0.97 0.49 0.94 0.53 
83358 Stromversorgung Seebruck eG Bavaria 
M245 83358 Stromversorgung Seebruck eG Bavaria 0.53 0.96 0.55 0.94 0.58 83435 Elektrizitätsgenossenschaft Karlstein eG Bavaria 
M243 
83334 Stromversorgung Inzell eG Bavaria 
0.43 0.71 0.61 0.82 0.75 
83342 Elektrizitäts-Genossenschaft Tacherting-Feichten eG Bavaria 
M246 
83435 Elektrizitätsgenossenschaft Karlstein eG Bavaria 
0.62 1.00 0.62 0.94 0.65 83457 Gemeinde Bayerisch Gmain Bavaria 
M255 84424 
F.X. Mittermaier & Söhne GmbH & Co. KG 
Accum.-Fabrik und Elektrizitäts-Werk Bavaria 0.28 0.42 0.66 1.00 0.66 
84428 Bauer Elektrounternehmen GmbH & Co Bavaria 
M284 90530 Gemeindewerke Wendelstein Bavaria 0.28 0.41 0.67 0.76 0.88 90537 Feuchter Gemeindewerke GmbH Bavaria 
M237 
83080 Gemeindewerke Oberaudorf Elektrizitäts- und Wasserwerk Bavaria 0.32 0.47 0.69 0.83 0.83 
83093 Stern Strom GmbH Bavaria 
M249 83607 Gemeindewerke Holzkirchen GmbH Bavaria 0.37 0.54 0.69 0.78 0.89 83646 Stadtwerke Bad Tölz GmbH Bavaria 
M50 
16816 Stadtwerke Neuruppin GmbH Brandenburg 
0.36 0.52 0.70 0.70 1.00 
18069 Stadtwerke Rostock AG 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
M219 
77694 Hafenverwaltung Kehl -Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts- 
Baden-
Württemberg 0.37 0.45 0.84 0.85 0.99 
77723 Stadtwerke Gengenbach Baden-Württemberg 
Note: The higher the values the greater is the potential of merger gains. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
In order to detect certain general trends we compared the characteristics of the post-merger companies 
to the mean of the whole sample as provided in Table 4.9.52 Our findings of large potential gains for 
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albeit with little explanatory power. 
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small units are supported by the fact that, with an exception of merger no. 50 (M50), the other mergers 
are all characterized by outputs and inputs that are far below the corresponding mean of the sample. 
We also found that the input-output mix differs notably from the sample mean, e.g. the units per 
customer or the share of aerial to cable lines.  
 
Table 4.9: Characteristics of Mergers and the Sample 
Merger Units delivered  Customers Labor Aerial Lines Cable Lines 
M244 29,576 4,100 4 8 212 
M245 13,818 3,126 4 4 121 
M243 42,775 5,993 4 7 175 
M246 15,969 3,404 4 4 103 
M255 22,109 3,766 4 85 46 
M284 94,985 16,165 14 0 188 
M237 45,792 8,511 8 6 99 
M249 131,958 18,402 20 4 196 
M50 440,566 90,390 58 1 1,013 
M219 49,208 4,090 37 0 114 
Sample mean 248,864 33,136 30 84 392 
Sample max 3,808,108 474,983 545 2,431 8,927 
Sample min 398 43 2 0 3 
Note: The inputs are shown with efficient quantities because these are used for calculating merger effects. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
We now move beyond the mere examination of merging companies’ characteristics and of the merger 
effects of a subset of mergers. Therefore, we define two measures that evaluate differences in the 
merger parties’ customer structure, the output side (supplying mainly residential or industrial 
customers), as well as the service area, the input side (rural versus urban), respectively. The 
differences are calculated by each company’s deviation from the mean of the merger parties 
concerning each of these measures and thus, the values lie between zero (no difference) and nearly one 
(large difference). 
The customer structure is approximated by the measure units supplied per customer, which accounts 
for the size of the customer. In the case of very different merging parties we expect the measures to be 
high because in this case we merge a DSO mainly supplying residential customers with a DSO that 
predominantly supplies large industrial customers.  
Concerning the operating area, given that cable lines are mainly used for electricity distribution within 
a city or village, the ratio of km cable lines to total lines is used as an approximation for indicating the 
urban sprawl within the settled area. Equivalently, very heterogeneous DSOs in terms of the area 
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supplied are expected to have high measures, e.g. a DSO supplying a rural area with customers that are 
distributed across the whole area merging with an urban DSO supplying mainly the densely settled 
city. 
After calculating the measures we group the merging companies into three clusters for customer 
structure and operating area, respectively: homogeneous, medium, heterogeneous. The DSOs are 
relatively homogeneous (heterogeneous) if they belong to the group (1/3) of the companies with the 
smallest (largest) values for both measures. The remaining 1/3 distributed around the median value are 
considered to be medium. Eventually, we evaluate nine groups of merger parties.  
Table 4.10 provides an overview of the impact of relative similarity in terms of customer structure and 
the service area on the synergy effect provided in the upper table and the scale effect in the lower 
table, respectively. Basically, we cannot conclude strong statistical correlation between the synergy, 
scale or total effects and both structural measures of relative similarity. In addition, the nine clusters 
each consist of a similar number of mergers, with about 36 mergers indicating no common trend 
between the merged units in form of customer structure and service area. That can be easily explained 
by our quasi-random choice of merged units depending solely on spatial proximity. Nevertheless, the 
analysis reveals some interesting effects in this regard with three major outcomes. 
First, the mean and median synergy and scale effects differ slightly from each other, with higher 
values for the median effects. This shows that both distributions are skewed towards left with higher 
frequency observed near unity. Second, the highest synergy effects (i.e. lowest values) can be 
observed in the case of merging relatively heterogeneous DSOs, especially in terms of customer 
structure as measured in terms of outputs. Thus, gains from portfolio effects are shown more clearly 
on the output side than on the input side. The smallest gains appear to be achieved by merging 
medium or homogeneous companies. Third, the scale effect shows an opposite effect, resulting in 
higher gains for homogeneous companies and lower gains for heterogeneous companies, especially 
with regard to the structure of the service area. Summarizing these findings it may be said that the 
opposite relationship between relative similarity and synergy and scale effects results in a more or less 
uneven picture of the product of both effects – the pure merger gains.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
calculating DEA with and without the IDI. 
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Table 4.10: Relative Similarity and Synergy and Scale Effects 
Synergy Effect Customer Structure 
 Homogeneous Medium  Heterogeneous  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Se
rv
ic
e 
A
re
a
 
Homogeneous 0.940 0.984 0.961 0.986 0.955 0.960 
Medium 0.968 0.992 0.938 0.955 0.935 0.957 
Heterogeneous 0.962 0.980 0.969 0.988 0.935 0.956 
 
Scale Effect Customer Structure 
 Homogeneous Medium  Heterogeneous  
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Se
rv
ic
e 
A
re
a
 
Homogeneous 0.944 0.957 0.947 0.978 0.939 0.970 
Medium 0.975 0.995 0.941 0.974 0.960 0.984 
Heterogeneous 0.966 0.996 0.969 0.998 0.980 1.000 
Note: Light grey values show high effects (i.e. small values) whereas dark grey values show small effects (i.e. high values). 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Finally, we use our methodology to assess if, and to which extent, further restructuring towards fewer 
but significantly larger DSOs can lead to additional efficiency gains. We therefore calculate a scenario 
in which all DSOs of a Federal State (Bundesland) are merged into a single entity. Not surprisingly, 
scale effects of such large mergers are negligible under NDRS. However, there is scope for significant 
synergy effects, as shown in Table 4.11. For comparison purposes, the table also reports the initial 
number of DSOs per state as well as the average synergy gains per state for mergers between two and 
three DSOs.53 Obviously, average synergy gains are mainly larger if all DSOs of a state are merged 
into a single company, which indicates that significant synergies can be realized if company sizes are 
significantly increased.54 In most cases, gains from scale effects are higher in the case of merging two 
or three DSOs but that appears to be due to the underlying NDRS assumption. The technology allows 
scale efficiency only for the smaller DSOs implicitly assuming VRS technology, whereas larger DSOs 
are compared with CRS and thus, no scale effects are expected to exist.  
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 In the case of a merger between two or three DSOs from different Bundesländer we allocate them separately to all states. 
54
 The only exception here is Bremen, a city-state (Stadtstaat) for which there is only one DSO in the sample. 
59 
Table 4.11: Comparison of Synergy Effects from Different Merger Scenarios 
   NDRS merger of: 
No. Federal State No. of DSOs …2 DSOs …3 DSOs …all DSOs in a state 
  
 HJ SJ HJ SJ HJ SJ 
1 Baden-Württemberg 45 0.95 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.83 1.00 
2 Bavaria 77 0.94 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.97 
3 Brandenburg 12 0.94 0.98 0.92 0.98 0.86 0.99 
4 Bremen 1 0.96 0.94 0.92 0.82 1.00 1.00 
5 Hesse 19 0.95 0.99 0.93 0.99 0.94 1.00 
6 Lower-Saxony 37 0.95 0.95 0.92 0.96 0.88 0.98 
7 Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania 
6 0.95 0.97 0.92 0.98 0.94 1.00 
8 North Rhine-Westphalia 36 0.96 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.89 1.00 
9 Rhineland-Palatinate 16 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.87 1.00 
10 Saarland 9 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.88 1.00 
11 Saxony 22 0.96 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.85 1.00 
12 Saxony-Anhalt 16 0.94 0.99 0.92 1.00 0.71 1.00 
13 Schleswig-Holstein 12 0.97 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.76 0.89 
14 Thuringia 15 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.91 0.99 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
4.6.4 Conclusions 
Against the background of the planned introduction of an incentive-based regulation scheme for 
German electricity DSOs in 2009 we analyzed the potential merger gains among selected electricity 
distribution companies in Germany. Within this framework we evaluated how efficiency levels could 
be improved not only by reducing costs but also by potential scale and synergy effects resulting from 
mergers.  
Following Bogetoft and Wang (2005), we applied traditional deterministic non-parametric efficiency 
analysis (DEA) to estimate overall gains from mergers and to decompose the gains into cost 
reductions as well as economies of scale and synergies from joint operation. 
We defined different scenarios to analyze the different effects and to detect certain trends concerning 
the most promising mergers. Our results show that scale and synergy effects are possible and that in 
general larger efficiency gains could be realized by means of synergy effects than scale effects, which 
at least in parts appear to be due to the underlying NDRS technology. A comparison of size with scale 
and synergy clearly shows that potential merger gains by means of scale and synergy advantages could 
mainly be realized within smaller units. Looking at the impact of relative similarity in terms of 
customer structure and the service area we did not find a strong statistical correlation between the 
synergy, scale or total effect and the structural measures of relative similarity but it appears to show 
that a more heterogeneous structure is advantageous for gaining from synergy effects and that a more 
homogeneous structure is advantageous for achieving scale effects. In view of this finding we suggest 
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that in further research parameterization of the estimated frontier is important to produce more precise 
insights into the driving forces of synergy effects. 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we focused on the analysis of efficiency and restructuring in Germany against the 
background of the planned start of an incentive regulation scheme for German electricity DSOs in 
2009. After describing the past developments in industry restructuring, we reviewed the relevant 
literature and data sets on which we applied non-parametric DEA. The two data sets cover 323 
German electricity DSOs and are based on data of 2004.  
In our first application, we provided additional evidence concerning the discussion of homogeneity of 
German DSOs. We therefore tested the robustness of the structural difference of technical efficiency 
scores between East German and West German electricity distribution companies found by 
Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler (2006). In a first step, the data robustness was tested by using 
an alternative data set of 2004, data corrected for twelve outliers found by means of the procedure 
proposed by Wilson (1993), and an ex-post bootstrapping bias correction in all DEA models. In a 
second step, the specification robustness was tested. Therefore, we used model specifications with 
special focus on the units delivered and the grid composition on the grounds that this appeared to 
account more appropriately for the production environment. The third and last step accounted for the 
methodological robustness by applying parametric SFA on the models specified. Hence, concerning 
the initial question of this study we can confirm the findings of Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler 
(2006) that the "Ossis" do really beat the "Wessis" in terms of technical efficiency at least for the DEA 
models. As a consequence, the regulator should apply intensive proofs based on a more detailed data 
set concerning possible structural differences. Possible reasons for the puzzle are the investment boom 
in the East German electricity industry, a less excessive use of labor as compared to West Germany, 
and a more rapid adaptation of best practice procedures. The necessity of the energy industry 
restructuring in the 1990s in East Germany induced state-of-the-art planning of and great investments 
in the electricity network. 
In our second study, we analyzed the potential merger gains among selected electricity distribution 
companies in Germany. Within this framework we evaluated how efficiency levels could be improved 
not only by reducing inputs or costs but also by potential scale and synergy effects resulting from 
mergers. Following Bogetoft and Wang (2005), we applied traditional deterministic non-parametric 
DEA to estimate overall gains from mergers and to decompose the gains into cost reductions as well 
as economies of scale and synergies from joint operation. Concerning the question to be answered by 
this study, our results show that scale and synergy effects are indeed possible and that in general larger 
efficiency gains could be realized by means of synergy effects than by scale effects. A comparison of 
size with scale and synergy clearly shows that potential merger gains by means of scale and synergy 
advantages could mainly be realized within smaller units.  
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5 Efficiency and Restructuring in the US 
5.1 Introduction 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Europe and the US experienced a substantial merger wave in the energy 
industry that resulted in assets of about $ 180 bn being acquired in Europe in 2006 and thus, Europe 
becoming the key market in terms of ownership changes (PwC, 2007). The restructuring in the US has 
also been guided by other business strategies, such as joint ventures, and the formation of parent 
holding companies. The US can be seen as a precursor in energy market reforms as they introduced 
incentive regulation in as early as 1994 and the relevant data are published in a very detailed way.  
Considering that Germany designed its regulatory scheme in view of US regulatory experience, it may 
be assumed that other experiences will also be of interest. With incentive-based regulation, which is 
based on cost reductions, putting more pressure on regulated companies, we thus expect that certain 
trends in business strategies will also be observed more often in Germany. 
In the first step of our analysis, we make use of well-defined data sets with a huge time dimension in 
order to apply parametric panel data techniques, which might be useful for the German regulator 
provided they dispose of an appropriate data set, i.e. data covering several years. In our third empirical 
study we analyze the sensitivity of efficiency estimates by applying different parametric models that 
treat company-specific heterogeneity differently on a panel data set of US electricity DSOs.  
As benchmarking methods can not only be used to estimate efficiency but also to evaluate the success 
of such strategies we extend our analysis in a second step to business strategies. Our fourth application 
therefore focuses on the success of mergers of US electricity DSOs. In our fifth study we extend our 
analysis to certain business strategies of US gas TSOs, such as mergers, joint ventures, and the 
formation of holding companies.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: sections 5.2 and 5.3 give an overview of the 
restructuring process in the US electricity and gas industries, respectively. The respective literature 
dealing mainly with parametric frontier approaches for benchmarking especially US electricity DSOs 
and natural gas TSOs is reviewed in section 5.4. The data used for our analysis is discussed in section 
5.5. Our three empirical applications based on parametric panel data models are provided in sections 
5.6, 5.7, and 5.8, respectively. Our conclusions are provided in section 5.9. 
5.2 Industry Restructuring in the US Electricity Industry 
The electricity industry in the US is characterized by a large number of market participants; 
approximately 5,000 in 1998. Generation is provided by utilities (investor-owned utilities (IOUs), 
public power, and federal ownership) and independent power producers. In 1998, approximately 200 
IOUs accounted for 2/3 of total generation and capacity. Each of the 3,000 electric utilities engaged in 
generation, transmission, and/or distribution holds a monopoly franchise over a specified geographic 
area and is subject to regulation by state and federal agencies. Most IOUs had been vertically 
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integrated prior to the passing of the federal Energy Policy Act of 1992, and state legislation in the 
1990s required them to divest generation activities from the regulated transmission and distribution 
businesses to foster wholesale and retail competition. As a consequence, regulated and unregulated 
businesses are often organized in one holding company; by the end of 2004, 31 electricity “top holding 
companies” controlling more than two utilities had been registered (Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), 1999; US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 2008). An overview of 
the location of the IOUs in the US is given in Figure 5.1. 
 
Figure 5.1: U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utility Holding Companies 
 
Source: Zschokke (2004). 
 
General US antitrust policy has focused largely on preventing the formation of uncompetitive market 
structures (ex ante) and prosecuting explicit collusion ex post. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s (FERC) antitrust and regulatory authority over IOUs in the regulation of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) derives from the Federal Power Act of 1935. The commission has jurisdictional 
power over wholesale electricity transactions and their supporting transmission arrangements 
(Bushnell, 2003). In 1996, FERC adopted the horizontal merger guidelines of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission, hereby drawing upon their experience and 
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minimizing potential differences among the federal agencies sharing jurisdiction over proposed M&A 
(Pierce, 2005).55  
A typical merger review process includes the identification of the relevant products and the relevant 
geographic markets as well as an estimation of the price effect of the proposed merger as measured by 
its impact on supplier concentration in the relevant market. For electricity M&As, the products are 
non-company energy, short-term capacity (company energy), and long-term capacity, i.e. the most 
frequently traded products among the non-restructured vertically integrated utilities on the periphery 
of the spot market (Bushnell, 2003).56 
Recent M&A activities have been following a long tradition of concentration in the US electricity 
sector. The period 1917-1936 was the first “merger wave” and also the greatest consolidation process 
in the history of the sector with more than 200 mergers per year, peaking at over 300 mergers per year 
in the mid-1920s. As the nation’s economy expanded, small operating companies formed holding 
companies to pool the engineering, operating, and financial resources needed to overcome 
technological difficulties and capital constraints (for example, large-scale interconnections). This first 
wave of merger activity ended due to widespread financial abuse (Samuel Insull’s empire – the 
precursor to Enron – is the most infamous example) and the federal government began to exert a 
regulatory hand: the assets of many holding companies were subjected to reorganization and 
divestiture while the remaining holding companies were limited to a single integrated electricity 
system. More than 750 subsidiaries were spun off from the holding companies from 1935-1950; after 
that, consolidation continued, but at a greatly reduced pace (EIA, 1999; Ray et al., 1992).  
After 1965, when the IOUs assumed a dominant role in the consolidation process, 76% of the acquired 
companies joined an IOU. The relative size of mergers grew also, leading to the “comfort level” that 
government, utilities, and financial analysts generally express about the mega-mergers of the present 
era. The third merger wave of the sector began in the mid-1990s, peaked in the late 1990s, and has 
recovered somewhat since 2005. In the period 1994-2002 70 mergers with a combined value of 180 
billion US dollars could be observed within the electricity industry (Edison Electric Institute, cited in 
Kwoka and Pollitt, 2005, p. 33). See Table A.1 for the mergers approved by FERC and utilized for the 
purposes of calculation in this paper (EIA, 1999; Ray et al., 1992). 
As a summary it can be said that three major trends have defined M&A activities in the US electricity 
sector in the most recent wave: (1) the increasing size of IOUs and their concentration of generation 
capacity; (2) the disintegration of many vertically integrated IOUs into generation, transmission, and 
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 FERC is frequently involved in reviewing M&As to ensure competitive markets and access to reliable services at 
reasonable prices. In recent years, DOJ has relied upon FERC’s analyses and assumed a more passive role. 
56
 See Pierce (2005) for an overview of the development of FERC’s work and policies; see Bushnell (2003) for a full 
description of the US merger review process.  
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distribution;57 and (3) convergence – expanding IOUs formerly dedicated to electricity to include 
natural gas (EIA, 1999).58 
5.3 Industry Restructuring in the US Natural Gas Industry 
The US natural gas transmission system is characterized by a highly integrated network of 210 intra-
state and interstate pipelines, which evolved over the last few decades (see Figure 5.2). With more 
than 210,000 miles of network length and a capacity of 148 billion cubic feet per day, the 109 
interstate pipelines play the dominant role within the system. In 2005, the lion share (85%) of the 48 
trillion cubic feet that constitute the total volume transported was transported by the major interstate 
pipelines in order to supply mainly the consumption areas in the Northeast, the Midwest and 
California with gas coming from the South and the Gulf of Mexico, as pictured in Figure 5.3 (EIA, 
2006a, 2007).  
 
Figure 5.2: U.S. Natural Gas Pipeline Network 
 
Source: EIA (2007): http://www.eia.doe.gov, November 2007. 
 
                                                     
57
 For most mergers, the major cost-saving potential is in labor costs. Using a sample of five mergers, EIA (1999) concluded 
that over 50 percent of the expected savings resulted from a reduction in corporate and operations labor. See FERC (1981) 
for a detailed description of 15 sources of cost savings for generation and transmission by power pooling.  
58
 See EIA (1999), p. 33, for a description of the strategic benefits of a combined electricity and natural gas company over all 
natural gas supply-chain segments, such as natural gas supply security. For electricity distributors, the benefits emerge by 
cross-selling activities, expanding overhead over a larger customer base and combining administrative functions.  
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Figure 5.3: U.S. Principal Interstate Natural Gas Flow Summary, 2005 
 
Source: EIA (2006b): Natural Gas Annuals 2005. 
 
The interstate pipeline industry underwent a period of restructuring and re-regulation during the past 
decade but has not been deregulated yet. Due to Order 636, issued by FERC in April 1992, the 
industry had to vertically separate their interstate natural gas transportation segment from non-
regulated merchant functions (sales) by November 1993. Although Order 636 reduces the degree of 
total regulation, the operational and business practices of interstate pipelines are still under regulatory 
oversight by FERC. This includes the determination of rate-setting methods following a traditional 
cost-of-service regulation based on the Natural Gas Act.59 Other examples of FERCs responsibilities 
are the definition of rules for business practices and the approval of building or extending pipelines, 
natural gas storage fields, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities (EIA, 2007). 
Aside from unbundling within the supply chain of natural gas, FERC Order 636 also affected the 
ownership and business structure of many corporate parent gas companies. Some very large 
acquisitions had increased or even created parent holding companies, although the corporate strategies 
behind it changed. The unbundling of gas transportation and sales had also led to the creation of 
affiliated natural gas marketing units or even subsidiaries. One predominant strategy was the 
formation of a nationwide or regional pipeline network in support of trading operations, as pursued by 
El Paso and Williams. The horizontal concentration also raised concerns of anticompetitive company 
behavior and hence, the approval of such acquisitions was often accompanied by divestment 
requirements. For instance, for acquisition of the parent company Sonat holding assets in four 
pipelines in 1999, the buying company El Paso was forced by antitrust agencies to divest its interests 
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 Loeffler (2004) provides a detailed description of FERC’s rate-setting procedure.  
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in three pipelines correspondingly. Some companies focused on the enlargement of their marketing 
arms as an alternative corporate strategy without changes within the pipeline segment. For instance, 
Enron invested heavily in the gas-trading business and other pipeline operators were engaged in the 
sale of electricity following convergence mergers with electricity-related businesses (EIA, 2001). In 
2002, a major transfer of pipeline assets occurred due to a worsening of financial problems of many 
parent companies (EIA, 2003).60 An overview of the dominant acquisitions can be seen in Table A.2. 
It provides information on the structure of the parent holding companies in 2007 and the history of 
ownership changes of separate pipelines. 
5.4 Literature Review 
This section reviews briefly former studies related to parametric benchmarking approaches related 
mainly to US electricity DSOs and gas transmission companies. We want to provide insights into the 
findings and the techniques suggested for analyzing efficiency effects caused by different business 
strategies gains. 
US Electricity Distribution Companies 
An overview of mergers and acquisition (M&A) in the field of electricity industry in the US and 
efficiency measures is provided by Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007) who reviewed three streams of 
relevant literature: (1) US electricity merger literature; (2) mergers and productivity literature; and (3) 
electricity distribution efficiency and productivity measurements. Concerning benchmarking 
efficiency of US electricity distributors, there exist two main applied techniques: the average-based, 
stochastic approach and the frontier-based, deterministic approach.61 
Kwoka (2005) used a dataset of 436 electricity distribution utilities in the US (117 IOUs and 319 
publicly owned utilities in 1989) to assess determinants of average costs and cost performance 
applying Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression techniques. The author found economies of scale 
with respect to the outputs electricity units delivered and the number of customer, but the effects were 
minimal relative to the size of the service territory. As a result, economies of scope and economies 
from vertical integration in the distribution business could not be stated. Kwoka concluded that a 
“positive” reason for mergers can only be found in the scale effects. In addition, the findings indicated 
that the systematic cost advantages of public utilities were 14% on average compared to IOUs.  
Lowry, Getachew and Hovde (2005) assessed the average-based cost performance and efficiency of 66 
US electricity distributors in 1991-2002 and applied Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS). 
They used data from FERC and modified it to control for the age of the investment. In addition to the 
finding of minimal scope effects, the authors highlighted the number of customers as the dominant 
cost driver and that the age of investment had a significant positive effect on costs. Over time the 
annual cost decreased by 0.6% to 0.8% depending on the specification chosen. 
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 EIA (2001, 2003) discusses several case studies describing the growth strategy within the gas pipeline industry, such as El 
Paso, Williams, and Kinder-Morgan. 
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As already mentioned Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007) used DEA for estimating technical efficiency 
scores for US distributors and applied a two-stage procedure on FERC data for 78 IOUs from 1994-
2001 and several realized mergers within the industry. Efficiency was calculated in a first stage; in a 
second stage, a Tobit regression was estimated to assess several merger effects on efficiency. The 
main finding is that post-merger, the activities of merging parties were less efficient than those of non-
merging companies indicating that merging parties did not appear to increase efficiency.  
US Gas Transmission Companies 
Concerning the analysis of US natural gas transmission companies, there exists a bulk of empirical 
literature that is often related to the regulation of the gas companies but the former studies concentrate 
on the assessment of efficiency and do not evaluate the success of business strategies so far.  
Sickles and Streitwieser (1992) analyzed the performance of 14 US gas transportation companies for 
the period 1977-1985 with DEA and SFA and found decreasing technical efficiency over time that 
appeared to be caused by deregulation of wellhead prices in the US.  
Granderson and Linvill (1999) and Granderson (2000) studied the cost efficiency of 20 US gas TSOs 
for the period 1977-1987 by using DEA and random effect GLS in order to assess benchmarks that 
account for the effects of regulation. They found that the industry transmission costs decreased by  
0.3% and that the individual efficiency scores diverged over the sample period. 
Several studies used a dataset of gas TSOs from other countries and enriched the dataset with US gas 
TSOs studies in order to carry out a comparative analysis, such as Kim et al. (1999) for sample of 
TSOs from South-Korea, European countries, and the US, Carrington, Coelli, and Groom (2002) for 
Australian and US gas TSOs, or the recent studies of WIK-Consult (2007) and Jamasb et al. (2007) for 
a sample of European and US companies. Jamasb et al. (2007) give a good survey about the literature 
with respect to benchmarking gas distribution and transmission companies, even describing the 
variables used for the empirical analysis. 
5.5 Data 
This section gives an introduction to the data used for our empirical analyses of US electricity 
distribution companies and US natural gas transmission companies, with a focus on the data sources 
and the data modifications. As already mentioned, our three empirical investigations follow different 
objectives. The first application focuses on the sensitivity of technical efficiency estimates using 
different parametric frontier models for panel data. The second application assesses the changes in 
cost efficiency that is driven by mergers in the process of industry restructuring. Both applications 
focus on US electricity distributors. The third application uses data from US natural gas transmission 
companies and investigates the impact of different business strategies on technical efficiency during 
industry restructuring. 
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 See Fabrizio, Rose, and Wolfram (2007) for an application of average-based deterministic approach to assess the effect 
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US Electricity Distribution Companies 
The basic data requirements for the both studies are twofold. First, the production process is described 
by different variables in order to assess technical efficiency (section 5.6) and cost efficiency (section 
5.7). Second, data are needed that are related to the mergers analyzed in the latter application.  
The data used for both analyses of electricity distribution companies comes from the publicly available 
FERC Form 162 filings. We follow Kwoka and Pollitt (2005) in the definition of data and the 
calculation of variables for the electricity distributors, thus requiring: total expenditures (TOTEX), 
operating and maintenance expenditures (OPEX), output quantities, input quantities, input prices, and 
structural variables. The original dataset consisted of 295 IOUs and reduced to 108 IOUs due to the 
lack of data and data inconsistencies concerning some variables in order to have a balanced dataset 
with observations for each year. All monetary variables are controlled for inflationary effects by 
means of a GDP Deflator and thus, these variables are expressed in terms of year 2000 dollars. The 
deflator is based on Worldbank estimates and is provided by United Nations Statistical Division 
(unstats.un.org). 
The variables used and the corresponding sources and modification are displayed in Table A.3. Unlike 
Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007), we calculate the Total Distribution Assets (TDA) as the sum of the 
distribution assets (DA) and the share of total distribution assets of all assets (S2)63 times other assets 
(OA):  
  TDA = DA+S2*OA 
 
We also calculate the total number of units delivered (Nud), and a capital price variable (average 
capital price - AvCP) that is the ratio of capital costs (CC) and total distribution assets: 
 
  AvCP = CC / TDA = EBITDA / TOT 
 
where AvCP is the ratio of EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortization) 
and total assets implicitly assuming a constant capital price for the entire supply chain. The number of 
employees in distribution (TDemp) is calculated as a product of total employees (Temp) times the 
share of distribution on total salaries (S1).  
The dataset used for the first study consists of 108 US electric utilities covering the twelve years  
1994-2005, thus resulting in a total number of 1296 observations. The sample accounts for 68% of 
total electricity sold and for 52% of total customers in the year 2004 in the US. For the sample period, 
these fractions are rather constant over time. In order to use a very simple model to estimate a multi-
                                                                                                                                                                     
regulatory restructuring on electric generation efficiency in the US. 
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 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Form No. 1 is a comprehensive financial and operating report submitted for rate 
regulation and financial audits of investor owned utilities. 
63
 Kwoka and Pollitt (2005) used the share of distribution business in administration (S1) as weight for other assets instead, 
but to our mind it appears to be more appropriate to use the share of distribution assets as an approximation of a weight for 
other assets due to possible differences between the intensity of the distribution business in maintenance costs and assets. 
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output production frontier (distance function), we use the total distribution costs (C, in 1,000 $) as 
input and the two outputs total electricity sold (YE, in GWh) and the total number of customers (YNC). 
The observed heterogeneity is accounted by the share of residential of total sales (Z) following Kwoka 
and Pollitt (2007). They argued that residential sales are more costly compared to industrial sales. 
Related higher infrastructure costs and additional need for service as well as support makes it more 
likely that a high share reduces efficiency. The summary statistics of the used variables are given in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics; US Electricity Distribution Companies (1,296 Observations) 
Variable Explanation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
C Total Distribution Costs (1,000 $) 299,805 364,220 2,091 2,879,567 
YE Total Electricity Sold (GWh) 21,457 23,970 128 288,007 
YNC Total Number of Customers (#) 608,178 674,562 5,565 4,321,896 
Z Share of Residential on Total Sales 0.269 0.084 0.027 0.517 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The second study on electricity distributors is based on a smaller dataset due to the lack of necessary 
data since the year 2002. Thus, the sample that covers 108 DSOs but only for the eight year period 
1994-2001 consists of a balanced panel comprising 864 observations; this dataset accounts for 70% of 
total electricity sold and 54% of total customers in 2000. The ratios are quite constant for all years in 
our sample period. The variables used describe a cost frontier and therefore consist of total distribution 
costs (C, in 1,000 $), the outputs total electricity sold (YE, in GWh) and total number of customers 
(YNC), the input prices of labor (WL, in $) and capital (WK, in $), and the structural variable network 
density (Z, as share of residential of total sales). In calculating labor prices, we assume that wages are 
equal to the labor costs. In consequence, we allocate the share of OPEX that is not directly due to 
wages to the capital costs and respectively capital prices. In doing so, we implicitly assume that these 
costs might be mainly explained by maintenance costs not generated by labor.  
In addition, merger data also come from FERC that is dated by the year FERC issued a decision in 
form of a refusal or an approval of the merger plan.64 The dataset enables us to classify the 108 IOUs 
into buying utilities (26), acquired companies (26), and non-merging utilities (61) because these 
utilities submit data to FERC for the whole period even if they were involved in a merger. Thus, we 
can interpret the utility afterwards as a subsidiary of a holding company.65 Table 5.2 displays the 
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 In some cases there is a one-year lag between the issuance of the final decision by FERC and the completion of the merger. 
Additional reviews by state agencies can sometimes delay a pending merger.  
65
 The difference of five can be explained by companies that are buyers in one year and were acquired afterwards or vice 
versa. 
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distribution of the 29 successful mergers considered during our time period and Table A.1 lists the 
related companies.66  
 
Table 5.2: Year of Mergers Covered of Electricity Distribution Companies 
Year Merger Buyer Target 
1994 0 0 0 
1995 1 1 0 
1996 0 0 0 
1997 7 6 8 
1998 4 4 2 
1999 4 3 4 
2000 7 11  11 
2001 6 4  5  
Total 29 29 30 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The summary statistics of the variables used of the total data sample as well as differentiated by 
buying, target, and non-merging companies are shown in Table 5.3. The data is very heterogeneous 
and it is worth to note, that the merging party is larger than the average non-merging utility on average 
whereas the buyer has clearly the greatest company size.  
 
Table 5.3: Summary Statistics; US Electricity Distribution Companies (864 Observations) 
  Sample  
(864 obs) 
Buyer  
(208 obs.) 
Target  
(208 obs) 
Control  
(488 obs) 
Variable Explanation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Mean Mean 
C Total Distribution Costs (1,000 $) 274,966 341,199 2,077 2,727,000 367,963 270,960 240,571 
YE Total Electricity Sold (GWh) 21,185 23,643 128 182,194 27,358 19,516 19,396 
YNC Total Number of Customers (#) 609,381 703,044 5,565 3,935,296 763,234 623,227 541,165 
XL Total Employees in Distribution (#) 867 955 9 5.096 1,050 856 788 
XK Total Distribution Assets (1,000 $) 1,209,705 1,501,335 7,522 10,890,000 1,560,282 1,195,290 1,081,727 
WL Avg. Costs of Labor (Wages in $) 37,459 11,530 13,723 110,238 37,503 36,787 37,539 
WK 
Avg. Price of Capital (Capex plus 
non-wage Opex in $) 0.204 0.051 0.068 0.529 0.214 0.205 0.201 
Z Share of Residential on Total Sales 0.270 0.085 0.042 0.518 0.238 0.256 0285 
Source: Own calculations.  
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 Only successful mergers are considered because we are interested in investigating realized efficiency changes by merging 
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US Gas Transmission Companies 
Our empirical analysis of the US natural gas transmission companies also requires data covering the 
production process described by inputs, outputs, and environmental variables and information about 
the business strategies of the companies being analyzed, namely the ownership structure and the 
change of ownership of the natural gas interstate pipelines in the US.  
We mainly make use of the FERC Form 2/2A67 data (Major and Non-major Natural Gas Pipeline 
Annual Reports) for gathering the variables covering financial and physical information, as total 
revenues (Y), transmission assets (XASSETS), operating and maintenance costs (XOPEX), peak delivery 
(ZPEAK), and ownership. The corresponding sources and the relevant accounts within the FERC 
database are displayed in Table A.4. The initial FERC database consists of up to 118 pipelines for the 
analyzed period 1996-2005. In order to achieve a balanced panel structure, the total number of 
pipelines reduced remarkably to 47 pipelines (42 onshore and five offshore pipelines) due to 
inconsistencies and missing data within the dataset. Thus, our dataset covers about 85% of interstate 
pipeline network in terms of mileage and about 93% of pipeline capacity in 2005, indicating that 
mainly small pipelines had been discarded from the initial sample.68 Aside the use of the monetary 
input total revenue and monetary outputs total OPEX and total transmission assets used, we take 
into account the capacity of a pipeline network by means of using peak delivery as environmental 
variable. All monetary variables are controlled for inflationary effects by means of a GDP Deflator 
and thus, these variables are expressed in terms of year 2000 dollars. The deflator is based on 
Worldbank estimates and is provided by United Nations Statistical Division (unstats.un.org). 
Summary Statistics of the main variables used are given in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Summary Statistics; US Gas Transmission Companies (470 Observations) 
Variable Explanation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Y Total Revenues (mio. $, base year 2000) 200 199 0.064 967 
XOPEX OPEX (tsd $, base year 2000) 59,300 71,200 2 351,000 
XASSETS Total Transmission Assets (mio. $, base year 2000) 1,160 1,180 11 5,400 
ZPEAK Peak Delivery (1,000 Dth per day) 3,084 3.099 73 14,900 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Additional data about the ownership structure, the holding structure, and ownership changes come 
from SEC, EIA, and several pipeline operators’ websites. As mentioned above, we focus on mergers, 
joint ventures, and holding structures as types of business strategies in our analysis. Therefore, we 
made the following definitions: A transaction that allows a company to control at least 50% of the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
and not the potential ones.  
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 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Form No. 2/2A is a comprehensive financial and operating report submitted for 
rate regulation and financial audits of major and non-major natural gas pipelines. 
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ownership of a pipeline is defined as an acquisition because the buying company gains significant 
control over the pipeline by this transaction. In our sample, 47 acquisitions are analyzed and the lion 
share contains of transactions of full ownership (100%).69 Acquisitions are dated from the year of 
completion. See Table 5.5 for an overview of the occurrence and the frequency of pipeline 
acquisitions utilized for the purposes of calculation in this paper. The highest number of acquisitions 
covered occurred in 1999, when El Paso bought Sonat with a number of pipelines and the 
corresponding divestitures of El Paso.  
 
Table 5.5: Year and Frequency of Acquisitions Covered of US Gas Transmission Companies 
Year No. of 
acquisitions 
 Frequency of  
acquisitions of a pipeline 
No. of 
acquisitions 
1996 3  No Acquisition 14 
1997 5  One Acquisition 24 
1998 1  Two Acquisitions 7 
1999 12  Three Acquisitions 3 
2000 7    
2001 4    
2002 4    
2003 4    
2004 5    
2005 1    
Total 46  Total 46 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
A joint venture is defined as an ownership that does not cover 100% of a pipeline; there are about five 
joint ventures on average in our dataset.70 A holding covers all pipelines that are owned by one 
specific company that owns also at least one other pipeline; the respective ownership can be a co-
ownership. In our sample, we focus on the ownership structure of 13 separate company holdings of 
several “big players” in this industry that are significantly represented in our dataset: Coastal, 
Centerpoint, Chevron, El Paso, Enron, Kinder-Morgan, NiSource, Oneok (former Northern Border 
Partners), Questar, Southern Union, Spectra (former Duke), Transcanada, and Williams.71 
Interestingly, the pipelines within a holding cover about 70% of all observations, about 65% of the 
total interstate pipeline network, and about 70% of the pipeline capacity, respectively. This indicates a 
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 The proportions remain quite constant over the analyzed period. 
69
 Six transactions do not indicate changes in full ownership: five of them transfer 50%; one transaction covers only 18%. 
70
 The number of joint ventures changed over time due to acquisitions of outstanding shares or divestitures of pipeline parts. 
71
 In this context, a company holding dummy represents only holding companies representing at least ten observations and 
two pipelines in our sample to ensure a minimum variance within these variables. Thus, Boardwalk, Dominion, Enbridge, 
and MidAmerican are not incorporated in the variable list. Can be partly explained be a trend towards acquisitions of 
pipelines between holding companies.  
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high degree of horizontal integration within the interstate pipeline industry.72 An overview of the 
holding structure, the specific pipelines, their operating characteristics, the corresponding mergers of 
the interstate gas pipeline industry is given in Table A.2.73  
5.6 Evaluating Parametric Frontier Estimation Techniques 
5.6.1 Introduction 
With the introduction of incentive based regulation mechanisms, efficiency measurement 
(benchmarking) has been widely applied to electricity distribution utilities, both in academic studies as 
well as regulatory practice.74 Previous applications have found substantial differences among different 
methods of measurement in electricity distribution. Jamasb and Pollitt (2003), Estache, Rossi, and 
Ruzzier (2004), and Farsi and Filippini (2004) reported significant efficiency discrepancies depending 
on the cross-sectional econometric modeling specification for European, South American, and Swiss 
samples. However, Horrace and Schmidt (1996) and later Jensen (2000) showed that the individual 
efficiency estimates in cross-sectional data suffer from considerable inconsistency anyway and panel 
data can solve that problem as the variance of the estimators of the individual inefficiency component 
converges to zero if the time dimension goes to infinity. In a multi-period (panel data) setting, 
empirical studies are rather scarce yet.  
In a recent paper, Farsi, Filippini, and Greene (2006) applied different stochastic frontier panel data 
models on a set of 59 Swiss distribution utilities for a nine year-period. The paper addressed two major 
issues: The consistency of results with regard to different panel data methods and, related to that, the 
treatment and influence of unobserved company-specific heterogeneity. Therefore, the authors 
compared the results of established models such as a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) model 
proposed by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) as well as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) in line 
with Pitt and Lee (1981) with the ‘true’ random effects model introduced by Greene (2004, 2005). 
They found that the latter which is able to distinguish between company heterogeneity and actual 
inefficiency delivered much higher average cost efficiency estimates. In addition, the estimates were 
rather uncorrelated to the GLS and MLE results. These findings are non-trivial. When different 
econometric models lead to differences among efficiency estimates, which again are used to derive 
company individual productivity catch-up targets (i.e. X-factors), regulation imposes high and 
unforeseeable risks on regulated companies.  
The objective of this study is to provide additional evidence of the sensitivity of efficiency estimates in 
frontier panel models within the electricity distribution business based on a broader and somewhat 
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 The proportions are fairly the same for all years that can be partly explained by a trend towards acquisitions of pipelines 
between holding companies. 
73
 Note that not all pipelines and minor ownership changes listed are contained in the dataset due to the balanced panel 
structure and the definition of mergers in our analysis. 
74
 For an overview, see Jamasb and Pollitt (2001). 
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more important sample, a collection of 108 US electricity distribution utilities over twelve years.75 In 
contrast to Farsi, Filippini, and Greene (2006), we follow Growitsch, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005) and 
apply a distance function approach.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 5.6.2 describes briefly the methodological 
background and estimation strategy applied to the data shown in section 5.5. Section 5.6.3 presents the 
results and section 5.6.4 concludes. 
5.6.2 Methodology 
As discussed above, there are two advantages in using panel data in efficiency analysis: they produce 
consistent individual efficiency scores; and they allow for a differentiation of inefficiency and 
heterogeneity of companies. However, established panel data models, for instance the random effects 
estimation by Pitt and Lee (1981) or the Schmidt and Sickles (1984) random effects model have 
neglected in doing so. Instead, both strands of models have interpreted time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity as inefficiency.  
We estimate US electricity distribution utilities’ inefficiency with the MLE model of Pitt and Lee 
(1981) and the GLS estimator by Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and compare the estimates to those of 
Greene’s true random effects model. As suggested by Greene (2005), we use Halton draws in order to 
achieve an adequate and efficient approximation of the true likelihood function.76 
In contrast to previous research comparing different estimation methods, we apply a distance function 
approach. Originally proposed by Shephard (1953, 1970), distance functions have several advantages 
compared to production or cost functions.  
Their major benefit in describing a multi-input multi-output production technology is that they allow 
refraining from specifying a behavioral objective (such as cost minimization or profit maximization). 
This is especially advantageous and more realistic when dealing with regulated industries (Estache, 
Rossi, and Ruzzier, 2004). That is because classical behavioral assumptions are likely to be violated 
(Rungsuriyawiboon and Coelli, 2004). A second benefit of distance functions – compared to cost 
functions in particular – is that they render unnecessary the use of input prices. Concerning cost of 
capital, this is advantageous in particular, since the estimation or calculation of cost of capital tends to 
a general problem in economics and finance.77  
To model electricity distribution utilities’ production technology, we specify the input and output 
variables for the stochastic frontier model following Growitsch, Jamasb, and Pollitt (2005). We 
introduce total expenditures (C) as a single input in monetary terms, which is defined as the sum of 
operation and maintenance cost (OPEX) and the capital expenditure (CAPEX). With regard to outputs, 
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 In a more simple approach, Growitsch and Hess (2008) tested the sensitivity by means of a slightly larger US dataset.  
76
 The standard approach to simulation estimation is by means of random draws from the specified distribution. The 
drawback of this is that a large number of draws going often along with time consuming computation is required in order to 
achieve appropriate results. Fortunately, a Halton sequence of draws is often equally effective than a random sequence but 
needs only 10% of the number of draws.  
77
 See for instance Fama and French (1999) for a discussion of this topic. 
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we use energy supplied (YE) and the number of customers (YNC). Although both outputs form one joint 
service in electricity distribution, they can be treated separately, as they drive different costs (fixed 
versus variable) and are marketed individually – at least to a certain extent. As mentioned above, the 
structural variable (Z) describes the share of residential of total sales. It is not likely that this variable 
depends on the quantities of the outputs because it describes the customer structure in the operating 
area independently from the electricity demand and the population. We adopt a Translog functional 
form with variables corrected by their sample means for the distance function but do not incorporate 
the structural variable in the Translog formulation due to the reason above. The function can be 
written as: 
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with i=1,…,N and t=1,…,T, where subscripts i denotes the individual company and t the 
corresponding year. α are unknown parameters to be estimated and rit is the total residual (Coelli, 
2000). It can be decomposed into the company-specific component αi and into a time and observation 
varying term εit. We estimate all three models based on this specification. Differences among the 
models’ estimation results occur due to different distributional assumptions concerning the company 
specific and the time component as well as the estimation procedure for the efficiency scores. The 
different assumptions applied to a distance function are the same as for a production frontier that are 
already shown in Table 3.2. The efficiency scores are bounded between zero and unity; a value of one 
indicating relative efficiency. We apply the models on a panel dataset of 108 US IOUs the period 
1994-2005, as described in section 5.5. 
5.6.3 Estimation Results 
Table 5.6 presents the parameter estimates for the random effects GLS model of Schmidt and Sickles 
(1984) (Model I), the MLE random effects frontier model of Pitt and Lee (1981) (Model II), and the 
true random effects frontier model of Greene (2005) (Model III). The results show almost all 
coefficients to be highly significant and to have the expected signs.78 In addition, the estimation 
outcome supports the findings of Farsi, Filippini, and Greene (2006) of quite similar estimated 
coefficients across the considered models. Only the GLS model suggests production elasticities of the 
number of customers being low compared to the other models.  
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 Note that in our distance functions setting, the first order coefficients satisfy the monotonicity requirements and can be 
interpreted as partial production elasticities with regard to output. See Appendix B for a technical proof of the mean 
correction in a cost frontier framework. 
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Table 5.6: Distance Function Parameters: Panel Data (1994-2005) 
Coefficient  Model I 
GLS 
Model II 
MLE 
Model III 
True RE 
β Estimate Estimate Estimate 
YE -0.226
(0.049)
*** -0.325
(0.033)
*** -0.312
(0.009)
*** 
YNC -0.725
(0.055)
*** -0.624
(0.034)
*** -0.618
(0.009)
*** 
YEE 0.083
(0.029)
*** 0.076
(0.027)
*** 0.085
(0.009)
*** 
YNCNC -0.155
(0.053)
*** -0.134
(0.028)
*** -0.147
(0.012)
*** 
YE_NC 0.032
(0.037)
 0.033
(0.024)
 0.029
(0.010) 
*** 
Z -0.158
(0.056)
*** -0.263
(0.040)
*** -0.247
(0.011)
*** 
t -0.032
(0.001)
*** -0.031
(0.001)
*** -0.031
(0.000)
*** 
constant β0 0.274
(0.026)
*** 0.587
(0.024)
*** 0.378
(0.004)
*** 
    
σα (normal) – – 0.173 
σu (half-normal) – 0.527 0.138 
σv (normal) – 0.069 0.104 
Significance on 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level: *, **, ***; standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
A summary of the model-specific efficiency estimates is shown in Table 5.7. Interestingly, the mean 
efficiency scores differ notably between all three models. This contrasts – at least partly – the findings 
of Farsi, Filippini, and Greene (2006) of similar efficiency distribution between the GLS and MLE 
models. As expected, the true random effects model shows not only a substantially higher average 
efficiency scores but also a smaller variation of the individual efficiencies. By separating (time 
variant) inefficiency and company-specific unobserved heterogeneity, the true random effects 
estimator identifies productivity disadvantages beyond managerial control. Therefore, the other 
models that do not account for these effects tend to underestimate efficiency.  
 
Table 5.7: Summary of Efficiency Measures 
 
Model I 
GLS 
Model II 
MLE 
Model III 
True RE 
Mean 0.436 0.651 0.877 
Median 0.411 0.655 0.911 
Min 0.089 0.318 0.513 
Max 1.000 0.993 0.987 
95th percentile 0.822 0.974 0.976 
Source: Own calculations.  
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To analyze the different estimation results in more detail, we computed Pearson correlation 
coefficients between the model estimates as well as the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. 
Despite the significant differences of efficiency measures among the models, the correlations between 
the inefficiencies are significant with values between 59% and 80%. Moreover, the correlation 
between the ranks is significant and even higher with coefficients lying in the band width of 67% and 
89%, especially the correlation of the true random effects model improves notably. These outcomes 
contradict also the results of Farsi, Filippini, and Greene (2006) who found that the efficiency 
estimates of the true random effects model did not correlate much with the other models. A possible 
explanation might be the relative small sample covering a period of only nine years and 59 companies 
in their application or structural differences between Switzerland and the US.  
5.6.4 Conclusions 
Previous applications of different benchmarking techniques, both in academica and regulation 
practice, have shown substantial differences among the models’ results. These experiences provoked 
serious concerns about the sensitivity of efficiency measurement methods and the related policy 
recommendations. Especially for network industries, where efficiency estimates are used to derive 
company specific productivity targets, the problem is of major economic importance.  
In this paper, we applied different parametric SFA panel data models to analyze the sensitivity of 
efficiency scores of a dataset consisting of 108 US electricity distribution utilities. Following Farsi, 
Filippini, and Greene (2006), we compared the results of three different stochastic frontier models, 
namely the random effects GLS model of Schmidt and Sickles (1984), the MLE random effects model 
of Pitt and Lee (1981), and the true random effects model of Greene (2005). However, to refrain from 
limiting – and for regulated industries somewhat unrealistic – behavioral assumptions inherent in cost 
function approaches (as profit maximization or cost minimization), we applied a distance function 
approach. Analogous to previous research, we found substantially higher efficiency scores for the 
Greene model, indicating that the other formulations underestimate companies’ efficiency due to an 
insufficient consideration of company specific heterogeneity. In contrast to other studies, the 
efficiency estimates in our paper do not differ considerably in form of correlation. As the distance 
function’s coefficients are however rather similar to the cost function’s results of Farsi, Filippini, and 
Greene (2006), we suggest that efficiency estimates are more sensitive to the underlying data set than 
to the assumptions about the inefficiency and heterogeneity terms. Nevertheless, the applied 
techniques seem to have only an impact on the level of efficiency, not the ranking. 
Future research should analyze the sensitivity of efficiency estimates for other samples from various 
industries and under different production technology models. Our and prospect findings should be 
taken into account in the further development of incentive-based regulation mechanisms. 
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5.7 Evaluating Gains from Mergers in the Electricity Industry 
5.7.1 Introduction 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, the US experienced a substantial merger wave in the electricity industry 
that resulted in more than 70 mergers (Kwoka and Pollitt, 2005). During the same period, the 
European Union experienced its own electricity industry consolidation.79 This notable reconstructing 
of the electricity industry seems to have different sources. One argument, stated by Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990) amongst others, is that mergers can increase the companies’ efficiency due to economies of 
scale and scope and customer can benefit from mergers by decreasing prices but evidence of the 
phenomenon of these mergers so far is scarce. 
As shown in section 5.4, there exist two streams of applied techniques (average approach and DEA) 
that have been applied to US electricity DSOs but both have their drawbacks. First, the average-based 
techniques do not explicitly consider the boundaries of the cost or production function, the 
deterministic frontier approach does not regard stochastic errors. Second, the two stage procedure used 
in Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007) is subject to an inconsistency problem well discussed in the 
literature, e.g. by Simar and Wilson (2007) which developed a model to overcome this problem. 
Additionally, most of the studies estimated technical efficiency instead of cost efficiency that appears 
to be a better measure because it contains information about the technical and the allocative efficiency 
of a company.  
The objective of this application is to deal with these drawbacks by proving a fresh approach to 
investigate and evaluate gains of realized merger by applying the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
to fundamental data of US electricity distributors in the context of M&A. The rest of the study 
proceeds as follows: section 5.7.2 describes the methodology and the model specification briefly that 
are applied on the dataset described above in section 5.5. The empirical results are given in section 
5.7.3 and section 5.7.4 offers conclusions and suggestions for future research.80 
5.7.2 Methodology 
The parametric SFA in a cost frontier framework with input-orientation is applied on panel data to 
allow for random unobserved heterogeneity among the different distributors, but it lacks a 
specification of a functional form of a minimum cost function. This paper uses a functional approach 
for panel data set that is developed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and further extended by Battese and Coelli 
(1995), as introduced in section 3.4.2.3, because this one-step approach does not only consider a 
minimum cost boundary (frontier) by differentiating random noise from inefficiency but also assesses 
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 See Codognet et al. (2003) and Lévêque and Monturus (2007) for a detailed survey of European M&A activities within the 
energy sector. 
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 In the present and the next analysis we focus on evaluating business strategies. Although, there is software available that 
are able to model inefficiency changes by environmental factors, such as business strategies, as well as unobserved 
heterogeneity, calculations with existing models have not resulted in appropriate outcomes. Therefore, we concentrate only 
on observed heterogeneity that can be easily controlled for by incorporating structural variables.  
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the impact of mergers on the inefficiency simultaneously and thus, is not prone to an inconsistency 
problem.  
We consider that the distribution utilities are operating in a given network with the objective to deliver 
electricity to an exogenously defined area. Therefore, they transform capital and labor into outputs; 
our study’s outputs are the amount of electricity delivered and the total number of connected 
customers. The heterogeneity of different service areas is often defined by additional network 
characteristics. We control for this by using the share of residential sales on total sales, as explained 
above. We expect a distributor to have higher costs when it serves mainly residential customers that is 
indicated by a higher value of the variable. In addition, we use a time trend t to assess the 
technological change for the entire electricity distribution industry.  
A transcendental logarithmic (Translog) function is generally chosen for estimating the cost frontier 
because its flexible form places no restrictions on the elasticity of substitution at the outset and it 
allows economies of scale to differ with the level of output. The variables used are mean corrected due 
to the advantages of reduced effects of outliers without affecting the data structure and the convenient 
interpretation of first order coefficients as elasticities at sample means (Coelli et al., 2003).81 The total 
cost function can be written as: 
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where Cit displays the observed total costs and the output variable Ym represent the two outputs, the 
quantity of electricity delivered (YE) and the number of customers and (YNC) respectively, WK and WL 
are the input price variables of capital and labor respectively, Zit is the share of residential sales on 
total sales, t displays the time trend, and β are the coefficients to be estimated. The linear homogeneity 
condition is imposed by normalizing the costs and the capital price by the labor price WL.  
We are also interested in the effects of M&As on the company’s cost efficiency. Our two models used 
consist of the common cost frontier (19) but differ by the structural variables introduced for the merger 
analysis. Model 1 adopts the idea of measuring the merger’s time path as proposed by Kwoka and 
Pollitt (2005, 2007). We introduce separate “merger timing” dummies for each year before and after a 
merger differentiated by buyer and target to account for the whole time path of a merger. Model 2 
assesses the overall effect of a merger by means of dummies that do not describe the entire timing of a 
merger but a company’s status instead; this results in a “post-merger” and a “pre-merger” dummy for 
the buyer and the target separately.  
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 See Appendix B for a technical proof of these conditions in a cost frontier framework. 
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Some companies in our data set were involved in more than one merger and thus, we like to 
distinguish total efficiency changes by the first merger (first round) from those of later mergers 
(second round). Therefore we control for second round effects by the dummies “multiple buyer” and 
“multiple target”. All dummies can take a value of zero or unity for each year and company. We can 
now describe the mean of the inefficiency term as: 
               (20) 
where dnit displays the specific merger dummies. The software “FRONTIER 4.1” developed by Coelli 
(1996) is used for calculation purpose. Our empirical analysis is based on parametric SFA on a panel 
dataset of 108 US IOUs the period 1994-2001, as described in section 5.5. 
5.7.3 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the cost function of both models are provided in Table 5.8. All models show 
very similar significant positive coefficients of the outputs and the input prices of the cost function. 
 
Table 5.8: Estimation Results of the Cost Function 
Coefficient Model 1 Model 2 
β Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E. 
constant β0 -0.40*** 0.02 -0.41*** 0.02 
YE 0.18*** 0.02 0.18*** 0.02 
YNC 0.82*** 0.02 0.82*** 0.02 
WK 0.75*** 0.02 0.76*** 0.02 
YEYE -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
YNCYNC -0.02 0.05 -0.02 0.05 
WKWK  -0.15*** 0.05 -0.13*** 0.05 
YEYNC 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 
YEWK -0.01 0.04 -0.01 0.04 
YNCWK 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.04 
Z 0.23*** 0.02 0.23*** 0.02 
t 0.02*** 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 
σ2 0.07*** 0.01 0.07*** 3.67 
γ= σ2u/σ2 0.97*** 0.01 0.97*** 75.32 
Log Likelihood 207.93  195.58 
Significance on 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level: *, **, ***. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Since total costs and all explanatory variables are in logarithms and normalized by their means, the 
cost elasticities of energy delivered are quite low on average with 0.18; an increase of 1% in customer 
numbers will raise the costs by 0.82%. As expected, the impact of sales to residential customers is 
significantly positive with a value of 0.23%. This indicates that a distributor serving mainly residential 
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customers has a cost disadvantage compared to a DSOs serving mainly non-residential (e.g. industrial) 
customers. Due to the imposed homogeneity, the cost elasticities with respect to input prices are equal 
to their cost shares. Interestingly, we observe a low cost share of capital, ranging from 75% to 76% 
despite the fact that our dataset shows a capital cost share (including non-wage OPEX) of about 85% 
on average; hence, the labor share is about 25%. However, the results support the structure of a high 
capital/labor ratio that is typical for network industries with high capital investments. The coefficient 
of the time trend is significantly positive, which indicates a negative technological change of 2% to 
3% over time testifying that distribution technology has not changed much over time.  
Regarding an overall evaluation of the models, the γ coefficients (measuring the share of the 
deviations from the cost function due to inefficiency) are above 95% that shows clear evidence for the 
existence of inefficiency and thus, preferring a frontier approach than a simple average approach. The 
decision to include a network density variable can be evaluated by a likelihood-ratio test that proofs 
the network density variables to be zero at a given significance level. For both models we can reject 
the null hypothesis at a 99% level in favor of Models 1 and 2 with structural variable included.82 
The estimated coefficients of the environmental variables in the inefficiency equations are shown in 
Table 5.9. The coefficients of the merger dummies are significant only in some portions, but their 
magnitude reveals notable differences among buyer, target companies, and non-merging companies. 
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 In addition, we tested the assumption of a Cobb Douglas cost function and the specification of a density variable that enter 
the equation only with a first order derivation. Both assumptions could be rejected for both models applying a likelihood-
ratio test on a 99% level. 
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Table 5.9: Estimation Results of the Efficiency Function 
Coefficient Model 1   Coefficient Model 2 
δ Estimate S.E.  δ Estimate S.E. 
constant δ0 0.21*** 0.04  constant δ0 0.20*** 0.04 
Multiple buyer 0.05 0.08  Multiple buyer 0.05 0.08 
Multiple target -0.86*** 0.28  Multiple target -0.89*** 0.29 
Buyer: 7 years before 0.36* 0.19      
Buyer: 6 years before -0.03 0.11      
Buyer: 5 years before 0.14 0.08      
Buyer: 4 years before 0.09 0.08      
Buyer: 3 years before -0.03 0.08      
Buyer: 2 years before 0.00 0.08      
Buyer: 1 year before -0.03 0.08  Buyer: before first merger 0.03 0.06 
Buyer: 1 year after -0.02 0.09  Buyer: since first merger -0.01 0.04 
Buyer: 2 year after 0.08 0.10     
Buyer: 3 years after -0.08 0.14     
Buyer: 4 years after -0.06 0.16     
Buyer: 5 years after -0.13 0.40     
Buyer: 6 years after 0.08 0.34     
Target: 7 years before -0.28 0.32     
Target: 6 years before -0.31* 0.18     
Target: 5 years before 0.01 0.10     
Target: 4 years before -0.03 0.10     
Target: 3 years before -0.02 0.09     
Target: 2 years before 0.03 0.08     
Target: 1 year before 0.09 0.07  Target: before first merger 0.01 0.04 
Target: 1 year after 0.05 0.08  Target: since first merger 0.17*** 0.05 
Target: 2 years after 0.21** 0.09      
Target: 3 years after 0.28** 0.11      
Target: 4 years after 0.36*** 0.12      
Significance on 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level: *, **, ***. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The results of the estimation of the inefficiency function provide at least weak evidence for efficiency 
gains by merging. Although Model 2 does not show significant changes in the relevant buyer dummies 
before and after merging, Model 1 provide more clearly by a significant dummy that prior to the 
merger, the buyer is less inefficient compared to the non-merging utilities indicated by a positive sign 
of a dummy but it can reduce the inefficiency in the post-merger period bringing it to an average level 
similar to that of the control group. Hence, Models 1 supports slightly the finding of an efficiency gain 
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by merging for the buyer.83 The fact that a company was buying more than one company appears to 
have no significant effect on inefficiency.  
On the other hand, we have more clear evidence for the acquired companies: In the pre-merging 
period the target companies are good cost performers which is shown by the significant negative 
dummy in Model 1 that indicates lower cost inefficiency than the control group. In the post-merger 
period the target companies experience a significant boost in terms of cost inefficiency, becoming a 
relative bad cost performer: Almost all relevant dummies become significant and turned positive and 
Model 1 indicates an acceleration of this trend by widening the gap to the control group starting with 
0.21 in the second year to 0.36 in the fourth post-merger year.84 The estimation results also show that 
target companies that are involved in more than one merger are generally very good performer as it 
can be seen by the significantly negative multiple target dummy. As a first conclusion, we can state 
that buying companies appear to gain or at least show no worsening in terms of cost efficiency 
whereas the target companies loose efficiency by merging.  
Table 5.10 gives a summary of the actual inefficiency estimates with very similar results for both 
models: The pair-wise correlation as well as the rank order correlation between the inefficiency 
estimates from our both models is of over 99%. The inefficiency measures can be interpreted as excess 
costs measured by the ratio of actual costs to efficient cost. The value can be equal or greater than one 
where a value of one indicates cost-efficient companies. The mean inefficiency shows excess costs of 
about 40%. The quite small positive difference between mean and median, as well as the  
95 percentile value suggest that there are only a few very inefficient companies with a maximum value 
across all models of about 400%. The efficiency trend between buyers and targets can also be seen 
here but much more clearly. The average buyer’s inefficiency is slightly declining whereas the average 
targets inefficiency is increasing notably by merging.  
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 We are aware of the fact that the significance of only one dummy especially seven years before the merger does not 
provide strong evidence for merger gains for the buyer but rather weak evidence. We therefore suggest further research 
concerning this topic. 
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 The values displayed can not by interpreted directly, similar to Tobit or Probit regressions. The values indicate the 
influence on the mode, i.e. the underlying distribution and the efficiency is estimated only as expected value given that 
distribution. However, the signs and the values can be used to derive information about the direction and the relative strength 
of the impact. 
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Table 5.10: Summary of Inefficiency Measures  
Group Statistics Model 1 Model 2 
Sample average 
(864 obs) 
Mean 1.392 1.392 
Median 1.334 1.336 
Minimum 1.018 1.018 
Maximum 4.332 4.317 
95th%percentile 1.971 1.968 
Buyer 
(208 obs) 
Mean: Pre-merger 1.441 2.286 
Mean: Post-merger 1.371 1.941 
Target 
(208 obs) 
Mean: Pre-merger 1.371 2.033 
Mean: Post-merger 1.503 2.419 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
Recalling the argument of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) that economies of scale (ES) are a driving force 
for welfare-enhancing mergers, we investigate the scale effects of the merging parties following the 
concept described in section 2.4. As seen in Table 5.11, we find ES on average of 1.00 indicating that 
on average there are no economies of scale existing in the industry. Interestingly, the merging parties 
almost always face slightly different scale effects than the average distributor. Both merging parties 
can increase their ES by merging. However, the average buyer can increase its ES to a larger degree 
than the targets. A better exploitation of scale effects appears to be an explanation for the efficiency 
shift for the buyer at least partially but not for the target form. Thus, technical and/or allocative 
efficiency might be the drivers for the target’s efficiency change.85 
 
Table 5.11: Economies of Scale Estimates for the Median Company 
Group Period Model 1 Model 2 
Buyer 
(208 obs) 
Pre-merger 0.992 0.985 
Post-merger 1.011 1.022 
Target 
(208 obs) 
Pre-merger 0.996 0.992 
Post-merger 1.003 1.006 
Control Group (488 obs) 8 years 1.001 1.001 
Sample average (864 obs) 8 years 1.000 1.000 
Source: Own calculations.  
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 We also calculated DEA and Tobit regressions as suggested by Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007) on the data sample and 
reveal that changes in technical efficiency cause the non-synchronous efficiency effects of mergers while post-merger 
changes in allocative efficiency favor targets rather than buyers. 
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5.7.4 Conclusion 
In this analysis we have analyzed the effects of mergers on the efficiency of the merging utilities 
within a fresh approach of parametric SFA applied on a panel dataset of 108 IOUs from the US for the 
years 1994-2001. Cost efficiency and merger effects on efficiency are estimated simultaneously in a 
one-stage procedure following Battese and Coelli (1995).  
The estimation results of the cost function show low cost elasticities of about 18% with respect to the 
electricity delivered and cost elasticities of about 80% of the output ‘number of customers’. These 
findings as well as a positive coefficient for residential sales intensity are in line with existent 
literature revealing first, the customer number to be the major cost driver and second, residential sales 
are more costly compared to industrial sales. 
The results of our efficiency analysis indicate that mergers change the efficiencies of the merging 
parties significantly. As there is one significantly positive coefficient for the buyer prior to a merger 
we can state that the average buyer was a good cost performer whereas the target companies appear to 
be average cost performers in the pre-merger period (similar inefficient compared to the control group 
of non-merging utilities). Post-merger, a diverging trend can be observed. On the one hand, the mean 
buyer experienced a gained efficiency becoming an average performer, whereas on the other hand, the 
mean target company lost efficiency, thus becoming a bad cost performer. Though, the overall effect 
of the merged company remains ambiguous. We cannot confirm the overall cost savings of a merger, 
nor their magnitude, but we can state that economies of scale appear to be relevant for buyers’ 
efficiency gain but irrelevant for the targets’ efficiency loss. 
Post-merger improvements suggest that the new holding company shifts best-practice technology and 
processes from target companies to buyers. The parametric approach we applied does not allow 
investigating the channels by which efficiencies can be transferred from one company to another, and 
in particular why target companies’ efficiency decreases. In addition to the implementation of more 
structural parameters to improve the cost function, such as transformer capacity, line length, and 
quality, future research might include: Additional evidence for efficiency gains for the buyers; 
decomposing cost inefficiency into technical and allocative components to reveal the sources of the 
inefficiency; and examining the rise in convergence mergers (combining electricity and natural gas) to 
analyze economies of scope.  
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5.8 Evaluating Business Strategies in the Natural Gas Industry 
5.8.1 Introduction  
Since the early 1990s, the US natural gas sector has been characterized by substantial industry 
restructuring as a result of regulatory requirements following a liberalization objective, as outlined in 
section 5.3. Accordingly, companies have chosen different strategies as a reaction towards regulatory 
constraints, such as acquisitions, forming holding companies, or joint venture investments.  
Although there is a bulk of empirical literature that is often related to the regulation of gas companies, 
the focus of these studies lies mainly with the efficiency assessment of gas distribution or transmission 
companies.  
In order to contribute findings on the success of business strategies driven by the regulatory 
framework, we are going to provide first evidence for the impact of business strategies on a 
company’s efficiency within the gas transmission business. First, we evaluate the production process 
of gas transportation and second, the impact of different strategies on a company’s efficiency.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 5.8.2 briefly describes the methodology 
used and the specified models. The empirical results are given in section 5.8.3. The main conclusions 
and implications for future research are provided in section 5.8.4. 
5.8.2 Methodology 
This section describes the measurement of technical efficiency by using parametric SFA on panel data 
and our assessment of the effects of different business strategies on efficiency following the model of 
Battese and Coelli (1995), which was introduced in section 3.4.2.3. 
We account for the fact that gas transmission companies operate in a given network with the objective 
to transport gas to an exogenously defined area. Therefore, they transform capital and labor into 
outputs; our study’s output is the total revenue and the inputs are the total transmission assets and the 
total OPEX in order to approximate capital and labor expenses, respectively. Although our variables 
are very much in line with previous studies and they appear to show a high level of data accuracy due 
to their monetary measures we have to account for some kind of heterogeneity within the network 
operated. The reason for doing so is that average costs are decreasing in relation to the diameter of a 
pipeline (International Energy Agency (IEA), 1994) and we can conclude that companies have cost 
advantages in the case of operating pipelines with a high diameter. Therefore, network capacity 
approximated by using peak delivery is used as a structural variable. In addition, we use a dummy for 
offshore pipelines to consider higher investment costs and therefore a higher asset base for 
transporting gas offshore. Generally, the higher investment should be reflected by the offshore 
transmission charges and revenues and thus we test for an impact of operating offshore that is not 
passed through to the charges by means of an offshore dummy. A time trend t is included to assess the 
technological change for the entire gas transportation industry.  
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In this application, a Cobb-Douglas form of a production function is chosen mainly due to the high 
number of variables required by a Translog form. Given our rather small data set a Translog form 
would decrease the degrees of freedom remarkably and hence, the significance of our estimation. 
Another problem associated with the high number of variables of a Translog function is the potential 
problem with near-multicollinearity between the variables. The production frontier can be written as: 
itittl llk kkit
vutZXY
itit
+−+++= ∑∑ ββαα lnlnln 0         (21) 
where Y is the output, Xk is the k-th input, and the structural variable Zl enters the equation to eliminate 
observed heterogeneity in the underlying production technology. t is a time trend and αk and βl are the 
corresponding coefficients to be estimated.  
The four models used by us all consist of the common production frontier (21) but differ in the 
structural variables introduced for the analysis of business strategies within a consolidated industry. 
Model “Acquisition A” adopts the idea of measuring the time path of an acquired pipeline operator as 
proposed by Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, 2007). We introduce separate “acquisition timing” dummies for 
each year before and after an acquisition to account for the whole time path of a merger. Model 
“Acquisition B” assesses the overall effect of a merger by means of dummies that do not describe the 
entire timing of a merger but a company’s status instead; this results in a “post-acquisition” and a 
“pre- acquisition” dummy for the acquired company. Hence, both models capture the idea shown in 
the last analysis of the electricity sector. Model “Holding” accounts for being controlled by a parent 
holding company by introducing dummies for thirteen different holding companies and we expect a 
pipeline being organized within a holding to be more efficient because of learning or synergy effects 
within the holding. The Model “Joint Venture” focuses on a situation where a pipeline is controlled by 
at least two companies and we expect a company to be less efficient due to the difficulties associated 
with balancing different companies’ interests in the pipeline. All dummies can take a value of zero or 
unity for each year and company. For the purpose of calculation, we use the software “FRONTIER 
4.1” developed by Coelli (1996). Our empirical analysis is based on parametric SFA on a panel data 
set of 47 US interstate pipeline companies for the period 1996-2005, as described in section 5.5.  
 
5.8.3 Estimation Results 
The estimation results of the production function for all four models are given in Table 5.12. All 
models show positive and highly significant input coefficients and highly significant coefficients for 
the environmental variables and the time trend. Furthermore, the coefficients do not differ very much, 
which indicates that the models do not depend on the underlying distributional assumptions of the 
inefficiency term and the stochastic error.  
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Table 5.12: Estimation Results of the Production Function 
Coefficient Model Acquisition A Model Acquisition B Model Holding Model Joint Venture 
α, β Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
constant α0 
0.15
(0.22) 
0.14 
(0.19) 
0.53
(0.22)
*** 0.20
(0.22)
 
XOPEX 0.14
(0.02)
*** 0.13 
(0.01) 
*** 0.11
(0.01)
*** 0.11
(0.01)
*** 
XASSETS 0.73
(0.02)
*** 0.73 
(0.02) 
*** 0.72
(0.02)
*** 0.74
(0.02)
*** 
ZPEAK 0.12
(0.02)
*** 0.12 
(0.02) 
*** 0.13
(0.02)
*** 0.12
(0.02)
*** 
ZOFFSHORE -0.64
(0.05)
*** -0.68 
(0.04) 
*** -0.79
(0.06)
*** -0.72
(0.05)
*** 
t -0.03
(0.00)
*** -0.03 
(0.00) 
*** -0.03
(0.00)
*** -0.03
(0.00)
*** 
σ2 
2.18
(0.71)
*** 3.09 
(1.27) 
*** 2.18
(0.71)
*** 4.14
(1.69)
*** 
γ= σ2u/σ2 
0.99
(0.04)
*** 0.99 
(0.00) 
*** 0.97
(0.01)
*** 0.99
(0.00)
*** 
Log Likelihood -61.63 -65.57 -32.13 -63.97 
Significance on 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level: *, **, ***; standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
As the input coefficients in a Cobb-Douglas production function given in logs can be interpreted as 
input elasticities of the output, we observe input elasticities of the transmission assets of about 73% 
and of the labor-related OPEX of between 11% and 14%. An increase in the asset base of 1% thus 
leads to an increase in the revenues of 0.73%. This indicates the well-known capital intensity of 
natural gas transportation. In addition, revenues increase with pipeline capacity, which can be seen 
from the positive coefficient of peak delivery. Interestingly, our results show that operating offshore 
will reduce the revenues and therefore we conclude that not all additional costs are passed-through 
into the transmission charges. The time dummy is negative, which suggests decreasing revenues by 
3% per year, although the demand for natural gas is increasing over the sample period. This effect 
might be explained by strong requirements to decrease charges associated with approvals of 
acquisitions within the industry. Antitrust agencies often use that policy instrument to ensure that 
customers share the gains from acquisitions by decreasing gas prices.  
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Table 5.13: Estimation Results of the Efficiency Function 
Model Acquisition A Model Acquisition B Model Holding Model Joint Venture 
Coeff. Estimate 
 
Coeff. Estimate Coeff. Estimate Coeff. Estimate Coeff. Estimate 
constant 
δ0 
-9.72
(3.47)
***     constant δ0 -14.40
(6.16)
** constant  
δ0 
-2.06
(0.53)
*** constant  
δ0 
-16.69 
(7.19) 
** 
PRE-ACQUISITION  POST-ACQUISITION Pre-
acquisition 
5.09
(2.00)
** El Paso -0.76
(0.25)
*** Joint Venture 9.22 
(3.68) 
** 
9 years 
before 
5.33
(1.91)
***  9 years 
after 
3.39 
(1.28) 
*** Post-
acquisition 
4.00
(1.49)
*** Williams -4.60
(1.28)
***    
8 years 
before 
-2.37
(1.42)
*  8 years 
after 
0.39 
(1.00) 
   Kinder-
Morgan 
0.99
(0.23)
***    
7 years 
before 
-0.28
(0.90)
  7 years 
after 
1.33 
(0.95) 
    Spectra/ 
Duke 
-1.38
(0.87)
    
6 years 
before 
4.54
(1.52)
***  6 years 
after 
2.92 
(1.12) 
***    Questar 2.24
(0.38)
***    
5 years 
before 
1.38
(0.59)
**  5 years 
after 
2.56 
(0.88) 
***    Coastal 0.14
(0.37)
    
4 years 
before 
2.82
(0.96)
***  4 years 
after 
3.24 
(0.99) 
***    Enron -3.94
(1.34)
***    
3 years 
before 
3.43
(1.09)
***  3 years 
after 
2.39 
(0.81) 
***    Oneok -0.68
(0.69)
    
2 years 
before 
2.92
(0.98)
***  2 years 
after 
1.95 
(0.66) 
***    Centerpoint 1.19
(0.30)
***    
1 year 
before 
2.60
(0.84)
***  1 year  
after 
2.18
(0.67)
***    Chevron -3.57
(1.21)
***    
          Southern 
Union 
-0.33
(0.67)
    
          Transcanada 0.07
(0.94)
    
          NiSource -0.41
(0.79)
    
Significance on 10%-, 5%-, and 1%-level: *, **, ***; standard errors in parentheses. 
Source: Own calculations.  
 
The results of our analysis of the impact of business strategies are provided in Table 5.13. Model 
Acquisition A captures the entire time path of an acquisition starting nine years before and ending nine 
years after an acquisition. Results show mainly positive and highly significant coefficients describing 
the impact on inefficiency that is denoted by u in our model. The acquired companies thus appear to 
be less efficient than the control group of companies without a change in shareholders. We cannot 
observe a structural difference between the pre-acquisition and the post-acquisition period and 
therefore, we look at the results of Model Acquisition B, which does not consider the time path but 
rather the entire period before and after an acquisition.  
The construction of the two dummies used leads to a weighting by the year of the acquisitions; early 
acquisitions enter the pre-merger dummy more often, so do the later acquisitions within the post-
acquisitions dummy. Both coefficients are positive and significant but the influence on inefficiency in 
the post-acquisitions period is slightly smaller (5.09 compared to 4.00). This indicates that merged 
pipeline operators are still less efficient than non-acquired companies, but there is weak evidence that 
the technical efficiency increases by acquisition. 
Model Holding captures the effects of parent holding companies on the efficiency of their subsidiaries. 
The results show a heterogeneous picture of inefficiency effects: most of the coefficients are highly 
significant but the different signs of the coefficients indicate some holdings to be more and others to 
be less efficient than those companies not organized under the umbrella of a parent company. For 
instance, both El Paso and Kinder-Morgan were very active in the form of acquiring companies within 
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our covered period, but only El Paso appears to have exploited some forms of learning or synergy 
effects leading to a structural positive impact on efficiency, i.e. a negative coefficient. Another 
interesting finding is the highly negative coefficient of the companies Williams and Chevron, i.e. they 
are quite efficient. A possible explanation can be found in their great experience in the construction 
and operation of oil pipelines.  
The effect of a joint venture on efficiency is analyzed in Model Joint Venture. As expected, the 
corresponding coefficient is positive and significant, and we can conclude that multiple interests 
coming from different shareholders appear to influence the efficiency of a pipeline negatively.  
A descriptive summary of the technical efficiency estimates is given in Table 5.14. The estimates 
represent the level of inputs that are used efficiently or equivalently, the difference to unity is the level 
of inputs that can be reduced in producing a given output. The results suggest a mean efficiency of  
78–80% (median values of 84–86%), which appears to be in line with former findings. For instance, 
the studies of Jamasb et al. (2007), Carrington, Coelli, and Groom (2002), and Sickles and Streitwieser 
(1992) also found a mean efficiency of about 80% of gas TSOs. The efficiency estimates are very 
similar across all models and show a high level of variation as it can be seen by the difference between 
minimum and maximum efficiency scores. High pair-wise Pearson correlation and Spearman rank 
correlation of the efficiency scores (omitted from the paper) with values of above 95% across all 
models support the similar distribution of the estimates.  
 
Table 5.14: Summary of Efficiency Measures  
Statistics Model 
Merger A 
Model 
Merger B 
Model 
Holding 
Model  
Joint Venture 
Mean 0.781 0.785 0.801 0.792 
Median 0.837 0.842 0.855 0.848 
Minimum 0.040 0.040 0.033 0.034 
Maximum 0.963 0.963 0.962 0.959 
95th percentile 0.938 0.941 0.942 0.938 
Source: Own calculations.  
5.8.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have analyzed the effects of different business strategies by using a production 
frontier framework of a sample of 47 natural gas transmission pipelines in the US for the period 1996-
2005. We applied SFA following Battese and Coelli (1995) to assess technical efficiency and the 
strategies’ impact on efficiency in a single step.  
The empirical results are quite stable across all models and suggest a mean technical efficiency of 
about 80% in the gas transmission industry in the US. The results also suggest that offshore pipelines 
show relatively low revenues as compared to onshore pipelines and thus, indicate that the additional 
costs of offshore investment are not fully passed through to the transmission charges. Interestingly, 
total revenues decreased over the covered period despite the gas demand’s increasing at the same time. 
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The results also highlight significant effects of acquisitions, holding structures and joint ventures 
within the industry on the companies’ technical efficiency estimates. Although we cannot find huge 
changes in the companies’ efficiency through an acquisition, there is weak evidence for efficiency 
improvements caused by the new shareholder. The motivation for an acquisition does not appear to be 
an increase in efficiency; an example can be security of supply of gas-fired plants in the case that the 
acquiring company is also engaged in electricity generation.  
Parent companies by themselves appear not to influence a subsidiary’s efficiency positively, as one 
would expect due to learning effects. The results suggest those holdings to be successful, which have 
great experience in the construction and operation of oil pipelines.  
In the case that companies form a joint venture to construct and operate a gas transportation pipeline, 
the empirical analysis shows a negative impact of such a joint venture on technical efficiency of the 
pipeline company. This can be due to the multiple interests of different shareholders. Interestingly, we 
can observe a trend in the last years of acquisition of outstanding shares in order to exit a joint venture 
that can be seen as support of a non-successful cooperation of companies as it is shown in our 
analysis. 
The approach used in this chapter is limited to assess impacts of prevailing business strategies. 
Therefore, it appears to be interesting to analyze the suggested links between the source of the 
business strategy, such as engagement in other industries (crude oil transportation or electricity 
generation), and the strategy’s impact on efficiency in more detail in further research.  
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter discusses the issues of efficiency and the success of different business strategies within 
the US energy sector. The evidence provided can be used to derive information about business 
strategies in a sector under restructuring. Their success can be used for a valuation of the future 
structure in the German energy industry. The well-defined database provided by the federal energy 
regulator FERC yields to data sets of 108 US electricity DSOs for twelve years (1994-2005), 
respectively for eight years (1994-2001), and to a data set of 47 US gas TSOs covering ten years 
(1996-2005).  
In our third general application, which is the first one for the US, we focused on the DSO data set in 
order to contribute to the discussion of the sensitivity of efficiency estimates by using different 
parametric techniques proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984), and Greene 
(2005). Especially for network industries, where efficiency estimates are used to derive company-
specific productivity targets, the problem is of major economic importance. We specified a distance 
function and, on the one hand, the results are analogous to previous research in form of substantially 
higher efficiency scores for the Greene (2005) model. This involves that the other formulations 
underestimate companies’ efficiency due to an insufficient consideration of company-specific 
heterogeneity. On the other hand, our findings contrast other studies because the efficiency estimates 
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in our analysis do not differ considerably in their correlations. Nevertheless, the applied techniques 
seem to have only an impact on the level of efficiency, not the ranking. 
In our fourth analysis, we tested the argument stated by other scholars that mergers can increase 
efficiency. Therefore, we studied the effects of mergers on the cost efficiency of the merging utilities 
by using a fresh approach of parametric SFA. The results suggested a well-defined specification of the 
cost function and they indicate that mergers change the efficiency of the merging parties significantly. 
On the one hand, the mean buyer experienced gained efficiency and became an average cost 
performer, whereas on the other hand, the mean target company lost efficiency, thus becoming a bad 
cost performer. Though, the overall effect of the merged company remains ambiguous. We cannot 
confirm the overall cost savings of a merger, nor their magnitude, but we can state that economies of 
scale appear to be relevant for buyers’ efficiency gains but irrelevant for the targets’ efficiency losses. 
Post-merger improvements suggest that the new holding company shifts best-practice technology and 
processes from target companies to buyers.  
Our fifth application focused on US natural gas TSOs and extended the last SFA model to the analysis 
of efficiency changes due to acquisitions, joint ventures, and the formation of parent holding 
companies. The results highlighted significant effects of acquisitions, holding structures and joint 
ventures within the industry on the companies’ technical efficiency estimates. Although we could not 
find huge changes in the company’s efficiency by an acquisition, there is weak evidence for efficiency 
improvements caused by the new shareholder. The motivation for an acquisition does not appear to be 
an increase in efficiency; an example can be security of supply of gas-fired plants in the case that the 
acquiring company is also engaged in electricity generation. Parent companies by themselves appeared 
not to influence a subsidiary’s efficiency positively, as one would expect due to learning effects. The 
results suggested those holdings to be successful, which have great experience in the construction and 
operation of oil pipelines. In the case that companies formed a joint venture to construct and operate a 
gas transportation pipeline, the empirical analysis showed a negative impact of such a joint venture on 
the technical efficiency of the pipeline company. Interestingly, we can observe a trend in the last years 
of acquisition of outstanding shares in order to exit a joint venture that can be seen as support of a non-
successful cooperation of companies as it is shown in our analysis. 
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
Over the last 20 years, energy sector reforms have been transforming the structure and operating 
environment of the energy industries in many countries all around the world. The major objective of 
these reforms is to liberalize the industry and to encourage regulation in the network segments, i.e. the 
distribution and transmission system operators. Germany is following this tradition, such as in the US, 
by implementing an incentive-based regulation scheme by 2009. Incentive regulation generally 
decouples revenues and costs in order to provide incentives for cost reductions to the regulated natural 
monopoly. 
The proposed scheme will in a first step introduce revenue caps to bring companies’ inefficient cost 
base to an efficient level and then introduces yardstick competition among the efficient companies. 
The company-specific inefficiency levels are the result of the former cost-based regulation scheme 
that set no incentives to the regulated companies to operate at minimum costs. This was due to the fact 
that all costs were allowed to be recovered by tariff-setting. In order to estimate the inefficiency level 
and transform it into an X-factor of performance improvement per year, the German federal energy 
regulator BNetzA will make use of parametric SFA and non-parametric DEA and therefore, this thesis 
was mainly dealing with these techniques. 
Although the German regulatory framework appears to be well-defined because it draws from 
international experience and eliminates several present drawbacks existing with revenue-cap 
regulation doubts of industry and politicians concerning the application of benchmarking techniques 
and more importantly, the future industry structure, remain. The regulation scheme is based on 
experience with energy sector reforms in the US due to it being a precursor in this regard, e.g. by 
introducing incentive-based regulation as early as 1994 and publishing the relevant data in a very 
detailed way. This thesis therefore brings together the two issues of certain efficiency measurement 
problems and the industry restructuring in Germany and the US.  
In Chapter 2 an introduction to the analytical foundations of the benchmarking approaches for 
measuring efficiency was given. As efficiency is always measured in relation to a benchmark, the 
relevant single-output production frontier, the multiple-output distance function, and the cost frontier 
associated with different types of efficiency were shown. Cost efficiency in this regard can be 
calculated as minimum or frontier costs over observed costs and it can generally arise from an 
inefficient use of the production technology (technical inefficiency) or the inefficient input mix 
(allocative inefficiency). In addition, in a parametric setting, the concept of economies of scale can be 
used to analyze if a company is operating at the optimal scale. 
The following chapter discusses several approaches generally used for benchmarking companies and a 
detailed description of the two methods DEA and SFA, which are mainly relevant for our empirical 
analyses. In addition, the models used for estimating potential gains from mergers, addressing the 
issue of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), and for evaluating the success of observed business strategies, 
addressing the topic of Antoniou, Arbour, and Zhao (2006), are introduced. These are later applied for 
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our empirical instigation of efficiency and restructuring in regulated energy networks that constitute 
the heart of the whole study.  
In Chapter 4 we focused on the analysis of efficiency and restructuring in Germany against the 
background of the introduction of incentive regulation in 2009. The empirical analyses of both 
applications are based on a cross-sectional data set of German electricity DSOs. As mentioned above, 
the related efficiency increase of inefficient companies can be realized via direct cost cuts or by 
utilizing scale and synergy effects from mergers. 
In our first application we provided additional evidence concerning the discussion of comparability of 
German DSOs for benchmarking purposes. We therefore tested the robustness of the structural 
differences of technical efficiency scores between East German and West German electricity 
distribution companies found by Hirschhausen, Cullmann, and Kappeler (2006). In this study we can 
confirm the former findings that the East German DSOs are structurally better off on average than the 
mean West German DSOs in terms of technical efficiency, at least for the DEA models. As a 
consequence, the regulator should apply intensive proofs based on a more detailed data set concerning 
possible structural differences. Possible reasons for the puzzle are the investment boom in the East 
German electricity industry, a less excessive use of labor as compared to West Germany, and a more 
rapid adaptation of best practices.  
In our second German study, we analyzed the potential merger gains among selected electricity 
distribution companies in Germany. Within this framework we evaluated how efficiency levels could 
be improved not only by reducing costs but also by potential scale and synergy effects resulting from 
mergers. Following Bogetoft and Wang (2005), we applied non-parametric DEA to estimate overall 
gains from mergers and to decompose the gains into cost reductions as well as economies of scale and 
synergies from joint operation. Concerning the question to be answered by this study, our results show 
that scale and synergy effects are indeed possible and that in general larger efficiency gains could be 
realized by means of synergy effects than by scale effects. Comparing size with scale and synergy 
clearly shows that potential merger gains by means of scale and synergy advantages could mainly be 
realized within smaller units. 
We then discussed in Chapter 5 the application of parametric benchmarking techniques to panel data 
from the US. As Germany participated from US experience in regulation for the design of the German 
regulatory scheme other experience appears to be also of interest. We expect that certain trends in 
business strategies will also be observed more often in Germany as the incentive-based regulation will 
result in more pressure for cost reduction when implemented in 2009.  
In our third application we focused on US electricity DSOs in order to contribute to the discussion of 
the sensitivity of efficiency estimates by using different parametric techniques proposed by Pitt and 
Lee (1981), Schmidt and Sickles (1984), and Greene (2005), which might be used for German 
benchmarking in the future. We specified a distance function and with regard to the raised question of 
sensitivity the results are, on the one hand, analogous to previous research in the form of substantially 
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higher efficiency scores for the Greene model, indicating that the other formulations underestimate 
companies’ efficiencies due to an insufficient consideration of company-specific heterogeneity. On the 
other hand, our findings contrast other studies because the efficiency estimates in our analysis do not 
differ considerably as regards correlations. Nevertheless, the applied techniques appear to have only 
an impact on the level of efficiency, not the ranking. 
In our fourth analysis, we tested the argument stated by many scholars that mergers can increase 
efficiency. Therefore, we studied the effects of mergers on the cost efficiency of the merging utilities 
by using a fresh approach of parametric SFA. The results suggested a well-defined specification of the 
cost function. Furthermore, they indicate that mergers change the efficiency of the merging parties 
significantly. On the one hand, the mean buyer experienced an improved efficiency through becoming 
an average cost performer, whereas on the other hand, the mean target company lost efficiency, thus 
becoming a bad cost performer. However, the overall effect of the merged company remains 
ambiguous. We cannot confirm the overall cost savings of a merger, nor their magnitude, but we can 
state that economies of scale appear to be relevant for buyers’ efficiency gains but irrelevant for the 
targets’ efficiency losses. Post-merger improvements suggest that the new holding company shifts 
best-practice technology and processes from target companies to buyers.  
The fifth application is the first in this regard that focused on US natural gas TSOs and extended the 
last SFA model to the analysis of efficiency enhancements due to acquisitions, joint ventures, and the 
formation of parent holding companies. The results highlighted significant effects of acquisitions, 
holding structures, and joint ventures within the industry on the companies’ technical efficiency 
estimates. Although we could not find huge changes in the companies’ efficiency through an 
acquisition, there is weak evidence for efficiency improvements caused by the new shareholder. The 
existence of a parent company in itself appeared not to influence a subsidiary’s efficiency positively, 
as one would expect due to learning effects. In the case that companies formed a joint venture to 
construct and operate a gas transportation pipeline, the empirical analysis showed a negative impact of 
such a joint venture on the technical efficiency of the pipeline company. 
This thesis has provided in-depth findings that are, on the one hand, currently very relevant for the 
scientific debate concerning the robustness of efficiency estimates, and, on the other hand, concerning 
the political debate of the future structure of the German energy industry.  
From a scientific point of view this study has resulted in three major findings: 
First, the issue of comparability of companies is important in modeling the production process and 
therefore, the companies’ heterogeneity should be accounted for carefully in cross-section and 
especially in panel data models. This can be done by the choice of input, output, and environmental 
variables as well as of benchmarking techniques with special focus on parametric models for panel 
data. 
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Second, the one-stage parametric benchmarking approach can be used for ex ante analyses of the 
quantitative effects of business strategies on efficiency. This approach mitigates the drawback of two-
stage non-parametric approaches and techniques often applied in financial economics.  
Third, the application of different parametric frontier models for panel data does rather affect the level 
of efficiency but it does not necessarily lead to low correlations of the efficiencies. However, 
efficiency estimates appear to be more sensitive to the underlying data set than to the assumptions 
about the inefficiency and heterogeneity terms. 
In addition, this thesis has shown five major policy implications: 
First, in the light of benchmarking German electricity distributors, there appear to be structural 
differences between East and West German distributors. Therefore, the regulator is supposed to 
consider the heterogeneity within the calculation of X-factors unless it can contrast these findings 
based on a more detailed data set.  
Second, benefits are to be expected by mergers of German electricity DSOs that mainly arise from 
synergy or portfolio but also from scale effects. Antitrust analyses should generally make use of the 
approach applied in order to evaluate quantitative effects from proposed horizontal mergers as a 
support for the decision of approval or refusal of the merger proposed.  
Third, in the US electricity distribution industry, the prevailing business strategy of merging was 
successful only for the buyer and unsuccessful for the target company when it comes to cost 
efficiency. Moreover, economies of scale appear to be relevant for buyers’ efficiency gain but 
irrelevant for the targets’ efficiency loss. The shareholder of a target company should thus address 
decreasing efficiency through higher takeover prices because lower efficiency can lead to more 
restrictive regulation, especially when transferring this finding to German regulation.  
Fourth, the business strategies observed in the US natural gas transmission industry have been 
successful only in parts. Acquisitions are only slightly successful for the acquired company whereas a 
joint venture was not found to be successful in terms of technical efficiency. The formation of holding 
companies appeared to be of success only for companies with great experience in the construction and 
operation of oil pipelines. In this regard, antitrust agencies should provide incentives for horizontal 
concentration, and especially for concentration among industries that can improve efficiency by 
learning effects. 
Fifth, transferring the empirical evidence from the US to the German market, we would expect a 
continued consolidation process especially among DSOs in the German gas and electricity industries, 
but at a greatly increased pace due to the higher cost-reducing incentives caused by incentive-based 
regulation. Therefore, we suggest for the antitrust agencies not to underestimate the gains from these 
horizontal as well as vertical consolidation strategies in their concerns for anti-competitive behavior. 
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A Appendix A 
Table A.1: Mergers in the Electricity Sector Approved by FERC 1995-2001 
Merger status Buyer Target/Acquired/Merged In 
Panel 
 
 
Completed in 
2001 
E.ON AG Powergen plc X 
Potomac Electric Power Company  Conectiv X 
Energy East Corp.  RGS Energy Group  
National Grid USA Niagara Mohawk Holdings, Inc.  X 
The AES Corporation  IPALCO Enterprises, Inc. X 
FirstEnergy Corporation GPU, Inc. X 
Emera Bangor-Hydro Electric Company  X 
 
 
 
 
 
Completed in 
2000 
Entergy Power Marketing Corp. Koch Energy Trading, Inc.  
UtiliCorp United, Inc. St. Joseph Light & Power Company  X 
Carolina Power & Light (CP&L) Energy, Inc.  Florida Progress Corporation  X 
Interstate Power Company  IES Utilities, Inc.   
PowerGen plc  LG&E Energy Corporation  X 
Black Hills Corporation Indeck Capital, Inc. X 
Stora Enso Oyj (F/S) Consolidated Water Power Company   
Consolidated Edison, Inc.  Northeast Utilities  
PECO Energy Co.  Commonwealth Edison Co.  X 
Energy East Corp.  CMP Group, Inc.   
American Electric Power Company  Central and Southwest X 
Northern States Power Co. (Minnesota)  New Century Energies, Inc. X 
 
 
 
Completed in 
1999 
New England Electric System  Eastern Utilities Associates  
BEC Energy Commonwealth Energy System X 
ScottishPower plc PacifiCorp   
National Grid Group plc New England Electric System   
The AES Corporation CILCORP Inc. X 
Sierra Pacific Power Company  Nevada Power Company X 
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, 
Inc. 
Orange and Rockland Utilities, Inc. X 
CalEnergy Company, Inc. MidAmerican Energy Holdings Company   
 
 
Completed in 
1998 
Duke Energy Corporation Nantahala Power and Light Company X 
WPS Resources Corporation  Upper Peninsula Energy Corporation X 
Wisconsin Energy Corporation, Inc. Edison Sault Electric Company X 
Louisville Gas and Electric Company  Kentucky Utilities Company X 
 
 
 
Completed in 
1997 
Wisconsin Power & Light Company IES Utilities, Inc.  
Interstate Power Company  
X 
Ohio Edison Company  Centerior X 
Union Electric Company  Central Illinois Public Service Company  X 
Delmarva Power & Light Company  Atlantic City Electric Com  X 
Destec Energy, Inc. NGC Corporation  
Enova Energy, Inc. San Diego Gas & Electric Company  X 
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company  Potomac Electric Power Company X 
Public Service Company of Colorado  Southwestern Public Service Company  X 
Completed in 
1995 
Delmarva Power & Light Company  Conowingo X 
Source: EIA, 1999, 2000 and FERC’s website. 
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Table A.2: Overview of the Holding Structure in 2007; US Gas Transmission Companies 
Parent/ Pipeline Namea,b Prior Ownershipb Acqui
sition 
Transport  
(Mio dth) 
System 
Capacity 
System 
Mileage 
States in which Pipeline Operates 
Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP (Loews)       
Gulf South Pipeline Co (11) Koch-Entergy 2004 1,015 3,038 6,580 AL, FL, LA, MS, TX, GM 
Texas Gas Transmission Co (18) Williams  2003 2,178 2,979 5,643 AR, IN, KY, LA, MS, OH, TN 
Centerpoint  
(form. Houston Industries) 
      
Mississippi River Transmission Corporation (25) NorAm  1997     
Reliant Energy Gas Transmission Company (31) NorAm 1997 928 3,339 6,182 AR, KS, LA, OK, TX 
Dominion       
Dominion Transmission Co (22) Consolidated Natural Gas Company  1999 1,344 5,734 3,142 PA, MD, NY, OH, VA, WV 
Iroquois Gas Transmission System (110) Consolidated Natural Gas Company  1999     
Cove Point LNG Limited Partnership (127) Williams 
Columbia Energy 
2002 
2000 
    
Dominion South Pipeline, L.P. (196) No Change n/a     
El Paso Corp.       
Tennessee Gas Pipeline (9) Tenneco 1996 1,920 6,686 13,302 AR, KY, LA, MA, NY, OH, PA, TN, TX, WV, GM 
El Paso Natural Gas (33) No Change n/a 4,864 6,152 10,661 AZ, CO, NM, TX 
Southern Natural Gas (7) SONAT Corp 1999 937 3,365 7,671 AL, GA, LA, MS, SC, TN, TX, GM 
Colorado Interstate Gas (32) Coastal Corp 2000 939 3,000 3,996 CO, KS, OK, TX, WY 
Wyoming Interstate (76) Coastal Corp 2000 594 1,997 585 CO, WY 
Mojave Pipeline (92) No Change n/a     
Cheyenne Plains Gas Pipeline (188) No change n/a     
Florida Gas Transmission (34) (50%) SONAT (50%) 
Enron (50%) 
1999 
1986 
757 2,190 4,867 AL, FL, LA, MS, TX, GM 
Enbrige       
Enbridge Pipelines (AlaTenn) (1) Midcoast 2001     
Enbridge Pipelines (Midla) (15) Midcoast 2001     
Enbridge Pipelines (KPC) (166) Midcoast 2001     
Alliance Pipeline (176) (50%) No Change n/a 652 2,053 888 ND, MN, IA, IL 
Vector Pipeline (175) (60%) No change n/a     
Enbridge Pipeline (UTOS) (74)  Midcoast 2001     
Stingray Pipeline Company (69) (50%) Shell 2005     
Mississippi Canyon Gas Pipeline, LLC (134) Shell 2005     
Garden Banks Gas Pipeline L.L.C. (148) Shell (80%) / Ameranda-Hess (20%) 2005     
Nautilus Pipeline Company, L.L.C. (159) (76%) Shell (76%) 2005     
Destin Pipeline Company, L.L.C. (164) (33%) Shell 2005     
Enterprise Products       
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Parent/ Pipeline Namea,b Prior Ownershipb Acqui
sition 
Transport  
(Mio dth) 
System 
Capacity 
System 
Mileage 
States in which Pipeline Operates 
Nautilus Pipeline Company, L.L.C. (159) (24%) El Paso Energy Partners (24%) 2001     
High Island Offshore System, L.L.C. (HIOS) (77) El Paso Energy Partners 2004 234 1,800 212 LA, GM 
Kinder-Morgan       
NGPL (=Natural Gas Pipeline) (26) KN Energy MidCon Corp 1999 
1998 
2,69 4,485 9,111 AR, IA, IL, KS, LA, MO, NE, OK, TX, GM 
Kinder Morgan Interstate Gas Transmission (53) KN Energy 1999     
Trailblazer Pipeline Company (68) Enron (33%) 
Columbia Energy (33%) 
2002 
1999 
    
Horizon Pipeline Co., LLC (178) (50%) No Change n/a     
TransColorado Gas Transmission Company (143) Questar Corp (50%) 
KN (50%) 
El Paso (33%) 
2002 
1999 
1997 
    
MidAmerican Energy Holdings Co       
Kern River Gas Transmission Company (99) Williams 1999 718 1,833 1,680 CA, NV, UT, WY 
Northern Natural Gas Company (59) Dynergy 
Enron  
2002 
2001 
1,195 7,923 15,854 IA, IL, KS, NE, NM, OK, SD, TX, WI, GM 
Nisource       
Columbia Gas Transmission (21) Columbia Energy 2000 3,431 8,700 10,354 DE, PA, MD, KY, NC, NJ, NY, OH, VA, WV 
Columbia Gulf Transmission (70) Columbia Energy 2000 2,041 2,156 4,105 KY, LA, MS, TN, GM 
Crossroads Pipeline (123) No Change n/a     
Granite State Gas Transmission (4) No Change n/a     
ONEOK  
(former Northern Border Partners) 
      
Midwestern Gas Transmission Company (5) El Paso Corp 2001     
Viking Gas Transmission Company (82) Xcel 2003     
Guardian Pipeline, L.L.C. (184) Wisconsin Energy (33%) / WPS (33%) 
Xcel (33%) 
2006 
2003 
    
OkTex Pipeline Company (116) No Change n/a     
Northern Border Pipeline Company (89) (50%) No Change n/a 898 2,496 1,399 IA, IL, IN, MN, MT, ND, SD 
Questar       
Questar Overthrust Pipeline Company (78) Colorado Interstate Gas (10%)  
Enron Corp (18%) 
Tennessee Overthrust Gas Company 
(18%)  
2002 
2000 
1997 
    
Questar Southern Trails Pipeline Company (182) No Change n/a 
    
Questar Pipeline Company (55) No Change n/a 379 2,192 1,745 CO, UT, WY 
Southern Union (SU)       
Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company (28) Panhandle/CMS  
Duke Energy 
2003 
1999 
709 2,840 6,445 IL, IN, KS, MI, MO, OH, OK, TX 
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Parent/ Pipeline Namea,b Prior Ownershipb Acqui
sition 
Transport  
(Mio dth) 
System 
Capacity 
System 
Mileage 
States in which Pipeline Operates 
PanEnergy 1997 
Trunkline Gas Company (30) Panhandle/CMS  
Duke Energy 
PanEnergy 
2003 
1999 
1997 
606 1,680 3,558 AR, IL, IN, KY, LA, MS, OH, TN, TX  
Sea Robin Pipeline Company (6) Panhandle/CMS  
El Paso Corp 
2003 
1999 
    
Trunkline LNG Company (87) Panhandle/CMS  2003     
Southwest Gas Storage (106) Panhandle/CMS  2003     
Florida Gas Transmission (34) (50%) GE (25%) 
Enron (50% to GE and SU 25%/25%) 
2006 
2004 
757 2,190 4,867 AL, FL, LA, MS, TX, GM 
 
Spectra (former gas business of Duke)       
East Tennessee Natural Gas Company (2) El Paso Corp 2000     
Texas Eastern Transmission, LP (17) PanEnergy 1997 1,364 6,523 9,179 AL, AR, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MI, MO, MS, NJ, 
NY, OH, OK, PA, TX, WV, GM 
Algonquin Gas Transmission Company (20) No Change n/a 346 2,174 1,103 CT, MA, NJ, NY, RI 
Gulfstream (179) (50%)  Coastal purchases prior to start in 2001 2001     
Maritimes-Northeast Pipeline, LLC (172) (75%) Westcoast (37.5%) 2002     
Transcanada       
ANR Pipeline (41) El Paso Corp 
Coastal Corp 
2007 
2000 
2,815 6,844 9,616 AR, IA, IL, IN, KS, KY, LA, MI, MO, MS, NE, 
OH, OK, WI, GM 
Gas Transmission Northwest (GTN) (86) Pacific Gas & Electric Co  2004 767 2,636 1,356 ID, OR, WA 
North Baja Pipeline Co (183) Pacific Gas & Electric Co  2004     
Great Lakes Gas Transmission Company (51) 
(53% + 14.6% c) 
El Paso Corp (50%) 
Coastal Corp (50%) 
2007 
2000 
958 2,859 2,115 MI, MN, WI  
Iroquois Gas Transmission System (110) (44.5%) El Paso (16%) to Dominion and TCPL 
Coastal Corp (16%)  
2001 
2000 
    
Northern Border Pipeline Company (89) (15.7% b) ONOEK (20%) to TCPL 2007 898 2,496 1,399 IA, IL, IN, MN, MT, ND, SD 
Williams        
Northwest Pipeline Corporation (37) No Change n/a 700 4,500 4,046 CO, ID, OR, UT, WA, WY 
Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation (29) No Change n/a 3,338 8,161 10,469 AL, GA, LA, MD, MS, NC, NY, SC, TX, VA, GM 
Gulfstream (179) (50%) Coastal purchases prior to start in 2001 2001     
Discovery Pipeline (160) (60%) No Change n/a     
Black Marlin Pipeline (88) Blue Dolphin Energy (50%)  
/ MCN (33%) / MDU Resources (16%) 
Enron  
 
2001 
1999 
    
Note: a: FERC Pipeline Code b: ownership share (if not 100%) is listed in brackets; c: direct and indirect ownership via the joint venture TransCanada PipeLines Limited (TCPL;); information 
about the pipeline characteristics are given only for the 30 largest interstate pipelines (in terms of capacity). The pipeline data refers to the year 2005.  
Source: SEC filings at http://sec.edgar-online.com, EIA (2001); EIA website, (http://www.eia.doe.gov), and several companies’ websites, September 2007. 
101 
 
Table A.3: Variable Definition and Sources; US Electricity Distribution Companies 
Variable Definition FERC Pages FERC Account Name/Notes 
OPEX  Electric Operation 
& Maintenance 
Expenses 
FERC database table 
f1_elc_op_mnt_exp 
D Total Distribution Costs (US$) 322-126b TOTAL Distribution Expenses 
A Total Administration Costs (US$) 322-168b TOTAL Administration 6 General 
Expenses 
Cu Total Customer Service Costs (US$) Sum of 322-134b, 
322-141b, 322-148b 
 
  322-134b TOTAL Customer Accounts Expenses 
  322-141b TOTAL Customer, Service and 
Information Expenses 
  322-148b TOTAL Sales Expenses 
T Total Transmission Costs (US$) 321-100b TOTAL Transmission Expenses 
G+PP Total Power Production Costs (US$) 321-80b TOTAL Production Expenses 
    
Wage 
distribution 
 Distribution of 
Salaries & Wages  
f1_slry_wg_dstrbtn 
S1 Share of Distribution Business in 
Administration 
S1(a) / S1(b)  
    
S1(a) Numerator (wages of distribution and 
customer) 
Sum of 354-20b, 354-
21b, 354-22b, 354-
23b 
 
  354-20b Distribution 
  354-21b Customer Account 
  354-22b Customer Services and Informational  
  354-23b Sales 
S1(b) Denominator (wages) 354-25b TOTAL Operations and Maintenance 
    
Assets  Electric Plant in 
Service 
f1_plant_in_srvce 
S2 Total Distribution Share of EBITDA TDA / TOT  
= DA / (TOT-OA) 
 
DA Distribution Assets (US$) 207-69g TOTAL Distribution Plant 
TA Transmission Assets (US$) 207-53g TOTAL Transmission Plant 
PA Production Assets (US$) 207-42g TOTAL Production Plant 
TOT Total Assets (US$) 207-88g TOTAL Plant in Service  
OA Other Assets (US$) TOT - (DA+TA+PA)  
TDA Total Distribution Assets DA + OA*S2  
    
Revenues  Electric Operation 
Revenues 
f1_electrc_oper_rev 
R Total Revenue (US$) 300-12b TOTAL Sales of Electricity 
Nud Total Units Delivered (MWh) 301-12d TOTAL Unit Sales (MWh) 
Ncu Total Customers (#) 301-12f TOTAL Sales to Consumers (#) 
    
Others    
EBITDA  R-D-Cu-T-(G+PP)-A Earning before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation, Amortization 
CC Capital Costs in Distribution Business S2*EBITDA  
NCC Non-Capital Costs D+Cu+S1*A O&M of Distribution 
TDC Total Distribution Costs CC+NCC  
Temp Total Employees  323-4 TOTAL Employees (#) 
TDemp Total Employees in Distribution S1*Temp  
AvW Average Wages in Distribution (354-25b) / Temp  
LEQ Labor Equivalent O&M Costs NCC / AvW O&M Costs deflated by Labor Costs 
AvCP Average Price of Capital CC / (DA+S2*OA) 
= EBITDA / TOT 
 
Source: Own illustration based on Kwoka and Pollitt (2005, pp. 31-32). 
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Table A.4: Variable Definition and Sources; US Gas Transmission Companies 
Definition FERC Pages (Row number) FERC Account Name / Notes 
 
  
REVENUES (US$) Revenues from Transportation of Gas and 
Others Through Transmission Facilities 
f2_304_rev_gas_trans 
Total operating revenue through 
Transmission (US$) 
304-h  
Total Deliveries (Dth) 520-c (rn 2800) f2_520_nat_gas 
   
OPEX (US$) Gas Operation and Maintenance Expenses f2_317_gas_op_maint 
Total Transmission Opex 323-b (rn 20100) TOTAL Transmission Opex 
Total Transmission Operating Costs 323-b (rn 19100) TOTAL Operation 
Total Transmission Maintenance Costs 323-b (rn 20000) TOTAL Maintenance 
   
ASSETS (US$) Gas Plant in Service f2_204_gas_plant_in_srv 
Transmission Assets 205-g (rn 8600 till 2002; rn 9200 since 2003) TOTAL Transmission Plant 
Mains Assets 205-g (rn 8100 till 2002; rn 8600 since 2003) Mains 
Compressor Stations Assets 205-g (rn 8200 till 2002; rn 8700 since 2003)  Compressor Stations Equipment 
   
TRANSMISSION LINES  f2_514_trans_lines 
Total Miles of Pipe 518-d Line Length (in miles) 
   
OWNERSHIP Control Over Respondent f2_102_crtl_over_resp 
Company Name 102-a Owning company 
% Voting Stock Owned 102-d Share of ownership 
Note: The FERC pages are related to FERC Form No. 2 (12-96) if not otherwise specified. 
Source: Own illustration.  
 
 
 
103 
B Appendix B 
Translog Cost Function 
 
The generalized cost frontier in Translog form using SFA technique is: 
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where total costs are Cit, itmY  represents the m-th of the M outputs, itkW  is the price of the k-th input of K inputs, inefficiency is itu  and itv  represents statistical 
noise. α, β, and δ are the coefficients to be estimated. 
 
For simplicity, let us assume M=K=2 and impose symmetry condition ( nmmn αα =  and lkkl ββ = ) yields: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ititititWYititWYititWYititWYititWWitWW
itWWitWitWititYYitYYitYYitYitYit
vuWYWYWYWYWWW
WWWYYYYYYC
++++++++
++++++++=
22221212212111112121
2
222
2
11122112121
2
222
2
11122110
lnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnlnln
2
1
           
ln
2
1lnlnlnlnln
2
1ln
2
1lnlnln
δδγδββ
βββαααααα
 
 
Condition of homogeneity of degree +1 ( 0,0,1
111
=== ∑∑∑
===
M
m mr
R
r rs
R
r r ititit
γββ ) can be imposed, either by include restrictions in software or divide costs 
and prices by one price: 
 
 
 
 
 
( )( ) () ()MR
104 
Dividing by W1 then yields: 
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Translog can be interpreted in two ways: 
(1) exact representation of cost function 
(2) approximation around a point (often the sample mean as point of approximation is assumed) 
 
(1) exact representation of cost function: 
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Cost elasticity with respect to output Y1 is then given by: 
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If we plug in the mean for each variable Y1, Y2, W1, and W2, than all values in brackets become zero and thus, the first derivative is equal to the elasticity of sample 
means. 
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